JIVATMAN IN THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

BY

ABHAYAKUMAR GUHA, M.A., Ph.D.,

Author of "Soundarjya-Tatwa" in Bengalee, Lecturer, University of Calcutta

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To

The Hon'ble Sir ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE,

Kt., C.S.I., M.A., D.L., D.Sc., Ph.D.,

whose endeavour as an educationist

has been to make the University of Calcutta

worthy of the noble ideals of his

beloved Motherland and to place it on a par

with other progressive Universities

of the world, these pages are

dedicated by one of his

admirers.

PREFACE.

Max Müller in his Preface to the *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* expressed a desire for "a new class of native students who, after studying the history of European philosophy, have devoted themselves to the honourable task of making their own national philosophy better known to the world at large." The present work on "Jivatman in the Brahma-sutras" is an humble attempt on the same line. This is a study on a comparative method of *jivatman* in the Brahma-sutras based on 15 original commentaries (Sankara's *bhashya* and 4 other commentaries of his school, Ramanuja's *bhashya*, Mādhva's *bhashya*, Baladeva's *bhashya*, Sreekantha's *bhashya*, Nimvarka's *bhashya* and one more of his school, Vallabha's *bhashya* and one more *tika* of his school, Vijnana-bhiksu's *bhashya*, and Bhaskara's *bhashya*) and numerous other works philosophical, religious, scientific, and literary of the east and the west to which reference has been made in the body of the work. The Sutras of Bādarāyana contain the quintessence of the Vedanta Philosophy. But scholars have often presented views peculiar to a certain school only arising out of the Sutras, for instance those of Sankara, as Vedantism pure and simple without even referring to the original aphorisms. Such treatment has satisfied few and has not unfrequently been the source of misunderstanding and contention among thinkers interested in Indian philosophy. In order to remove this defect, I have, in the following pages, deemed it proper to discuss the *sutras* themselves

in the light of the commentaries of the different schools and to deduce my conclusions therefrom. The process though somewhat laborious and at times dry, will surely be welcomed by all scholars desirous of accuracy in statement and thought. Among the existing commentators, the great Sankara stands unrivalled for lucidity of expression, but his interpretation of the Sutras has very often appeared to me forced and farfetched. Ramanuja though wanting in clearness of expression, in my opinion, stands unrivalled for cogency of reasoning. Sreekantha has literally followed Ramanuja and has on that account been called a "thief" by one of the commentators.* I have found Baladeva in most cases satisfactory and to the point. Nimvarka is both cogent, succinct, and clear. Madhva and Vallabha are not unfrequently beside the point. Bhaskara and Vijnanabhikshu are not of much original worth. In interpreting the Vedanta-sutras, I have generally followed the interpretation of the Vaishnava schools as represented by Ramanuja, Nimvarka, and Baladeva, and that of Sreekantha, and have very often subjected that of Sankara and his school to criticism often unpalatable. I have laid bare the results Sankara's system leads to, and they are, in my opinion, opposed not only to our revealed Scriptures but to our best traditions and highest aspirations as well. As the subject requires it, I could not help making such unfavourable remarks. I have also pointed

* "शैवस्तु तन्मतस्यैव चौरः शैवो"—पुरुषोत्तममहाराज-कृत ४।४।७ सूत्रटीका

out the difficulties in the method of Hegel and the superiority of the Vedantic method over that of Hegel. The interaction of mind and body as conceived by European thinkers has not appeared to me satisfactory either and so I have placed the Vedantic conception by its side to show its advance upon the fomer. In these and other matters I have very often cited views of eminent scholars who have been found to agree with my own which have, in fact, added strength to the position I have taken up. But I have nowhere sacrificed my own independent views for the sake of authorities however illustrious they might be. The mode of treatment all throughout, I hope, will be found to be entirely new. I do not know of any such attempt either in the east or in the west.

In the *Introduction*, I have shown on evidence, both internal and external, that Bādarāyana and Veda-vyasa are the same person and that the Sutras of Bādarāyana must have been composed prior to Pānini, who flourished about 700 B. C., if not earlier still.

In Chapter I., entitled "Scope and Method of the Vedanta Philosophy as compared with those of Hegel," I have shown that the Vedanta aims at the attainment of true knowledge regarding Brahman—all-intelligent cause of the universe, omniscient and omnipotent, entirely pure and abundantly full of bliss and other qualities unsurpassed in excellence. True knowledge aimed at by the Sutras is not speculative knowledge but direct and immediate knowledge arising out of the vision of Brahman Himself. The Sāstras are the

only guide to Brahman who passes all reasoning. Reasoning, according to Bādarāyana, exercises but a secondary function with regard to His knowledge. As the records of the spiritual experiences of the rishis or seers, the Scriptures have ever commanded respect and reverence.* The Vedantic and scientific methods though superficially distinct are alike in kind. Hegel, on the contrary, attempts to unfold and demonstrate everything—both Nature and Mind out of the inner necessity of the Logical Idea—the highest category of his Logic. To use his own words "their problem in that case is only to recognise the logical form under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind—the shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought."† It is not a fact as contended by some that Hegel did not deduce nature from abstract thought. The whole form and structure of the system and the express declarations of the author at points of critical importance can only be interpreted to mean that abstract thought out of its pure necessity gives birth to nature. Hegelianism, particularly its method, has satisfied few.‡ Some of the best thinkers of Europe have taken serious exception to the method of Hegel.§ The failure of the Dialectical Method

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* Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shakta*, p. 7.

† Wallace's translation of Hegel's Logic, p. 50.

‡ Aliotta, Idealistic Reaction against Science, Preface vii, p. 99, and other places : Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 123.

§ Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p. 223 ff.

in which European thinking has culminated leads but an additional support to the Vedantic dictum that God cannot be established by reasoning. The application of any method based on pure thinking to matters lying strictly beyond thinking leads to conclusions which are anything but satisfactory. Western thinkers are beginning to realise that pure intellectual methods hardly succeed in matters spiritual and that they must resort to some other method for their solution.*

In Chapter II., headed "Fourfold Classification of the Jivas," I have shown that the Vedanta Philosophy divides the *jivas* into four subclasses viz.,—*jarayuja*, *andaja*, *svedaja*, and *udvijja*, and views all of them inclusive of plants as conscious. There is nothing like it in the history of European philosophy. European thinkers have gradually been changing their views regarding animal and plant lives. In the west, animals have either been classified on the basis of their backbones or on the basis of their cells. Plants also have been classified on the basis of their cells. The Vedantic classification which is based on the mode of their first appearance on earth is highly practical. According to the Vedanta, the *jiva* is at the basis of the development of the fertilised egg, and it rejects *in toto* the opinion that the living can come out of the nonliving.

In Chapter III., named "The Jiva in its Connexion with the Body," I have pointed out that the majority of

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* Russell, *Problems of Philosophy*, p.242 ; Lotze, *Philosophy of Religion*, p. 95 ; Lodge, *Reason and Belief*, p. 156 ff.

European thinkers have conceived mind as non-extended and matter as extended and have virtually regarded them as of heterogeneous nature. Having thus conceived mind and matter, they have experienced insuperable difficulty in bringing out the connexion between mind and matter. Being dissatisfied with all previous solutions, the monists have ultimately concluded that there is in fact no interaction between mind and matter and that their seeming interaction is an illusion. But the interaction between mind and matter being a positive fact based on the experience of so many eminent thinkers and sages, it cannot be treated as a mere chimera. I have, on the contrary, maintained that in order to explain the connexion of mind and matter successfully, their supposed heterogeneity must be removed somewhat on the lines of Kant. I have shown on the basis of the recent advances of the science and the results attained by the Society for Psychical Research that not only does matter occupy space but mind does so as well, and hence there cannot be any real difficulty regarding the interaction between mind and matter. According to the Vedantists, the *jiva* or soul is a very minute knower having its seat in *hridaya* or *hridpadma*—a subtle centre lying within that particular region of the nervous system which is known as the spinal cord. So far as the researches in modern physiology go, there is nothing against the position of the Brahma-sutras that the spinal cord is the seat of the *jiva* or soul. Next, I have treated of the European classification of mind and have compared it with that of

the Hindus. The original classification of the Hindus is a twofold one—*manas* and *buddhi*, based on their theory of the *sukshma* body. According to the Vedanta, the connexion of the *jiva* first takes place with the *sukshma* body and through the *sukshma* body with the gross body. The Vedanta thus supplies a missing link which enables us to explain the interaction between the soul and body more satisfactorily. European psychologists, generally speaking, have conceived mind as composed of some irreducible and distinct components, and have subsequently tried to find out some unifying principle binding them all. In this attempt they have encountered much difficulty. But the Vedantists have started with one self-luminous conscious principle and have attempted to explain its variety in the shape of mental states through their theory of the *kosas*, which, according to them, shape the incoming flow of consciousness with their various individualistic peculiarities. In this respect too, the Vedantic conception seems to be an advance upon the European conception.

In Chapter IV., headed "A Critical Study of the principal Sutras bearing on Jivātman," I have shown from a critical examination of the principal sutras bearing on *jivatman* that Sankara's interpretation of the sutras is forced and indirect, and that the jivas, according to the Sutras, are very minute eternal knowers having their seat in *hridaya* or *hridpadma* and that they are to be viewed as eternal *amsas* of God just as the rays of light are *amsas* of a source of light,

and that they are not in reality one eternal all-pervading consciousness appearing as many, owing to the superimposition of the qualities of the buddhi as maintained by Sankara and his school. In this Chapter, the whole *advaita* system of Sankara has been subjected to criticism.

In Chapter V., entitled "Phenomenon of Sleep," I have shown in opposition to the views of Sankara that there is great difference between the state of deep sleep and that of *mukti*, and that during deep sleep the *jiva* does not put away the bondage of *maya* as in that case awakening becomes impossible, and that the phenomenon of deep sleep lends no support to *advaitism* in Sankara's sense.

In Chapter VI., headed "The State of Mukti or Final Release," it has been pointed out that in the state of *mukti*, the *jiva* does not entirely lose itself and attain a state analogous to that of deep sleep as Sankara holds, but on the contrary, is joined unto Brahman as one spirit enjoying His bliss for ever. Thus the state of final release, according to the Vedanta, is one of positive bliss.

In my concluding Chapter, I have dealt with the philosophical presuppositions of Sankara and his school, particularly their doctrine of *maya* and the results they lead to. To say the least, his views are opposed to our best traditions and highest aspirations. The Vaishnava schools, generally speaking, and the Saiva school of Sreekantha, conceive of *maya* as something real and identical with *prakriti* of the Geeta which veils the

true relation of the jiva with the Lord and when on the attainment of *bhakti* or loving devotion this veil is removed, the jiva is joined unto the Lord as one spirit and goes on drinking into his joy for ever. The Vedanta as interpreted by them is in accord with the revealed Scriptures and our best aspirations. It has been a solace to many a devotee and will ever be a guide unto all seekers after truth.

Thus it will appear that I have treated of the Vedanta from a standpoint, to a large measure, untouched by any scholar, and that no pains have been spared to make it really useful. The manner of presentation, I venture to think, will be found to be entirely novel.

I am sorry to note that I have not been able to adopt the system of Transliteration recommended by the Council of the Royal Asiatic Society for want of necessary types with diacritical marks in the Press where I have got this Thesis printed, for which I hope to be excused by all scholars engaged in Oriental studies. If any occasion arises for a second edition, I will certainly try to remove this and other blemishes that have passed unnoticed in the pages of the work.

September, 1920. ABHAYAKUMAR GUHA.

ERRATA

Page	Line	For	Read
23 (Introduction)	10	" 'तस्य निमित्तपरिष्टिः' इत्येवमादिम् ।"	6
19 (Chap. I)	16	sense-preceptions	sense-perceptions
Do.	23	Do.	Do.
48 (Chap. I)	9	spencer	Spencer
58 (Chap. II)	4	Leibintz	Leibnitz
180 (Chap. IV)	20	Rupa	Jiva
182 (Chap. IV)	7	*hypothesis*	hypothesi
186 (Chap. IV)	6	Do.	Do.

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INTRODUCTION.

It is generally admitted that there was in India during many centuries a purely mnemonic literature which was handed on through a succession of teachers and disciples from generation to generation according to a system which is fully described in the Prātisākhyas.* When it was found that men's memories fail, and that it is not always possible to recollect lengthy texts of the Sastras in details without errors, and when it was further discovered that somewhat unintelligible and unsystematic texts of the *Brahmanas* and *Upanishads* require further arrangement and systematization in a form which would best help memory, the sages of India invented a form of literature known as the *sutra* literature in which the different branches of knowledge were codified in the form of short pithy sentences. The word "*sutra*" means 'thread.' The treatise bearing the title *sutra* consists of a string of aphorisms forming a sort of analysis of some particular branch of knowledge. As it consisted of short intelligible sentences, the pupil could easily learn and master it. When the utility of this form of literature was realised by the Hindus, it became popular and they gradually systematized all the different branches of learning,—household, ritualistic, religious, philosophical, legal, grammatical, linguistic,

Sutra Literature

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*Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 4-5, and also p. 121.

and medicinal in the form of *sutras*, which were treated of somewhat unsystematically in the earlier literature. Thus originated the so-called *sutra* literature of the ancient Hindus. The Brahma-sutras form but a part of this class of literature. A text of the *Skanda Purana* cited by *Madhva* in the beginning of his bhashya to the Brahma-sutras notes that a sutra should be concise, unambiguous, full of import, of universal application, free from repetition and inaccuracies, and as the Brahma-sutras possess all these characteristics in full, they form pre-eminently a *sutra* work without any qualifying word.* As it is very probable that this form of oral instruction was resorted to by the Hindus mainly for the purpose of helping recollection, they must have invented it before the texts of the Sastras were reduced to writing. European scholars like Prof. Max Müller, have viewed the *sutra* period as extending from 600 to 200 B. C., which seems to be an under-estimate. The Buddhistic *suttas* presuppose the existence of the sutras of the Hindus. Panini mentions the names of some sutra-writers, and in iv. 3. 105, distinguishes the *Kalpa-sutras* which were composed by the ancients from those that are nearer to his time. The *Grihya-sutras* of Asvalāyana, Sānkhāyana, Bharadvāja, and Bodhāyana, refer to the existence of *sutras*. Hence we conclude that the

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* "अल्पाक्षरमसन्दिग्धं सारवद्विश्वतोमुखम् ।
अस्तोभमनवद्यं च सूत्रं सूत्रविदो विदुः ।
निर्व्विशेषितसूत्रत्वं ब्रह्मसूत्रस्य चाप्यतः ।"—माध्वधृत-स्कन्दपुराण-वचनम्

sutra literature must have commenced long before Pānini, who, according to Sir R. G. Bhandarkara, flourished "in the beginning of the seventh century before the Christian era, if not earlier still"—a view which appears to us very reasonable.* As a prominent literature of the period, the Vedanta-sutras can *prima facie* claim a high antiquity.

Bādarāyana is the reputed author of the Brahma-sutras. His own name has explicitly been mentioned in nine places (i. 3. 26, i. 3. 33, iii. 2. 41, iii. 4. 1, iii. 4. 8, iii. 4. 19, iv. 3. 15, iv. 4. 7, iv. 4. 12) in the work.† It is noteworthy that he has used his name in the third person only where a definite statement of his own views as compared with those of other *acharyas* has become necessary. From the use of his name in the third person some scholars have inferred that these Sutras were not composed by Bādarāyana himself but by his successors in the school. When we examine critically the particular occasions with reference to which the author appears in his own name, we feel that instead of "I" which undoubtedly carries with it a sense of egoism, the use of the name in the third person is more modest and appropriate. Not only Badarayana, but other ancient

Authorship of the Brahma-sutras.

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* Vide Bombay Gazetteer, vol. I. Part II., p. 141.

† Prof. Belvalkar, in his article on the *Multiple Authorship of the Vedanta Sutras*, Indian Philosophical Review, October, 1918, says that his name occurs in 8 places but we as a matter of fact find that his name occurs in 9 different sutras.

teachers of India such as Jaimini, Bodhayana, Kautilya, and Vatsyayana—the author of the Kama-sutra, resort to the same method. Dr. Fleet in his introductory note to the English translation of the Artha-sastra of Kautilya by Pandit Shama-sastry pertinently observes that "in conformity with a common practice of Indian writers, the name Kautilya figures constantly through the book, especially in places where the author lays down his views as differing from others which he cites." This is a practice not only common among Sanskrit writers, but also among writers of almost all the vernaculars of India. *Nanaka*, *Tulsidasa*, *Kavira*, *Tukarama*, *Chandidasa*, *Vidyapati*, and others invariably use their names in the third person and not in the first, singular or plural. *Krishna-dasa* Kaviraja—the author of Chaitanya-Charitamrita in Bengalee appears in his own name at the end of each chapter. In fact except in the writings of some authors who sometimes use the first person plural in similar cases, the usual procedure in India for asserting one's authorship is to put it in the third person. If the introduction of one's own name *prima facie* suggest a later interpolation as recently held by Professor Belvalkar,* then we shall not only have to reject the traditionally accepted authorship of some of the ancient works but also the anthorship of some of the modern ones which are too well known to us.

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* Vide Professor Belvalkar, *Multiple Authorship of the Vedanta Sutras*, Indian Philosophical Review, October, 1918.

All the scholiasts from Sankara downwards have ascribed the authorship of the Sutras to Badarayana. We have hardly any justification to reject such a well-established tradition on the flimsy ground that the author at times appears in the Sutras with his own name in the third person.

In India Bādarāyana—the author of the *Sutras* has been indentified with Veda-vyasa—the author of the Mahabharata. Windischmann was the first to suggest that Bādarāyana and Veda-vyasa cannot be regarded as one and the same person on the ground that Sankara in the whole of his commentary never mentions that the Vyasa of the epic is the author of the book on which he is commenting, though he mentions Bādarāyana as such. Max Müller endorses his views. We wonder that certain scholars should make such capital out of the silence of Sankara. We point out that the argument *ex silentio* in this case is particularly worthless as there was no call on the part of Sankara to mention it. It was too well known in Sankara's time that Veda-vyasa was the author of them and so there was no necessity on his part for making a positive statement to the effect that Bādarāyana is Veda-vyasa. If Sankara could foresee that the identity of Veda-vyasa and Bādarāyana would be questioned in far future he would have undoubtedly made such a positive statement. But he had no occasion to foresee it. Sankara has shown much respect both for Veda-vyasa and Bādarayana in his Bhashya. Though he does not say in so many words that

Badarayana and Veda-vyasa.

Veda-vyasa is the author of the Sutras yet any one going through his Bhashya carefully cannot but be impressed by the fact that the identity between Veda-vyasa and Badarayana was in his mind. That such identity was in his mind is also plain from the fact that all his devoted disciples who have written glosses upon his Bhashya and who had full knowledge of the traditions of his school such as *Govindananda*, *Vachaspati Misra*, and *Ananda Giri* have attributed the authorship of the Sutras to Veda-vyasa thus identifying Veda-vyasa with Bādarāyana. *Ramanuja*, *Madhva*, *Ballabha*, *Srinivasa*, *Baladeva*, and others have also ascribed the authorship of the Sutras to Veda-vyasa. Madhva and Baladeva of Bengal refer to a text of the Skanda-purāna which in clear words proclaims that Veda-vyasa is the author of the Sutras.* The Bhagavata-purana which is held in high honour at least among the Vaishnavas all throughout India and which is regarded as the true Bhashya to the Brahma-sutras by the Vaishnavas of Bengal, also identifies Bādarāyana with Veda-vyasa. The tradition is so very strong among Indians that Hemachandra in

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* "ते विज्ञापितकार्य्यस्तु भगवान् पुरुषोत्तमः ।
अवतीर्णो महायोगी सत्यावत्यां पराशरात् ॥
उत्सन्नान् भगवान् वेदानुज्जहार हरिः स्वयम् ।
चतुर्धा व्यभजत् तांश्च चतुर्व्विंशतिधा पुनः ।
शतधा चैकधा चैव तथैव च सहस्रधा ।
कृष्णो द्वादशधा चैव पुनस्तस्यार्थवित्तये ।
चकार ब्रह्मसूत्राणि येषां सूत्रत्वमञ्जसा ॥"—Skanda-purāna referred to by Madhva and Baladeva.

his Abhidhana-chintamani—which is placed by scholars in the 11th century A. D., has deemed it necessary to give Māthara, Dvaipayana, Parasarya, Kāneena, Badarayana, and Vyasa as synonyms of the name Veda-vyasa.* But our position may be assailed on one ground. In the *Mahabharata*, *Vishnu-purana*, *Bhagavata* and also in the *Sama-Vidhana-brahmana*, Jaimini is spoken of as the disciple of Veda-vyasa. If Bādarāyana the author of the Sutras is the same as Veda-vyasa, then he becomes a disciple of Bādarāyana too. But Jaimini in his Mimansa Darsana quotes Bādarāyana five times (**i. 1. 5, v. 2. 19, vi. 1. 8, x. 8. 44, xi. 1. 64**).† Badarayana too quotes Jaimini in ten clear cases (**i. 2. 28, i. 2. 31, i. 3. 31, iii. 2. 40, iii. 4. 2, iii. 4. 18, iii. 4. 40, iv. 3. 12, iv. 4. 5, iv. 4. 11**). So it may be argued that they figure more as contemporaries and rivals than as disciple and master. We have carefully considered the point and have concluded that they figure more as disciple and teacher than as rivals in the two *Mimansas*. Jaimini has indeed quoted Badarayana in his Sutras, but he has always taken his views as the views of one who commands high respect and authority, and has nowhere combated or controverted them. *Sabara Svamin*—the

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* वेदव्यासस्तु माठरः ।५१०
द्वैपायनः पाराशर्य्यः कानीनो बादरायणः ।
व्यासोऽस्याऽम्बा सत्यवती वासवी गन्धकालिका ॥ ५१२, मर्त्य काण्डः

† Here also Prof. Belvalkar has failed to notice two sutras in which Bādarayana is referred to by Jaimini. He states that the name occurs only three times.

ancient commentator of the Mimansa has noted this fact. In his Bhashya to sutra I. 1. 5, he says :—

"वादरायणग्रहणं वादरायणस्येदं मतं कीर्त्त्यते वादरायणं पूजयितुं, नात्मीयं मतं पर्युदसितुम् ॥"*

Badarayana too has treated him as his disciple and not as his rival. In most cases he has accepted his views. In cases where he has differed, he has instructed him as a disciple and has pointed out his errors. Both *Govindananda* and *Ananda Giri* in their Tikas to the bhashya of Sankara have noticed it.

"तत्त्वनिरूपणार्थं गुरुशिष्ययोः कथावादोऽयमिति ज्ञापनार्थं जैमिनिग्रहणम् ॥"—रत्नप्रभाव्याख्या ३।४।२

"जैमिनिग्रहणं न प्रतिपक्षतया शिष्यस्य तदयोगात् ।"—आनन्दगिरीयव्याख्या ३।४।२

Thus we see the fact of mutual quotation rather supports the theory of disciple and teacher (*guru*) than of rivals.

Another question may fairly be asked, if Veda-vyasa is really the author of the Sutras, why does he appear under the name of Badarayana and not that of Veda-vyasa in the Sutras ? In reply we beg to point out that it appears to us that as he composed his Vedanta-sutras while carrying on contemplation at his own hermitage of "Badaree" which is also known as "Nara-nārayanāsrama" or "Badarikāsrama," he appears under that peculiar name of Bādarāyana in them. The name

* Vide also Sabara's Bhashya to sutra xi. 1. 64.

"Badarayana" as far as we have been able to trace it, does not occur in the Mahabharata. But the names "Badaree" and "Naranārāyanāsrama" occur in it.* We read in the Mahabharata that Narada carried on contemplation there for many a long year and received inspiration from the Highest. We further read therein that Veda-vyasa used to reside at the feet of the Himalayas with his five disciples Sumantu, Vaisampāyana, Jaimini, Paila, and his son Suka.† We find in the *Skanda-purana* that Veda-vyasa really resided at the *Badarikaranya*.‡ May we not therefore suppose that because he composed the *Sutras* while at Badaree—the place of divine inspiration of *Narada*, that he appears in the *Sutras* under the peculiar name of "*Badarayana*" which is evidently derived from Badaree (वदरी + षायन)? We point out in passing that the word Badarayana does not occur in Panini but only in the Gana-patha to Panini.§ Of course we cannot say with certainty when a particular word was included in a *gana* but there is nothing to show that the name did not occur in the *gana* at the time of Pānini himself. The name Badarayana occurs also in the

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* "नरनारायणस्थानं वदरीत्यभिविश्रुतम् ।"—वनपर्व्व, १५६ अध्याय, १४ श्लोकांश

† Vide महाभारत. शान्तिपर्व्व, मोचधर्म्म, ३२७म अध्याय (Calcutta edition.)

‡ "ततो वदरिकारण्ये समासीनं महामुनिम् ।
द्वैपायनं समागम्य प्रणनाम सभक्तिकम् ॥"—स्कन्दपुराण, व्रह्मखण्ड, सेतुमाहात्म्य, एकोविंशाध्याय, ९७ श्लोक

§ Weber, History of Indian Literature, p. 241.

Bhagavata, *Sandilya-sutra*, and in the *Charaka-samhita*—the earliest known work on Hindu medicine. Charaka, who is probably a contemporary of Kanishka, mentions Bādarāyana along with other *rishis* as the fountain of *brahma-jnana*.* In Varāha-mihira and Bhattotpala, an astronomer of this name is referred to, but he must be a different person. The name Badarayana is also found in the closing *vansa* of the Sāma-vidhāna-brahmana, but the bearer of it appears there as the disciple of Pārāsaryāyana, four steps later than Vyasa-Pārasarya, and three later than Jaimini, and so he too must be other than the author of the Sutras.† Before bringing our discussion on the point to a close, we may point out that two Indian scholars of eminence namely B. G. Tilak and Professor Belvalkar have very lately held that Badarayana and Veda-vyasa are one and the same person.‡

Date of the Brahma-sutras

Next we pass on to the date of the Brahma-sutras. It is well known that Badarayana in his *Sutras*, refers to 7 other teachers namely—*Jaimini*, *Badari*, *Asmarathya*, *Kasakritsna*, *Karshnajini*, *Atreya*, and *Audulomi*. We have noted above that Jaimini—the author of the

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* Vide Charka, samhita-sutra-sthanam.

† Weber, History of Indian Literature, note 259.

‡ Vide B. G. Tilak's Geeta-rahasya in Mahratti, and Prof. Belvalkar's article on the *Multiple Authorship of the Vedanta Sutras*, Indian Philosophical Review, October, 1918.

Purva-mimansa-sutras, was a contemporary and disciple of Veda-vyasa. Jaimini too in his *Sutras* mentions the names of 7 other teachers *viz.*, *Atreya*, *Badari*, *Badarayana*, *Labukayana*, *Aitisayana*, *Karshna jini*, and *Kamukayana*. Five names *viz.*, Badarayana, Jaimini, Atreya, Badari, and Karshnajini are common to both the Mimansas—*purva* and *uttara*. The teachers' names occurring in the Vedanta-sutras are found most of them in the Srauta-sutras ; for example, Asmarthya in Asvalayana ; Badari, Karshnajini, and Kasakritsni in Katyayana, and Atreya in the Taittiriya-pratisakhya. The names of Atreya, Kasakritsna and Badari also occur in Bodhayana (Grihya-sutra), and the name of Atreya in Bharadvaja (Grihya-sutra). Kasakritsna is a very old Vedic commentator. Bhatta Bhaskara in his commentary upon the Taitt. Yajus refers to Kasakritsna, Ekachurni and Yaska as his predecessors in the work.. The name of Audulomi is found in the Mahabhashya on Panini, V. 1. 85, 78 ; and the name of Kasakritsni is mentioned in the Mahabhashaya on Panini, IV. 1. 14. It may further be mentioned that Asmarathya occurs in the gana 'Garga,' Audulomi in the gana 'Bāhu,' Krishnājini in the ganas 'Tika' and 'Upaka,' and Kasakritsna in the gana 'Upaka' as well. Charaka Samhita also refers to Atreya, Asmarathya, and Badarayana. Most of these teachers were probably contemporaries of Badarayana, and some of them may be his predecessors. These teachers carry us to the time in which Badarayana lived. As they are all very old and mentioned with

respect, they *prima facie* bespeak a high antiquity for the *Sutras*.

We read in different places of the *Mahabharata* that Veda-vyasa had five disciples *viz.*, *Vaisampayana*, *Paila*, *Sumantu*, *Jaimini*, and *Suka*. As disciples they must be contemporaries of Veda-vyasa. In the Taittiriya-aranyaka we find the names of Vyasa-parasarya and Vaisampayana. In both the Sankhayana and the Asvalayana Grihyas we come across the names of Vaisampayana, Paila, Sumantu, and Jaimini. Panini refers to Parasarya (Veda-vyasa), Vaisampayana (IV. 3. 104), and Paila (II. 4. 59). The Mahabhashya refers to *Vaisampayana* and *Suka-vaiyasaki*. All these names recall to us the period in which Veda-vyasa flourished, and as these names occur in Panini and in works nearer to his time, the time of Veda-vyasa must have been earlier than that of Panini.

Now to the works which refer to the Brahma-sutras. The Brahma-sutras are generally known as the Vedanta-sutras or simply as the Vedanta. The word Vedanta, which orginally signified the Upanishad, generally stands for the Vedanta-sutras of Badarayana in later literature.* The *Garuda-purana*, the *Padma-purana*, and the *Manu-samhita* refer to the Vedanta in the sense of the Vedanta-sutras.† The name Brahma-sutras is also found in the

* "वेदान्तो नाम उपनिषत्-प्रमाणं तदुपकारीणि शारीरकसूत्रादीनि च।"—
इति वेदान्तसारे

† "वेदान्तसांख्यसिद्धान्तब्रह्मज्ञानं वदाम्यहम्।"—गारुड़, ब्रह्मज्ञान,
२४० अध्याय

*Garuda-purana.** The *Bhagavata* which is regarded as the true *bhashya* to the Vedanta-sutras begins with the very second aphorism of the Brahma-sutras. We have pointed out above that the *Skanda-purana* refers to the Brahma-sutras and ascribes their authorship to Veda-vyasa. The *Hari-vansa* which is placed by Hopkins at 200 A. D., contains clear reference to the Sutras.†

The Charaka-samhita—a work, which is supposed to have been composed, or at least redacted about the time of Kanishka, not only mentions the name of Bādarāyana but gives a short exposition of the main doctrines of the *advaita* school of the Vedanta. It appears that the *advaita* school of the Vedanta was established before the composition of the Charaka-samhita. Kautilya while noticing the systems of the Samkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata, seems nowhere to refer to the Vedanta. But we find one compound in it which is peculiarly Vedantic namely विद्यासामर्थ्यम्‡ In the Purva-

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"वेदान्तवेदसुस्नाते गीताया अपि कर्त्तरि।
परितापवति व्यासे मुह्यत्यज्ञानसागरे॥
तदा त्वया पुरा प्रोक्तं चतुःश्लोकसमन्वितम्।
तदीयश्रवणात् सद्यो निर्बाधो बादरायणः॥"—पद्मपुराण, उत्तर खण्ड,
कुमार-नारद-संवाद २य अः ७२-७३ श्लोः

"वेदान्तं विधिवच्छ्रुत्वा सन्न्यसेदनृणो द्विजः।"—मनु ६।९४

* "अर्थोऽयं ब्रह्मसूत्राणां भारतार्थविनिर्णयः।
गायत्रीभाष्यरूपोऽसौ वेदार्थपरिबृंहितः॥ — हरिभक्तिविलासधृत-गरुड़-
पुराण-वचनम्

† "यतयो नियता भूत्वा मन्त्रब्रह्मनिषेविणः।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदे सक्तास्तदर्थालोकतत्पराः॥—खिलहरिवंश, १०७ अः १२ श्लोः

‡ Vide Kautilya, Artha-sastra, Book I, Chapter V.

mimansa Darsana we meet with शब्दसामर्थ्यात्, अधिकारसामर्थ्यात्, श्रुतिसामर्थ्यात् and so on but we vainly seek for विद्यासामर्थ्यम् there. We meet with the compound only in the Sutras of Badarayana.* From the use of this compound which is Vedantic and the whole tenor of the passage in which it occurs, it is not unfair to hold that the Brahma-sutas were konwn to Kautilya (B. C. 321—296). The Buddhistic *suttas,* it has been rightly pointed out by Max Muller presuppose the existence of the philsophical sutras of the Hindus.† In the *Brahma-jala-sutta*—one of the many suttas or sermons supposed to have been preached by Buddha himself,—Buddha is found to mention the names of no less than 62 philosophical theories with many subdivisions, and he claims to be acquainted with every one of them. The very name *Brahma-jala-sutta* is suggestive of the Brahma-sutra. If we leave out the word 'jala' we get the name 'Brahma-sutra.' In it we discover the faint traces of the different schools of the Vedanta namely,—the *advaita* Vedanta, the *dvaitadvaita* Vedanta and the *dvaita* Vedanta. It undoubtedly presnpposes the existence not only of the Brahma-sutras but of all the schools of philosophy treated of in the Brahma-sutras.‡

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* Brahma-sutras iv. 2. 17.

† Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 119-20.

‡ Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 21-28.

Panini refers to the *Bhikshu-sutras* of Parasarya. The scholiast Jnanendra Sarasvati rightly points out that Parasarya is the same as Veda-vyasa. It appears from Panini that there were at least two classes of *bhikshus* prior to Panini—*parasarins* and *karmandins.*[1] The parasarins have been referred to in the Mahabhashya too.[2] Amara Singha also refers to these two classes of *bhikshus* with the addition of a third *maskarins.*[3] The word 'bhikshu' is the name of the fourth *asrama* of the Hindus. This *asrama* is also known by the name of *yati* or *parivrajaka* or *sannyasin.* Gotama, Bodhayana, and the Mahabharata give the name 'bhikshu' to this fourth asrama. We learn from the Upanishads that in this stage of life the devotees, being calm and free from all desires, had to contemplate Brahman in the forest and to live on alms of others.[4] They had also to study the *sutras* helpful to the contemplation of Brahman prepared by their own school. The *parasarins* used to study the *Bhikshu-sutras* of Parasarya and the *karmandins* those of Karmanda. As these sutras were conducive to the contemplation of Brahman, they were in fact Brahma-sutras. As we do not know of any other Bhikshu-sutras of Pārāsarya,

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1. Vide Pānini-sutras iv. 3. 110-11.
2. Mahabhashya iv. 2. 66.
3. "भिक्षुः परिव्राट् कर्म्मन्दी पाराशर्य्यपि मस्करी।"—अमरकोष,ब्रह्मवर्ग
4. "एतं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः * * भिक्षाचर्य्यं चरन्ति।"—
बृहदा ० ३।५।१

"शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्ष्यचर्य्यां चरन्तः।"—मुण्डं ० १।२।११

we are at one with Vachaspati Misra (9th century A.D.) in holding that the Bhikshu-sutras of Pārāsarya are the same as the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. The word 'bhikshu' must not mislead us. We are decidedly of opinion that the four *asramas* were known to the Hindus before the rise of Buddhism, and two of them were taken over by the Buddhists from the Hindus.* As men entering this fourth stage of life had to study the Upanishads and the Brahma-sutras based on the Upanishads, it is not difficult to see why Panini gives the peculiar name of the Bhikshu-sutras to the Brahma-sutras.† This compels us to place the Sutras anterior to Panini.

Rapson, speaking of the Mahabharata, Ramayana, and Puranas, says that "it can scarcely be questioned that much of their substance is extremely ancient although the form in which it is expressed may have undergone change in the course of ages" The Grihya-sutras of Bodhayana quotes a verse from the Yayati-upakhyana of the *Mahabharata*. The Grihya-sutras of Asvalayana and Sankhyayana refer to the *Bharata* and *Mahabharata* as two distinct works. Patanjali, Kautilya, and Panini presuppose the existence of the Mahabharata in some form. In the introduction to the work it is clearly intimated that it

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* Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 310.

† "वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्‌ यतयः शुद्धसत्त्वाः ।"—
मुण्ड० ३।२।६

"वेदान्तं विधिवच्छ्रुत्वा सन्न्यसेदनृणो द्विजः ।"—मनु ६।९४

originally consisted of 8,800 slokas only. Rai Bahadur C. V. Vaidya in his able work on the *Mahabharata* has shown that the present *Mahabharata* is but the enlarged edition of the *Bharata* and fixes the date of the Bharata at about 3100 B. C. Whatever that may be, it is undoubted that the original Bharata was composed long before Panini. B. G. Tilak in his scholarly work on the Geeta-rahasya shows that the Geeta forms an integral part of the *Mahabharata* and that both come from the same pen. But it appears to us that the Geeta forms not only an integral part of the present *Mahabharata* but that of the original *Bharata* too. The Geeta has been referred to in the sutra works of Bodhayana, Gotama, and others as has been shown by the late Mr. Trimbak Gurunath Kale.* Gotama precedes not only Bodhayana but Panini too, for in sutra II. 4. 65, Gotama has expressly been mentioned. In the *Grihya-sesha-sutra* the verse 'पत्रं पुष्पं फलं तोयं' (Geeta IX. 26) is quoted. The Tenth Discourse of the Geeta names the objects animate and inanimate possessing divine glories and enjoins Arjuna to contemplate God in them. It is inculcated therein that 'of the Vrishnis Vasu-deva I am, and of the Pandavas Dhananjaya.'† The worship of Vasu-deva and Arjuna must have arisen in India after the above-noted preaching contained in the Geeta which is also known as the

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* See his article in the Vedic Magazine Vol. 7, Nos. 6 and 7.

† "वृष्णीनां वासुदेवोऽस्मि पाण्डवानां धनञ्जयः।"—गीता १०।३७।

'Krishnārjuna-samvada' or 'Vasudevārjuna-samvada.' Panini in composing the sutra 'वासुदेवार्ज्जुनाभ्यां वुन्' (iv. 3. 98) must have been in his mind the worship of Vasudeva and Arjuna as proclaimed in the *Vasudevarjuna Samvada* or the *Geeta.* The Geeta in unqualified language preaches the superiority of *bhakti* or loving devotion. We know of no other work prior to the Geeta in which the doctrine of *bhakti* has been taught with such emphasis. Panini in mentioning the word '*bhakti*' (IV. 3. 95) in the sense of loving devotion must have the Geeta in his mind. The *Mahabharata* too in clear words intimates that the Geeta forms an ancient part of the *Mahabharata.* † The Geeta which forms an integral part of the original Bharata refers in unequivocal terms to the Brahmasutras.‡ According to Sankara the word 'ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैः' refers to the texts expressive of Brahman. But he does not tell us whether the Sutras of Badarayana which are expressive of Brahman as well fall within

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* "इत्यहं वासुदेवस्य पार्थस्य च महात्मनः ।
संवादमिममश्रौषमद्भुतं रोमहर्षणम् ।" गीता १८।७४

† "नारदेन तु सम्प्राप्तः सरहस्यः ससंग्रहः ।
एषो धर्म्मो जगन्नाथात् साक्षान्नारायणान्नृप ॥
एवमेष महान् धर्म्मः स ते पूर्व्वं नृपोत्तम ।
कथितो हरिगीतासु समासविधिकल्पितो ॥"

मोक्षधर्म्मपर्व्व, ३४६ अध्याय, १०।११ श्लोक

‡ ऋषिभिर्बहुधा गीतं छन्दोभि र्विविधैः पृथक् ।
ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव हेतुमद्भि र्विनिश्चितैः ॥—गीता १३।४

the range of the compound 'ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैः'. But his devoted disciple Ananda Giri indicates in unmistakable terms that it includes the Sutras of Badarayana as well.* In the light of the two qualifying words 'हेतुमद्भिः' and 'विनिश्चितैः' the text can have no other meaning. Sridhara Svamin gives two meanings of the word—one of which being that it refers to the Brahma-sutras of Badarayana. Ramanuja, Madhva, and others have seen the same meaning in the word. In modern times, T. R. Amalnerkar, Max Müller, and B. G. Tilak have adopted the same interpretation. In our opinion too this interpretation alone can bring out the propriety of the different words of the sloka in their true bearings. We have noted above that there existed different schools of the *bhikshus* or *sannyasins* who were virtually Vedantists from very ancient times. We have noted above that Amara has referred to three schools of the *bhikshus* or *sannyasins*, and Panini has also referred to two of them. Badarayana has mentioned the names of several *acharyas* who were undoubtedly the founders of the different schools of the Vedanta. In the Geeta we come across the word *'Vedantakrit,'* which, according to Sankara refers to the 'founder of the *sampradaya* or school of the Vedanta.'† Madhusudana Sarasvati says that the word refers to the founder of

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* "अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' इत्यादीन्यपि सूत्राण्यपि गृहीतान्यन्यथा छन्दोभिरित्यादिना पौनरुक्त्यादिति मत्वा विशिनष्टि हेतुमद्भिरिति।" इति आनन्दगिरीय-व्याख्यायाम्

† "वेदान्तकृत् वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायकृदित्यर्थः।"—शङ्करभाष्य (गीता १५।१५)

the school of the Vedanta in the shape of Veda-vyasa and others.* We are also of the opinion that the word *Vedantakrit* refers to all the founders of the schools of the Vedanta including Veda-vyasa. In the word *Vedantakrit* of the Geeta we also see a reference to the Sutras of Veda-vyasa. This makes the Vedanta earlier than Panini and also the Geeta. But as the Vedanta-sutras, according to the important commentators, refer to the Geeta they cannot be viewed as earlier than the Geeta. How are we to explain this mutual reference ? Max Müller suggests that this reciprocal quotation can be explained on the ground that the author of the Geeta and that of the Brahma-sutras were contemporaries. But this explanation is hardly satisfactory. One author who is in no way connected with another cannot allow his incomplete manuscript to be read by another and to refer to the same in his work which is also in the course of preparation. This can only be if the authors are in the capacities of master and disciple or are the same person. We find nowhere in the Scriptures that Veda-vyasa and Badarayana stand in the capacities of master and disciple. Hence the only inevitable conclusion is as has been pointed out by B. G. Tilak that the author who composed the *Sutras* was also the author who gave the *Bharata* along with the Geeta its present form at about the same time. The *Geeta* being prior

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* "वेदान्तकृत् वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायप्रवर्त्तको वेदव्यासादिरूपेण ।"—

मधुसूदनी व्याख्या (गीता १५।१५)

to Panini as shown above, the date of the Sutras must be earlier than that of Panini.

The existing commentaries on the Sutras also throw some light on their date and to a great extent corroborate the views we take as to their date. Among the existing commentaries, Sankara's commentary is probably the oldest. Acharya Sankara has more than once referred to 'another' commentator and has at times quoted the views of this author.* We learn from the Tikas of Ananda Giri and Govindānanda this 'another' is the Vrittikara. It appears from the teachers of the *Visishtadvaita* school noted below that this *Vrittikara* is Bhagavan Bodhayana. Acharya Sankara in his bhashya to sutra I. 3. 19, refers to 'other theorisers again, among them some of ours,'† and in his bhashya to sutra I. 1. 4, I. 2. 23, I. 4. 12, and IV. 3. 14, refers to some commentators. Thus it is clear that there were several commentators to the Brahma-sutras prior to Sankara, one of whom was the Vrittikara. Goudapada who has been styled an *acharya* having full knowledge of the tenets of the *sampradaya* or school has been mentioned twice in the bhashya.‡ The name of Upavarsha also occurs twice in the bhashya and the epithet of *Bhagavan* has invariably been added to his name. Sankara has indeed referred to the ancient

* Vide his bhashya to sutras I. 1. 25, I. 3. 1, I. 1. 27, and I. 3. 13.

† "अपरे तु वादिन: * * अस्मादीयाश्च केचित्।"—शङ्कर भाष्य १।३।१९

‡ Vide Sankara's bhashya to sutras I. 4. 14 and II. 1. 19.

grammarian—Panini thrice in his bhashya but he has nowhere qualified him by any such epithet. In connexion with his opposition of the *sphota* theory, he cites a passage from Upavarsha in his support.* In another place where Upavarsha has been mentioned, he says in effect that there being no *sutra* in the first Pada of the Mimansa-sutras regarding the soul as distinct from the body, Acharya Sabara Svamin's remarks on the same must be taken as connected with this sutra (III. 3. 53), which has been framed by the *sutrakara* to remove this blameable want, and for that very reason too *Bhagavan Upavarsha* in his commentary to the First Tantra (Purva Mimansa) notes that he will treat of the soul in his commentary to the *Sariraka* (Brahma-sutras). † It appears from the words of Sankara as has been rightly pointed out by Professor Jacobi that prior to him the two *Mimansas* formed but parts of the same treatise (Mimansa) and Upavarsha wrote commentaries on both the Mimansas—*purva* and *uttara*. ‡ A text cited by Ramanuja in his

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* "'वर्णा एव तु न शब्दः इति' भगवानुपवर्षः।" Sankara's commentary to sutra I. 3. 28.

† "ननु शास्त्रप्रमुख एव प्रथमे पादे शास्त्रफलोपभोगयोग्यस्य देहव्यतिरिक्तस्यात्मनोऽस्तित्वमुक्तम्। सत्यमुक्तं भाष्यकृता न तु तत्रात्मास्तित्वे सूत्रमस्ति। इह तु स्वयमेव सूत्रकृता तदस्तित्वमाक्षेपपुरःसरं प्रतिष्ठापितम्। इत एव चाकृष्याचार्य्येण शबरस्वामिना प्रमाणलक्षणे वर्णितम्। अतएव च भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे आत्मास्तित्वाभिधानप्रसक्तौ शारीरके वक्ष्याम इत्युद्धारः कृतः।"—Sankara's bhashya to sutra III. 3. 53.

‡ Vide Jacobi, J A O S. December, 1910.

bhashya to sutra I. 1. 1. from the Vritti of Bodhayana also corroborates the view that in ancient days both the *Mimansas* formed parts of the same work.* On consulting the *bhashya* of Acharya Sabara Svamin on the Mimansa Darsana alluded to by Sankara we find that a long passage has been quoted by the Acharya from the *Vrittikara* which begins, according to the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition of the *Mimansa Darsana*, after the words 'वृत्तिकारस्तु अन्यथेमं ग्रन्थं वर्णयांचकार,' and ends on p. 18 with the line " 'तस्य निमित्तपरीष्टिः'—इत्येवमादिम्". But according to Kumarila Bhatta the quotation from the Vrittikara ends on p. 8 of the same edition with the words 'स एवासमीचीनः प्रत्ययो नान्य इति'. Where the quotation from the Vrittikara ends does not concern us here, though we are more inclined to accept the view of Kumarila in preference to the view of the editor of the *Bibliotheca Indica* edition which has been accepted by Professor Jacobi. It is clear from the words of Sabara Svamin that the Vrittikara whoever he may be, had also a *Vritti* on the Purva Mimansa Darsana. We have seen above that Sankara in his bhashya refers to one *Vrittikara* who has been identified by the teachers of the *Visishtadvaita* school with Bhagavan Bodhayana—the founder of their school. It is very probable that the two Vrittikaras are the same person. In our opinion Professor Jacobi has done a distinct service by pointing out for the first time that the *Vrittikara* re-

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* "संहितमेतच्छारीरकं जैमिनीयेन षोडशलक्षणेनेति शास्त्रैकत्वसिद्धिः।"—श्रीरामानुजभाष्य-धृत-बोधायन-वृत्तिवचनम् (१।१।१)।

ferred to by Sabara Svamin is the same as Bodhayana and that Bodhayana wrote Vrittis on both the Mimansas which were regarded as the same treatise in his time. It is further noticeable that Sabara Svamin in his commentary qualifies *Upavarsha* by the epithet *Bhagavan* but no such epithet has been given to the ancient grammarian Panini and Pingala—the earliest author of a systematic treatise on prosody, though they have also been quoted by him.

Sankara in his introduction to his bhashya of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (Kanva recension) calls his bhashya thereto a "small treatise." Ananda Giri in his *tika* to the above notes that he calls his bhashya a "small treatise" as compared with that of Bharttriprapancha who wrote an extensive bhashya on the *Madhyandina* recension of the same Upanishad which begins with the word 'द्वया,' whereas the Kanva recension upon which Sankara commented, begins with the words 'उषा वा अश्वस्य'.* Hence Sankara's commentary covers a field untrodden by that of Bhattriprapancha. The Acharya in his commentary to Brihadaranyaka v-i, characterizes Bharttriprapancha's theory as '*advaita-dvaita*'—at once one and dual and subjects it to criticism. Acharya Sankara in his introductory notes to his bhashya to the

* "एतेन चिकीर्षितायाः वृत्तेः भर्तृप्रपञ्चभाष्येण अगतार्थत्वमुक्तम्। तद्धि 'द्वया' इत्यादिमाध्यन्दिनश्रुतिम् अधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तम्, इयं पुनः 'उषा वा अश्वस्य' इत्यादि काण्वश्रुतिमाश्रित्येति। अथ उद्देश्यं निर्दिशति—तस्या इति। भर्तृप्रपञ्चभाष्याद् विशेषान्तरमाह—अल्पग्रन्थेति। अस्या ग्रन्थतः अल्पत्वेऽपि नार्थतः तथात्वमिति ग्रन्थस्य ग्रहणम्।"—इति आनन्द-गिरिकृत-टीकायाम्

Chandogya Upanishad calls his bhashya a 'small treatise' as well. Ananda Giri clears up the same by saying that he calls his own a 'small treatise' as compared with that of 'Dravidacharya'* who composed a voluminous commentary on the same.† We learn from the teachers of the Visishtadvaita school that Bharttriprapancha and Dramidacharya had commentaries on the Brahma-sutras. Yamunācharya—the *guru* of Ramanujacharya, in his well-known work—*Siddhi Traya* refers to a series of teachers who preceded him and composed commentaries on the Brahma-sutras. They are the *bhashyakrit* (probably Dramidācharya), *Tanka*, *Bharttriprapancha*, *Bharttrimitra*, *Bharttrihari*, *Brahma-datta*, *Sankara*, *Srivatsanka-misra* and *Bhaskara*.‡ Acharya Ramanuja in his well-known work—*Vedanta-sangraha* mentions the names of six ancient teachers viz.,—*Bodhayana*, *Tanka*, *Dramida*, *Guha-deva*, *Kapardi*, *Bharuchi* who preceded him and

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* Dramidacharya is probably the correct name.

† "अथ पाठक्रमाश्रित्यापि द्राविड़भाष्यं प्रणीतम् तत् किमनेनेत्याशङ्क्याह। अल्पग्रन्थमिति।"—इति आनन्दगिरीय-टीकायाम्

‡ यद्यपि भगवता बादरायणेन इदमर्थान्येव सूत्राणि प्रणीतानि, विवृतानि च तानि परिमित-गम्भीरभाषिणा भाष्यकृता, विस्तृतानि च तानि गम्भीरन्यायसागर-भाषिणा भगवता श्रीवत्साङ्कमिश्रेणापि तथापि आचार्य्य-टङ्क-भर्तृप्रपञ्च-भर्तृमित्र-भर्तृहरि-ब्रह्मदत्त-शङ्कर-श्रीवत्साङ्क-भास्करादिसितासितविविधनिबन्धनश्रद्धाविप्रलब्ध-बुद्धयो न यथावदन्यथा च प्रतिपद्यन्त इति तत्प्रतिपत्तये च युक्तः प्रकरणक्रमः।"—इति श्रीयामुनाचार्य्य-विरचित-सिद्धित्रये

claims them all as belonging to his own school.* In the same work he cites the views of *Sankara*, *Bhaskara*, and *Yadavaprakasa*, and controverts them. In the opening lines of his Sribhasya to the Brahma-sutras, Ramanuja further notes that the ancient teachers such as Dramidacharya and others abridged the extensive Vritti on the Brahma-sutras composed by *Bhagavan* Bodhayana, and that he himself explains the syntactical meanings of the sutras agreeably to their views.†

Acharya Ramanuja both in his *Vedartha-sangraha* and *Sribhashya* has also quoted passages from the commentaries of *Bodhayana*, *Tanka* (Vakyakara) and *Dramidacharya* (Bhashyakara). Srinivasadasa in his *Yatindra-mata-dipika* cites the names of the following Vedanta teachers: *Vyasa*, *Bodhayana*, *Guhadeva*, *Bharuchi*, *Brahmanandi*, *Dravidacharya*, *Sri-Parankusanatha*, *Yamuna-muni*, and *Yatisvara*.‡

From the above short review it is clear to us that two principal schools at last arose out of the Sutras—one *advaita* headed by Upavarsha for whom Sankara shows special reverence and invariably calls him a *Bhagavan* and another *visishtadvaita* school headed by

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* "यथोदितक्रमपरिणतभक्त्यैकलभ्य एव भगवद्बोधायन-टङ्क-द्रमिड़-गुहदेव-कपर्दि-भारुचि-प्रभृत्यवगीत-शिष्टपरिगृहीत-पुरातन-वेद-वेदान्त-व्याख्यान सुव्यक्तार्थ-श्रुतिनिकरदर्शितोऽयं पन्थाः।"—इति रामानुजाचार्य्यप्रणीतवेदार्थसंग्रहे

† "भगवद् बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्व्वाचार्य्याः संचिक्षिपुः। तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये १।१।१

‡ Weber, History of Indian Literature, pp. 322-23.

Bodhayana for whom Ramanuja shows special reverence and calls him *bhagavan* as well. Gaudapada belongs to the former school, and *Tanka, Dramidacharya Guhadeva, Kapardi, Bharuchi, and Sri-vathsanka-misra* belong to the latter. As Sabara Svamin also calls *Upavarsha Bhagavan* too, he appears to be an ancient and revered teacher. The ancient commentator Sabara Svamin whose style closely resembles that of Patanjali's Mahabhashya, cannot be, according to Bühler's estimate, much later than the beginning of the Christian era. So Upavarsha must be far anterior to Sabara Svamin. It is well known that the *Sphota-vada* has been promulgated by Panini, Patanjali, and other vaiyakaranas. Sankara in his bhashya to sutra I. 3. 28, opposes the same and cites the authority of the venerable Upavarsha apparently with the object of opposing the ancient grammarian Panini whose name stands connected with the *sphota* theory. Sankara's statement in a way supports, the traditional view about Varsha, Upavarsha, and Panini recorded in the *Katha-sarit-sagara*. The *Katha-sarit-sagara* by Somadeva—a Kasmirian poet who composed his work about 1070 A. D., mentions the names of Varsha, Upavarsha, Panini, Patanjali, and others. According to this work Varsha is the guru of Panini and Upavarsha is the brother of Varsha. Somadeva himself states that his work has been based upon the work--*Brihat-katha* and has in no way deviated from the original. The original *Brihat-katha*, in the opinion of Bühler, must go to the first or second century A. D. Hence it appears to us that

the traditional opinion recorded in the Katha-sarit-sagara to the effect that Varsha and Upavarsha were the teachers of Panini has come down to us from an ancient time, and when it is viewed in the light of Sankara's statement does not seem to be unfounded. For the reasons stated above we are inclined to take Upavarsha as a teacher and contemporary of Panini. We are glad to note that Mahamahopadhyaya Haraprosada Sastrin in his able article on "Two Eternal Cities in the Province of Bihar ahd Orissa," has very recently held that the dates of Panini, Varsha, and Upavarsha must be earlier than 300 B. C., and thus his views are fairly in agreement with the conclusion we have come to above.* Now about the date of Bodhayana. As Sabara Svamin refers in his bhashya to the Vrittikara Bodhayana, Bodhayana must be earlier than Sabara. We have noted above Ramanuja calls him Bhagavan and places him at the head of the *Visishtadvaita* school. Now who is this Vrittikara Bodhayana ? We know of one *Bodhayana* also called *Baudhayana* who is the reputed author of the Srauta-sutras, Grihya-sutras, and Dharma-sutras. Is this Bodhayana the same person as the Vrittikara *Bodhayana* referred to by Ramanuja ? In the *Grihya-sutras* (iii. 11),is given the following list of teachers to whom reverence is shown : *Vaisampayana*, *Phalingu*, *Tittiri*, *Ukha*, *Atreya*, the *Padakara Kaundinya*, the *Vrittikara Kanva Bodhayana*, *Bharad-*

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* Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, Vol. VI. Part I.

dvaja, the *Sutrakara Apastamba*, etc. In the Baudhayana Grihya-sutras, we find almost the same names,—*Phalingu, Tittiri, Ukha, Aukhya Atreya*, the *Padakara Kaundinya*, the *Vrittikara Kanva Baudhayana*, the *Pravacanakara, Apastamba*, etc. Bühler holds that the word *Vrittikara* qualifies *Kaundinya* that is the word which precedes it and not *Kanva Bodhayana* which comes after : he will hardly be followed by any one in his rather far-fetched conclusion. The word *Vrittikara* naturally goes and is evidently an epithet of the name that follows. Moreover, we do not know of any *Vrittikara* of the name of *Kaundinya* but we know of one *Vrittikara* named *Bodhayana*. Hence it is but proper to view the *Vrittikara* as connected with *Kanva Bodhayana* than with *Kaundinya*. Further, from a comparative study of the philosophical views of the *Vrittikara Bodhayana* cited both by Sankara and Ramanuja and of the *Sutrakara Bodhayana* as contained in his Dharma-sutras, we are decidedly of opinion that these two Bodhayanas are the same person. According to the *Vrittikara Bodhayana* cited by Ramanuja, *karman* or work is but a stepping-stone to Brahmajnana.[A] This is exactly the view of the Bodhayana of the Dharma-sutras.[A'] The Vrittikara cited both by Sankara and Ramanuja is found to hold that *Paramatman* is above *jivatman* and after the attainment of final

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A "तदाह वृत्तिकारः 'वृत्तात् कर्म्माधिगमादनन्तरं ब्रह्मविविदिषा' ।"—
Vrittikara cited by Ramanuja in I. 1. 1

A' "एवमाचरन् ब्रह्मभूयाय कल्पते ।"—धर्म्म सू० २।७।१३

release *jivatman* abides in *Paramatman* as one spirit and passes beyond the fear of mundane existence.[B] The views of Bodhayana of the Dharma-sutras appear to be similar.[B'] The Vrittikara cited by Ramanuja holds that the *mukta* attains unity with the Highest in light or Divine nature only, but not in respect of the powers of creation, preservation, and destruction of the universe.[C] Bodhayana of the Dharma-sutras advocates similar views.[C'] The Vrittikara cited by Sankara is found to maintain that *gayatri* (गायत्री) is Brahman.[D] Bodhayana of the Dharma-sutras holds that *pranava* is Brahman.[D'] The similarity of the views of the two Bodhayanas cited above, I think, is sufficient to establish their identity. Thus in our opinion the

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B "यदा त्वेतस्मिन्नानन्दमये निरन्तरं तादात्म्यने प्रतितिष्ठति तदा संसारभयान्निवर्त्तत इति ।"—Vrittikara cited by Sankara in I. 1. 19.

"तदाह वृत्तिकारः—'भूमा त्वेवेति ब्रह्म, नामादिपरम्परया आत्मन ऊर्द्ध्वमस्योपदेशात्' इति ॥"—Vrittikara cited by Ramanuja in I. 3. 7.

B' "ब्रह्मणि स आत्माऽमृतत्वायेत्यात्मनम् ।"—धर्म्म सू० २।८।२२

"एवमेवैष आत्मानं तर्पयत्यात्मने नमस्कोरोति आत्मा ब्रह्मात्मा ज्योतिः ।"
धर्म्म सू० २।१०।२५

C "जगद्व्यापारवर्ज्जं समानो ज्योतिषा ।"—Vrittikara cited by Ramanuja in I. 1. 1.

C' "मुक्तो यो विधिनैतेन सर्वपापार्णसागरात् ।
आत्मानं मन्यते शुद्धं समर्थं सर्व्वकर्म्मसु ॥"—धर्म्म सू० ४।८।११

D "अपर आह—साक्षादेव गायत्रीशब्देन ब्रह्म प्रतिपाद्यते, संख्यासामान्यात् ॥"
शाङ्कर भाष्य १।१।२५

D' "प्रणवो ब्रह्म ।"—धर्म्म सू० ३।१।९०

Dharma-sutra-kara Bodhayana is identical with the *Vrittikara Bodhayana* referred to by Ramanuja, Sankara, and Sabara Svamin. According to Macdonell, Bodhayana's Dharma-sutras are older than those of Apastamba.* Professor Bühler places Apastamba between the 5th and 3rd centuries B. C., and Bodhayana in the 4th century B. C. But as in the list of teachers given both in the Grihya-sutras of Bharadvaja and Bodhayana. Bharadvaja intervenes between Bodhayana and Apastamba, Bodhayana ought to be placed a little earlier. So we cannot be far wrong if we place *Bodhayana* in the 5th century B. C. Hence we conclude that two ancient schools at least arose out of the Brahma-sutras one *advaita* founded by *Upavarsha*, and another *visishtadvaita* founded by Bodhayana and the texts of the Sutras must have been preserved by them in purity with great care. A few differences in the readings of the texts that have arisen must have arisen in the mnemonic stage just like the differences in the readings obtaining among the different *sakhas* of the Vedas or Upanishads. From these minor differences in the readings we cannot conclude anything with regard to the multiple authorship of the Brahma-sutras as Professor Belvalkar has very recently contended. The Brahma-sutras, according to the authoritative commentators, refer to the *Sankhya*, *Yoga*, *Vaiseshika*, and *Purva-mimansa* systems. As these systems have in a way been named in the Sutras, references to their

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* Macdonell, History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 259.

tenets are undoubted. They most probably refer to the *Nyaya**, *Buddhistic*, *Jaina*, *Pasupata*, *Pancharatra*, and *Barhaspatya* or *Charvaka* systems also. The *sutrakara* nowhere implies that he refers to these systems. But we learn from the commentators that these systems have been alluded to. Now the question arises, if the date we have fixed for the Sutras is correct, how can they possibly contain references to other philosophical systems which are generally believed to be of later origin ? In the first place, we point out that having regard to the date we have fixed for the Sutras, the very fact of their mention in the sutra, with the exception of the Sutras of Jaimini, which have been mentioned by name, *prima facie* makes it probable that these references are to their previous ancient forms not to the forms in which we find them now. We are glad to note that Svamin Vivekananda and Pandit Bidhusekhara Sastrin are in agreement with our views.* Svamiji is of opinion that all the philosophical systems of India including those of the Buddhists and the Jainas have taken their

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* Colebrooke's views (i. 352) that Gotama's teaching is noticed neither in the text nor in the commentaries upon it, appears to us erroneous. In our opinion in sutras II. 1. 11—12, the views of the *Nyaya* school with regard to the proof of God by reasoning have been disapproved by the *sutrakara* (vide Ramanuja's commentary).

* Vide Svamiji's work "भाववार कथा" in Bengalee, and Pandit Bidhusekhara Sastrin's article in J R A S, 1914, p.748.

rise from the Vedas. Let us now see if there is any likelihood of these systems having some previous ancient forms. Among the philosophical systems that have been discussed in the Sutras, Jaimini has been mentioned by name as we have already pointed out above. We have proved above that Jaimini was a disciple and contemporary of Veda-vyasa, and that both the Mimansas—*purva* and *uttara* formed one complete treatise in ancient days. So from their mutual quotations it is but reasonable to hold that they were composed at about the same time. From the words of Sankara and Sabara Svamin, it is clear to us that both *Upavarsha* and the *Vrittikara Bodhayana* had commentaries upon the Purva-mimansa Darsana. Sabara Svamin himself has noticed only a few differences in the readings of the sutras. Hence we may presume that Sutras of Jaimini have come down to us in an unpolluted form from ancient days and that it had no other ancient form. It is generally conceded that like—the two *Mimansas Sankhya* and *Yoga* formed but one comprehensive system in old days. This is equally true of the *Vaiseshika* and *Nyaya.* They too show clear traces of a common origin. Hence from a reference to one of these complementary systems in an ancient text, we can take for granted the existence of the other too.

Now to the texts which contain references to the philosophical systems treated of in the Brahma-sutras. Haribhadra Jaiña who died in 528 A. D, in his *Saddarasanasumuccaya-sutram* describes the (1)

Bauddha, (2) *Naiyayika*, (3) *Sankhya*, (4) *Jaina*, (5) *Vaiseshika*, and (6) *Jaiminiya* systems and also refers to the *Lokayata* system. Weber in his paper on the Bhagavati of the Jainas states that the following systems viz,—*Baisesiya* (Vaiseshika), *Buddhasasana*, *Kavila* (Kapila), *Logayata* (Lokayata), and *Satthi-tanta* (Shashti-tantra) have been mentioned in the sacred literature of the Jainas.* The theory of the *anus* or or atoms taught in the *Tatvarthadhigama-sutram* by Umasvati-vacaka (1st. century A. D.) indicates an acquaintance with the theory of the *anus* or atoms of the *Nyaya* and *Vaiseshika* schools.† The Lalitavistara (chap xii)—a work probably anterior to 70 A. D., mentions the names of the philosophical systems of the *Sankhya*, *Yoga*, *Vaiseshika*, *Hetu-vidya*, and *Barhaspatya*. In the Buddhistic Sanskrit text—Lankavatara—the names of *Kanada*, *Kapila*, *Akshapada*, and *Brihaspati* occur. Asvaghosha who is probably a contemporary of Kanishka in his *Buddhacarita* gives an account of a conversation between Buddha and Arada—a teacher of the *Sankhya* philosophy. The name *Sankhya* does not occur in that work but that of *Kapila* does (XII, 21). But in the Buddhistic text Visuddhi-magga (Chap. XVII) the *Sankhya* system has been mentioned by name. Charaka in his Sanhita—the earliest extant work on

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* Weber, History of Indian Literature, p. 236 (note 249).

† "अणवः स्कन्धाश्च।" "भेदसंघातेभ्य उत्पद्यन्ते।" "भेदादणुः।" "भेद-संघाताभ्यां चाक्षुषः।"—तत्त्वार्थाधिगमसूत्रम्

Hindu medicine deals with *Sankhya* and *Yoga*, and *Nyaya* and *Vaiseshika* as complementary systems.* The Brahma-jala-sutta mentioned above gives an account of the variety of philosophical opinions which were held in India at or even before the time of Buddha.† In this work we not only find clear traces of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy, but also of the *Lokayata*, *Jaina*, and all the philosophical systems of the Buddhists. The Katha-vatthu—a work on the earliest and most primitive form of Logic and Philosophy of the Buddhists, deals exhaustively with the points in which the eighteen sects of the Buddhists differed from each other. It presupposes the existence of all the philosophical schools of the Buddhists. Max Müller in his *Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* cites one passage from the Mahabharata, Anugita, Chapter XXIV, which not only proves the existence of the philosophical systems like those of the *Lokayata*, *Nyaya*, and *Mimansa* at the time of the Mahabharata, but also proves that the philosophical systems analogous to those of the *Sunyavadins*, *Saugatas*, and *Yogacharyas* were also in existence at that time.‡ In the *Narayaniya* section of the Santiparvan of the Mahabharata, we

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* Vide Charak Sanhita Sutrasthanam, and also Sarirasthanam.

† Vide Brahma-jala-sutta translated by Rhys Davids.

‡ Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 28-29.

find the names of the *Sankhya*, *Yoga*, *Pancharātra*, and *Pasupata* systems. The Mahabharata itself ascribes the origin of these systems to some ancient teachers. It is related therein that Paramarshi *Kapila* is the founder of the *Sankhya*, *Hiranyagarbha* is the founder of the *Yoga*, Siva is the founder of the *Pasupata*, and Narayana Himself that of the *Pancharatra*.* Hence it appears to us that Patanjali—the reputed author of the Yoga-sutras is merely a teacher of the school and is undoubtedly not its founder. In the *Santiparvan* and also in the *Anugita* we find a concise statement of the main principles of the *Sankhya* and *Yoga* schools. The name of Gautama appears in the work but not as the founder of any school. The name of *Charaka*—a Rakshasa occurs in the Mahabharata (Santiparvan, Chapters 35-38), and there is also reference to the school of Brihaspati.†

In the Mahabhashya, there is mention of the *Lokayata* system. In Panini the word *kevala* occurs (II. 1. 49) which may indicate a reference to the *Nyaya* system. In the Geeta there is reference to the *Sankhya* and *Yoga* as names of philosophical systems (II. 39), and it has been stated therein (V. 4-5) that only children and not sages take the two systems as different and the place which is gained by the *Sankhyas*

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* भारते, शान्ति-मोक्ष० । ३५०-६०-२-६४ ।

† "चतुर्व्विधा ह्यर्थसिद्धि वृंहस्पतिमतं यथा । पारम्पर्य्यं तथा दैवं काम्यं मैत्रमिति प्रभो ।"—Mahabharata, Santiparvan, Chapter 170 (Calcutta edition).

is also reached by the *Yogins*. In Discourse XIII. 20, we meet with a statement of the doctrines of *Prakriti* and *Purusha* on the lines of the *Sankhyas*, and in XIII. 23, we find the name of *Isvara* (Mahesvara) of the *Yoga* system. The name of *Kapila* also occurs in the Geeta (X. 26), but not that of Patanjali. In X. 32, there is a clear reference to the Nyaya system. * By-the-by we notice that Professor Garbe interprets the '*Yoga*' in Geeta IV. 2, as referring to *Patanjala Yoga*. B. G. Tilak in his Geeta-rahasya rightly points out that this interpretation is wholly untenable.

It is necessary to note there is frequent mention of the views of the *Charvakas*, *Laukayatikas*, *Barhaspatyas* in Sanskrit works. There must have existed a complete system of the school of *Brihaspati*, but no remnant of this old school has survived save occasional quotations, introduced with a view to their refutation in the commentaries of different scholiasts. The Sutras of Brihaspati are referred to by Bhaskarāacharya in his bhashya to the Brahmasutras (III. 3.53), and as he also gives an extract from that work, it is very likely that they existed in his time. Kautilya refers to the school of Brihaspati in his *Artha-sastra* (Book I. Chapter II.). Among the books mentioned in the *Lalita-vistara* as studied by Buddha a *Barhaspatyam* is mentioned. There are references in the *Mahabharata* and *Upanishads* (Maitrayana, and Chhandogya) to the principles of Brihaspati. Even in Vedic hymns (X.

* "प्रवक्तृद्वारेण वदनभेदानामिव वादजल्पवितण्डानामिव ग्रहणं प्रवदतामिति।"

—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

71, X. 72, and VIII. 96. 15) the name of Brihaspati is given, and a distinction has been made between a Brihaspati Angirasa and a Brihaspati Laukya (Laukayatika). But alas ! these Sutras composed by Brihaspati are lost. "It is a sad truth," says Professor Max Müller, " which we have to learn more and more, that of the old pre-Buddhistic literature we have but scanty fragments, that even these may be, in some cases, mere reproductions of lost originals, as in the case of the Sankhya-Sutras." * These *Barhaspatya Sutras* which treated of the views of the different schools of thinkers who denied the authority of the *Vedas* if discovered, might have cleared up many difficulties with regard to the origin of the current Buddhistic and Jaina philosophical systems.†

What we have said above about the antiquity of the philosophical systems alluded to in the Sutras proves that all these systems existed in some forms prior to the Christian era and some of them were very probably anterior to Panini. But when we take this fact along with the further fact that all these systems are referred to in the Brahma-sutras which must have been composed prior to Panini according to the evidence adduced above, we cannot but conclude that these philosophical systems must have existed prior to Panini in forms fit for discussion in the Sutras.

The views as to the date of the Sutras come to above are not in agreement with the views of Professor

* Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 113.

† Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, p. 135.

Jacobi.* Jacobi is of the opinion that the *vijnana-vada* is the logical conclusion of the *sunya-vada* and that the *sunya-vada* has been refuted in the Sutras. The *sunya-vada* was established by Nagarjuna who flourished about the end of the second century A. D. Hence the Brahma-sutras must have been composed somewhere between 200 and 500 A. D.

We are unable to subscribe to the views of Jacobi. The proposition that the *vijnanavada* is the logical conclusion of the *sunya-vada* is not only opposed to the views of the best Indian thinkers but is historically incorrect too. *Kumarila*, *Sankara*, *Vachaspati*, *Ramanuja*, *Nimvarka*, *Baladeva*, and others have, on the contrary, viewed *the sunyavada* as a logical consequence of the *vijnana-vada*. Sankara in his bhashya to sutra II. 2. 18, places the Buddhistic systems in the following logical order viz, (a) *sarvastitva-vada*, (b) *vijnana-vada*, and (c) *sunya-vada*. In his opinion the sutras 18–27 constitute the *samudayādhikarana* and the sutras 28—32 constitute the *abhavādhikarana*. In sutras 18—27, *sarvastitvavada* has been controverted, and in sutras 28–32, *abhava-vada* has been refuted. The word *abhava* being sufficiently comprehensive it includes both *vijnana-vada* and *sunya-vada*. According to Sankara, in sutras 28—31 constituting the *abhavādhikarana* the *vijnana-vada* has been refuted and in sutra II. 2. 32 forming the last sutra of the same, both the *vijnana-vada* and the *sunya-vada* have been refuted ; for

* Vide J A V S Vol. XXXI. *Date of the Philosophical Sutras of the Brahmanas.*

the Acharya in his bhashya to sutra II. 2. 31 notes that the *sunya-vada* being opposed to all canons of proof the *sutrakara* takes no particular care to refute this theory. He implies thereby that only in the next sutra the *sunya-vada* along with the *vijnana-vada* has been refuted by the sutrakara and in none else. Hence Jacobi's view that according to the interpretation of Sankara the *sunya-vada* has nowhere been combated in the Sutras does not seem to be correct. Jacobi's standpoint is not correct historically either. On referring to the History of Philosophy both Indian and European it appears to us that positive systems arise first of all. When these systems are logically reduced, less positive systems arise, and when they are further reduced, destructive systems come into existence. We make our position more explicit by reference to the History of European Philosophy, which has taken a definite shape. On referring to Greek Philosophy, we find that the History of European Philosophy begins with some positive systems. When these systems were brought to their logical consequences, the principle of subjectivity first showed itself and this when further reduced resulted in the establishment of *Stoicism* on the one hand and *Epicureanism* on the other. It ultimately resulted in Scepticism. * On referring to the History of Modern Philosophy in Europe we find that a more consistent following out of Locke's Empiricism resulted in Hume's Scepticism and when it

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* Vide Schwegler, History of Philosophy, p. 134.

was further pushed to its ultimate consequence, arose the destructive systems of Sensualism and Materialism advocated by the French school.* Jocobi's contention that the *sunya-vada* alone has been refuted in the Brahma-sutras is opposed to the views of the existing scholiasts and we are not for accepting it. Even conceding that the *sunya-vada* has been refuted in the Sutras it does not appear to be a fact that the sunya-vada was first definitely established by Nagarjuna. It has been pointed out by Pandit Bidhusekhara Sastrin that the sunya-vada was evolved in the mind of Asvaghosa and other acharyas prior to Nagarjuna. † Prof. Berriedale Keith also seems to be of the opinion that both the *vijnana-vada* and *sunya-vada* may have existed earlier. ‡

We have stated above that there are traces of the *sunya-vada* in the *Brahma-jala-sutta*, *Katha-vatthu*, and even in the *Mahabharata*. It appears to be a teaching of a branch of the school of Brihaspati the original Sutras of which are not available. Hence it is not safe to date the *vijnana-vada* or the *sunya-vada* by the date of the author who first mentions it. Generally speaking, scholars must be very careful in fixing the date of an ancient cult or system. Even in the absence of any record of an earlier date, the presump-

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* Schwegler, History of Philosophy, p. 184.

† J R A S, 1914, pp. 747—48

‡ Vide, Keith, Sankhya System, p. 57, and also his article on Indian Philosophy, J R A S, 1914.

tion arises in favour of a date earlier than that of the author who first mentions. In this connexion we give below a pertinent observation of Farnell with reference to the history of Greek cults :

"The chronologic statement is embarassed by the absence of any record of date for the institution and diffusion of the most of cults, and for the growth of certain religious ideas ; nor can we safely date a religious fact by the date of the author who first mentions it ; a detail of ritual, a myth, a religious concept attested only by Pausanius or a late scholiast may descend from an age far anterior to the Homeric."*

The earliest Buddhistic literature such as *Mahapadhana-suttanta*, *Bhadra-kalpa-sutra*, *Culla-vagga*, and *Buddhavasma* allude to previous *Buddhas*. Even the *Bharaut Sculptures* bear testimony to the same. According to the earliest Jaina literature the last *Tirthankara* or *Jina* Mahavira Svamin is the 24th. in descent from the first Tirthankara Rishavadeva. Hence, according to the account, 23 *Jinas* preceded him. Scholars have generally failed to realise the real significance of these statements relating to previous *Buddhas* or *Jinas* and so have treated them as mere fictions. We are for accepting these stories of previous *Buddhas* or *Jinas* which in our opinion supply a missing link in the History of Indian Literature and are therefore highly useful for the purposes of tracing a connected historical development. In other words, these statements furnish us with a clue which enables to connect

* Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, VI. p. 394 b.

ideas and tenets proclaimed in the Buddhistic and Jaina literature with previous ones of analogous kind occurring in ancient Indian literature. Hence these traditions should be rejected on no account. These traditional opinions about previous *Buddhas* and *Jinas* make it probable that the systems analogous to the Buddhistic and Jaina philosophical systems have been handed down from ancient days. Hence the references to the Buddhistic and Jaina systems in the Brahma-sutras do not seem to be a bar to the date we have fixed.

Different theories on *Jivatman*.

Different theories on jivatman have existed in India from very ancient days.* Sankara in his bhashya to sutra I. 1. 1, notices some of these views. He says that unlearned people and the *Lokayatikas* hold that the body endowed with consciousness is the soul. Other people hold that the senses endowed with consciousness are the soul. Manas is the soul according to some. Fleeting ideas are the soul according to some others. Some maintain that the void is the soul. Some others hold that there is a soul distinct from the body which is an agent and enjoyer in the *samsara* stage. Some other thinkers hold that the soul is merely an enjoyer and not an agent, and that there is an all-knowing and all-powerful Isvara besides. Some other philosophers maintain that God Himself is the soul of the enjoyer. In the *Brahma-jala-sutta* noted above we notice an account of all these theories along with many others.*

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* Vide Chapter IV.

In the Mahabharata we come across many theories on *jivatman*. In the Brahma-sutras, some of the ancient theories on *jivatman* have been noticed. Aphorisms 20-22 of Adhyaya I, Pada IV., give a short account of the views of *Asmarathya*, *Audulomi*, and *Kasakritsna* on the relation of *jivatman* to Brahman. In sutras 5-7, Adhyaya IV., Pada IV., we find that Jaimini and Audulomi differ as to the form of the appearance of the released and that Badarayana reconciles them. In sutras 7-16, Adhyaya IV., Pada III., the views of Badari and Jaimini are given as to where the *vidvan* repairs on his death, and Badarayana's own views have also been mentioned in that connexion. These very teachers appear again to connexion with the question of assumption of bodies and sense-organs by the released (IV. 4.10-12). These teachers, as pointed above, carry us to ancient days. Any one going through the *Vedas*, *Brahmanas*, and *Upanishads* carefully, cannot but notice traces of different theories on *jivatman* from very old days in India. Scholars have already begun to explore that mine of ancient wisdom from an entirely detached and unprejudiced standpoint, and we venture to hope that their labours will bear fruits in no distant date. With these preliminary notes, we pass on to the subject-matter.

A. G.

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* Max Müller, Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, pp. 21-28.

JIVATMAN IN THE BRAHMA-SUTRAS

A COMPARATIVE STUDY.

CHAPTER I.

Scope and Method of the Vedanta Philosophy as compared with those of Hegel.

The Brahma-sutras, also known as the Vedanta or the Uttara Mimansa Philosophy, are mainly based on the teachings of the Upanishads. This philosophy is called the Aupanishada Darsana as well. Bādarāyana culled the choicest flowers from the revealed texts of the Upanishads and strung them together in the form of a garland which bears the name—Brahma-sutras.* It has proved a living source of inspiration to men of all ages. It has been a solace to many a devotee and will ever be a guide unto all seekers after truth.

Scope.

The Vedanta Philosophy aims at the acquisition of true knowledge regarding Brahman—the intelligent cause of the universe, omniscient and omnipotent, wholly pure and abundantly full of bliss and other auspicious qualities. The two words *'Jijnasa'* and *'Brahman'* occur in the text of the first sutra. The

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* "नन्विहापि तदेवोपन्यस्तं जन्मादिसूत्रे। न। वेदान्तवाक्यकुसुमग्रथनार्थत्वात् सूत्राणाम्। वेदान्तवाक्यानि हि सूत्रैरुदाहृत्य विचार्यन्ते॥"—Sankaracharya's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-2.

word '*Jijnäsä*' literally means 'the desire to know.' Every desire has something for its object. What the Vedanta Philosophy desires to know is Brahman. Thus it follows that the attainment of true knowledge regarding Brahman is the object of the Vedantic inquiry. The word knowledge ordinarily implies the existence of the subject and the object,—the knower and the known. But according to Sankarácharya and his school in true knowledge there cannot be any duality,—there cannot be any variety. It presents the same unchangeable aspect in the shape of a pure, undivided, unrelated mass of knowledge. The world's manifestation of duality in the form of the subject and the object,—the knower and the known is due to the work of *avidya* or *adhyasa* and as such is unreal. The *atman* or the self is free from all limitations, is beyond all relations. Even the idea of knowership cannot be ascribed to it. The *atman* is not a knower but a mass of eternal knowledge. It appears as a knowing and enjoying agent owing to the *adhyasa* or superimposition of the principle of egoity known as *ahankara.** The *atman* is a mere witness and as such the idea of personality must be foreign to it. That there is a state where there is absence of the notion of egoity is evident from the state of dreamless sleep. In the beatific state of final

* "एवमहंप्रत्ययिनमशेषस्वप्रचारसाक्षिणि प्रत्यगात्मन्यध्यस्य तं च प्रत्यगात्मानं सर्व्वसाक्षिणं तद्विपर्य्ययेणान्तःकरणादिष्वध्यस्यति। एवमयमनादिरनन्तो नैसर्गिकोऽध्यासो मिथ्याप्रत्ययरूपः कर्त्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वप्रवर्त्तकः सर्व्वलोकप्रत्यक्षः।"—Sankaracharya's Introduction to the Brahma-sutras.

release as well, the self is free from the limitation imposed by the material principle of egoity. One intelligent, unrelated principle being the only reality, the true object of the Vedanta Philosophy is to attain knowledge regarding this reality otherwise known as Brahman. But the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Srikantha have taken quite a different view of the matter. According to them, knowledge always implies the presence of the subject and the object,—the knower and the known. The apprehension of difference accompanies every state of consciousness. We cannot conceive of any state of consciousness where there is entire absence of distinction in some shape or other. If there is such a state it must be altogether unknown to us. No known criteria of proof can testify to its existence. Consciousness like luminosity must belong to an agent. To conceive consciousness without a conscious being,—knowledge without a knower, seems to be an impossibility. The example of dreamless sleep cannot help us in the matter. The idea of personality is potentially present even in that state; for on awaking, we realise that it is the same continuous 'I' that went to sleep, and that while asleep, we knew nothing at all,—we did not even know ourselves. The knowership of the *jiva* is a principle inseparable from the *jiva* and it cannot be due to the material principle of egoity known as *ahankara*; for in that case we have to assume that the quality of creating subjectivity can even belong to objective matter. The imposition of the idea of the ego upon the body is false, but the

knowership of the ego is not false. In the beatific condition of final release, the released individual self does not become identical in essence and powers with the Highest Self, but that it only acquires most of the auspicious and divine qualities of the Highest Self. The state of *moksha* is not one of mere attributeless intelligence, but it is a state in which the released goes on enjoying eternal bliss for ever. But in whatever way the question of true knowledge may be viewed it is certain that according to the Brahma-sutras such knowledge is true knowledge as arises from the actual experience of an objective reality [1]. Such knowledge is neither dependent on any injunction nor on the will of any person. Though it arises in the mind yet is it altogether independent of the mind. Being founded on the vision of an objective reality, nothing can alter its character. As Acharya Sankara puts it,—

"ज्ञानन्तु प्रमाणजन्यम्। प्रमाणन्तु यथाभूतवस्तुविषयम्। अतो ज्ञानं कर्त्तुमकर्त्तुमन्यथा वा कर्त्तुं न शक्यम्। केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् न चोदनातन्त्रम्, न पुरुषतन्त्रम्। तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम्।"—Sankaracharya's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-4[2].

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1 अतो न पुरुषव्यापारतन्त्रा ब्रह्मविद्या, किं तर्हि प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणविषयवस्तुज्ञानवत् वस्तुतन्त्रैव।"—Sankarácharya's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-4.

2 In this Essay I shall follow the numbering of the sutras as adopted by Sankarácharya.

We have stated above that the word '*Brahman*' also occurs in the first aphorism. The word literally means 'the greatest.'* Acharya Sankara contends that from the very root of the word '*Brahman*,' it follows that *Brahman* is eternal, pure, intelligent, free, all-knowing and all-powerful.

"**अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं, सर्व्वज्ञं, सर्व्वशक्तिसमन्वितम्। ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते, बृहतेर्धातोरर्थानुगमात्॥**"—Sankarácharya's Bhashya to sutra I-I-I.

Acharya Rámánuja holds that the word *Brahman* stands for the Highest Person who is, by nature, devoid of all evil, and possesses hosts of auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence. Brahman is so called owing to His possession of *brihattva* or greatness and His greatness consists in having qualities unsurpassed in excellence. Thus from the very root it follows that Brahman is great by nature as well as qualities unsurpassed in excellence and that He is alone the Lord of all.

"**ब्रह्मशब्देन च स्वभावतो निरस्तनिखिलदोषोऽनवधिकातिशयासंख्येयकल्याणगुणः पुरुषोत्तमोऽभिधीयते। सर्व्वत्र बृहत्वगुणयोगेन हि ब्रह्मशब्दः। बृहत्वञ्च स्वरूपेण गुणैश्च यत्रानवधिकातिशयं, सोऽस्य मुख्योऽर्थः, स च सर्व्वेश्वर एव,**

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* "बृहत्वाद् ब्रह्म गीयते"—इति महानिर्व्वाणतन्त्रे

"बृहत्वाद् बृंहणत्वाच्चतद्ब्रह्मेत्यभिधीयते।"—इति विष्णुपुराणे

अतो ब्रह्मशब्दस्तत्रैव मुख्यवृत्तः।"—Sribhashya to sutra I-I-I.

Now a further question arises—What are the characteristics of that Brahman whom the Vedanta Philosophy aims at attaining? Sankaracharya and his school at first sight seem to maintain that Brahman with attributes and powers is the object of the Vedantic inquiry.

"तद्ब्रह्म सर्व्वज्ञं सर्व्वशक्ति-जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकारणं वेदान्तशास्त्रादेव गम्यते। कथं, समन्वयात्। सर्व्वेषु वेदान्तेषु वाक्यानि तात्पर्य्येणैतस्य प्रतिपादकत्वेन समुपगतानि"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra I-I-4.

But as Acharya Sankara proceeds on with his Bhashya he gradually gives up this standpoint and comes to the conclusion that Brahman without any attributes and distinctions is the true Brahman and the Vedanta Philosophy aims at attaining absolute unity with Him. He has even gone so far as to maintain that the characteristics like bliss, omniscience, omnipotence, and causality cannot even belong to Him. So according to Acharya Sankara an attributeless unrelated infinite intelligence seems to be the proper object of the Vedantic inquiry.

तदेवमविद्यात्मकोपाधिपरिच्छेदापेक्ष्यमेवेश्वरस्येश्वरत्वं सर्व्वज्ञत्वं सर्व्वशक्तित्वञ्च न परमार्थतो विद्ययापास्तसर्व्वोपाधिस्वरूप

आत्मनोशित्रीशितव्यसर्व्वज्ञत्वादि-व्यवहार उपपद्यते।"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-14.

"अतश्चान्यतरलिङ्गपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्व्विकल्पमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्। सर्व्वत्र हि ब्रह्मस्वरूपप्रतिपादनपरेषु वाक्येषु 'अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययम्' इत्येवमादिष्वपास्तसमस्तविशेषमेव ब्रह्मोपदिश्यते॥"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra 3-2-11.

But the express teachings of the Sutras seem to be otherwise. The sutras 2 and 4 of the Páda I, Adhyaya I, unmistakingly point to Brahman—the all-intelligent cause of the universe as the object of the inquiry. The sutras 1-1-12[1] and 3-3-11[2] endow Him with bliss and other attributes. The sutras 1-2-1[3] and 1-2-2[4] characterise Him as possessing purity, truth in purpose and other attributes, and the sutra 2-1-30[5] assigns to Him omnipotence, omniscience, and other powers. Having regard to these and other sutras, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, and others have concluded that according to Bādarayana Brahman with attributes is the object of the inquiry.

"ये तु, निर्व्विशेषं वस्तु जिज्ञास्यम् इति वदन्ति, तन्मते 'ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा' 'जन्माद्यस्य यतः' इत्यसङ्गतं स्यात्; निरतिशयबृहत्, बृंहणञ्च ब्रह्मेति निर्वचनात्; तच्च ब्रह्म जगज्जन्मादिकारणमिति वचनाच्च। एवमुत्तरेष्वपि सूत्रगणेषु सूत्रोदाहृत-

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1. "आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्"। 2 "आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य"। 3 "सर्व्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्"। 4 "विवक्षितगुणोपपत्तेश्च"। 5 "सर्व्वोपेता च तद्दर्शनात्"।

श्रुतिषु चेत्तणाद्यन्वयदर्शनात् सूत्राणि सूत्रोदाहृताः श्रुतयश्च न तत्र प्रमाणम् ।"—Sribhashya to sutra 1-1-2.

They further point out that a Being devoid of all attributes and charactersistics cannot be known by any criterion of proof including even that of the Sāstras. The Sāstras cannot testify to a thing that is altogether attributeless and unrelated.

"तथा हि,—निर्विशेष-वस्तुवादिभि निर्विशेषवस्तुनि इदं प्रमाणमिति न शक्यते वक्तुम् ; सविशेषवस्तुविषयत्वात् सर्व-प्रमाणानाम् ।"—Sribhasya to sutra 1-1-1.

They further maintain that accordig to Acharya Sankara and his school from the standpoint of true knowledge (परमार्थ), all kinds of proof including the Sastras are unreal.* If so, it is difficult to see how they can transcend their sphere and bear testimony to anything that is not within their sphere. If the Sastras are unreal, then Brahman who is the object of the unreal Sastras becomes unreal as well, just like the knowledge as to fire inferred by wrongly taking aqueous vapour for smoke.

"इदं ततः—मिथ्याभूत-शास्त्रजन्यज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्यापि ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वम् ; यथा, धूमबुद्ध्या गृहीत-

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* "तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येवप्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि चेति ।"— Sankarácharya's preliminary remarks to the Sutras.

वाष्पजन्याग्निज्ञानस्य मिथ्यात्वेन तद्विषयस्याग्नेरपि मिथ्यात्वम् ॥"—Sribhashya to sutra 1-1-1.

There are sutras which, according to Sankara, teach that Brahman is devoid of all attributes. Ramanuja, Baladeva and others contend that they teach nothing of the kind. They further point out that the attributes like truth, knowledge, and bliss constitute the very nature of Brahman, and Brahman cannot be without them. To say that He does not possess all these attributes virtually amounts to His annihilation. The sutras like **'अरूपवदेव हि तत् प्राधान्यात्'**—(3-1-14), only teach that Brahman in His true nature does not possess any material (**प्राकृत**) and other inauspicious (**हेय**) attributes.* They never teach that Brahman is without attributes. We are at one with the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Srikantha in holding that Brahman with attributes is the object of the Vedantic inquiry and that an unrelated attributeless intelligence cannot be the object of any inquiry at all.

The Srutis enjoin that Brahman ought to be inquired into.† The Sutrakāra in the very first sutra teaches the same lesson. It may be asked why ? Most of the commentators are at one in holding that Brahman should be inquired into for the sake of *moksha* or final release.

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* "नचनिर्गुणवाक्यविरोधः प्राकृतहेयगुणविषयत्वात्तेषां—'निर्गुणं' 'निरञ्जनं' 'निष्कलं निष्क्रियं शान्तम्' इत्यादीनाम् ॥"—Ramanuja's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-1.

† "सोऽन्वेष्टव्य स विजिज्ञासितव्यः"—छान्दो. ८।७।१

They moreover maintain that on the attainment of true knowledge *avidya* or ignorance ceases and *moksha* results as a matter of course.

"व्रह्मावगति र्हि पुरुषार्थः। निःशेषसंसारवीजाविद्या-द्यनर्थनिवर्हणात्। तस्माद् व्रह्म जिज्ञासितव्यम्।"—
Sárirakabhashya to sutra I-I-I.

But it may further be asked, how does true knowledge arise ?—Does it arise from the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of the revealed texts or is it dependent on any mode of worship ? Sankaracharya and his school are of opinion that the cause of the bondage of the *jiva* is merely the perception of distinctions and is due to *avidya* or ignorance which veils the true nature of the *jiva*. This bondage is unreal and is totally destroyed by the knowledge of scriptural passages like "That thou art," "One who knows Brahman bocomes Brahman" etc., which teach the absolute identity of the *jiva* and Brahman. But Rāmānuja, Baladeva, and others maintain that the mere knowledge of what the Scripture says cannot destroy the bondage of *avidya* or ignorance which is a positive entity and that the actual knowledge arising out of worship of Brahman can alone produce such a result. In other words the true knowledge contemplated in the Vedanta Philosophy can alone arise from *dhyana* or unceasing communion with Brahman.* As Rāmanuja puts it,—

* "ध्यानं च तैलधारावदविच्छिन्न-स्मृतिसन्तानरूपा ध्रुवा स्मृतिः।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये।

अतो वाक्यार्थज्ञानादन्यदेव ध्यानोपासनादिशब्दवाच्यं ज्ञानं वेदान्तवाक्यैर्विधित्सितम् ।"—Sribhashya to sutra I-I-I.

Such *dhyana* is nothing but actual vision of God.*

"सेयं स्मृतिर्दर्शनरूपा प्रतिपादिता, दर्शनरूपता च प्रत्यक्षतापत्तिः ।"—Sribháshya to sutra I-I-I.

We have noted above that according to Sankará-charya and his school, on attaining final release, the *jiva* becomes Brahman Himself and issues forth in his own *chinmātrarupa*. But the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Srikantha hold that on final release the released sees all in Brahman and Brahman in all. In other words, the released realises all including himself as part and parcel of Brahman but does not attain absolute identity with Brahman. The distinction between the released and Brahman—as the seer and the seen, and enjoyer and the enjoyed, the ruler and the ruled does not pass away. Or how is it possible for the released—the seer, to communicate his experience to others ? But from whatever standpoint the question may be viewed it is undoubted that the Vedanta aims

* *Cf.* Plato.—"And thus having got rid of the foolishness of the body we shall be pure and hold converse with the pure, and knowledge of ourselves the clear light everywhere, which is no other than the light of truth."—Phaedo, Jowett's Translation.

at attaining a vision of Brahman as an organic whole—as an undivided objective reality.*

Any one going through the texts of the Brahma-sutras will find that in the Sutras besides Brahman various cognate subjects have been dealt with. The relation of Brahman with the universe and the jivas, different modes of worship of *Brahman*, departure and future stages of the jivas, and various other topics have found place within the Sutras. If Brahman is the only object of inquiry, how do all these matters come in ?

In answer to this query Acharya Sankara replies that Brahman being the highest of all is indeed the true object of inquiry. But all other matters which are necessary for the attainment of the knowledge of the highest necessarily fall within the field of the inquiry as well. When we say that the king is going, it as a matter of fact implies that the king with all his retinue is going.†

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* *Cf.* Plato.—"It has been proved to us by experience that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body—the soul in herself must behold things in themselves and then we shall attain the wisdom which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers."—Phaedo, Jowett's Translation.

† "तस्मिन् प्रधाने जिज्ञासाकर्मणि परिगृहीते यैर्जिज्ञासितैर्विना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासितं न भवति तान्यर्थाक्षिप्तान्येवेति न पृथक् सूत्रयितव्यानि। यथा राजासौ गच्छतीत्युक्ते सपरिवारस्य राज्ञो गमनमुक्तं भवति तद्वत्।" इति शाङ्करभाष्ये।

Thus we see that the attainment of true knowledge regarding Brahman and His relation with the universe and the *jivas* as an organic unity—the realisation of everything in Brahman and Brahman in everything as an objective reality, form the subject-matter of the Vedantic inquiry. Like the philosophies of Europe it is not merely a speculative attempt to know God but its aim is practical and speculative at the same time. Its aim is highly practical in the sense that it teaches men the way to true knowledge in the light of the revealed texts of the Upanishads. But it is speculative in the sense that it does not take the texts of the Upanishads as they are but classes them, defines them, interprets them, and thus eliminates the local and accidental texts from the really essential ones. It has been well said by Professor MaxMuller that it is at the same time a religion and a philosophy.*

Now to the method of the Vedanta Philosophy. The Brahma-sutras declare in unequivocal terms that Brahman cannot be established by reasoning. Reasoning unfounded on the revealed texts of the Sāstras simply leads on to an unending series of disputes and quibbles. It cannot be the source of truth regarding the Highest. Try to reason as best as you can you will never be in sight of any solid ground. You will ever be away from *moksha* which only arises from true knowledge that ever presents the same unchangeable

Method

* Vide his "Three Lectures on the Vedanta Philosophy" pp. 11-12.

aspect. This is the truth that has been propounded in the sutra 2-1-11[1]. In his Bhāshya to the above sutra Acharya Sankara rightly observes that what one establishes as true by reasoning inconsistent with the spirit of the Sāstras can be set aside by another powerful reasoner. What the latter establishes can as well be set aside by another reasoner more powerful still and so *ad infinitum*. Hence there cannot be any limit to reasoning about Brahman who is beyond all senses and reasoning. With regard to Brahman, the *Sāstras* are the only proof—the only guide.[2]

"इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यं। यस्मान्निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्र-निबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति। उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात्। तथाहि कैश्चिदभियुक्तै-र्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते। तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तस्ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्त इति न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुं पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात्॥"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-11.

All other commentators to the Sutras also follow the same line of reasoning.

The Brahma-sutras make a distinction between two spheres of existence—the thinkable and the unthinkable.

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1 "तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादप्यन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यविमोक्षप्रसङ्गः।"—२।१।११

2 "आगमाश्च द्रष्टा बोद्धा सर्व्वज्ञातेश्वर इति। बुद्ध्यादिभिश्चात्मलिङ्गै-र्निरुपाख्यम् ईश्वरम् प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानविषयातीतं कः शक्त उपपादयितुम्।"—Vatsyayana's Bhashya to Nyaya-sutras 4-1-21.

The sphere lying within Prakriti is thinkable and the sphere lying beyond is unthinkable. The five *bhutas*, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahankara* constitute the region of the thinkable existence. They are all simply transformations of Prakriti or Maya—the ultimate ground of the thinkable sphere.[1] The sphere lying beyond—Brahman Himself is the unthinkable sphere. The Sutras say that with respect to Brahman—the object of the unthinkable sphere, the Sāstras are the only guide. The sutras 1-1-3[2] and 2-1-27[3] express the above truth. In support of my contention, some commentaries are cited below :

"तथाचाहुः पौराणिकाः—'अचिन्त्याः खलु ये भावा न तांस्तर्केण योजयेत्। प्रकृतिभ्यः परं यच्च तदचिन्त्यस्य लक्षणम्।' इति। तस्माच्छब्दमूल एवातीन्द्रियार्थयाथात्म्याधिगमः॥"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-27.

"अत्यन्तातीन्द्रियत्वेन प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणाविषयतया ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रैकप्रमाणत्वात्॥"—Ramanuja's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-3.

"अविचिन्त्यार्थस्य शब्दैकप्रमाणत्वादित्यर्थः।"—Baladeva's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-27.

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1 "भूमिरापो ऽनलो वायुः खं मनो बुद्धिरेव च।
अहङ्कार इतीयं मे भिन्ना प्रकृतिरष्टधा॥"—गीता ७।४
"इतीयं यथोक्ता प्रकृतिर्मे ममेश्वरी माया शक्तिरष्टधा भिन्ना भेदमागता।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये।

2 शास्त्रयोनित्वात्।" 3 "श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात्।"

"जगत्कारणं ब्रह्म वेदान्तशास्त्रैकगम्यम्, 'नाविदविन्मनुते तं बृहन्तम्' इत्यादिषु वेदान्तशास्त्रमन्तरेण बोधासम्भवात्॥"—Srikantha's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-3.

In fact the Brahma-sutras and all the commentators thereto have made a distinction between the thinkable and the unthinkable spheres of existence and have further maintained that the Sastras are the only proof with regard to the unthinkable sphere--Brahman Himself.*

It ought to be noted here that the Brahma-sutras discountenance reasoning not based on the revealed texts with regard to the unthinkable sphere only, but not with regard to the thinkable sphere. Reasoning carried on for the purpose of clear understanding and elucidation of the meaning of the Sastras has rather

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* *Cf.*—"The whole drift of my education goes to persuade me that the world of our present consciousness is only one out of many worlds of consciousness that exist, and that those other worlds must contain experiences which have a meaning for our life also ; and that although in the main their experiences and those of this world keep discrete, yet the two become continuous at certain points, and higher energies filter in."—Prof. James's "Varieties of Religious Experience".

"It is my firm belief that science will shortly prove the definite survival of man after death and the existence of a larger world which sways our thoughts and action."—Sir Oliver Lodge (1917).

been encouraged even in respect of the unthinkable sphere.

अत आगमवशेनागमानुसारितर्कवशेन च चेतनं ब्रह्म जगतः कारणं प्रकृतिश्चेति स्थितम् ।"—Sankara's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-11.

"'मन्तव्य' इति श्रुत्या तु स्वानुसारितर्कोऽभ्युपगतः। 'पूर्व्वापरविरोधेन कोऽर्थोऽत्राभिमतो भवेत्, इत्याद्यमूहनं तर्कः शुष्कतर्कन्तु वर्जयेत्,' इत्यादि स्मृतेः। गौतमादि-शुष्कतर्कहेयत्वन्तु वच्यते, तर्काप्रतिष्ठानादिति ।"—Baladeva's Bhashya to sutra 1-1-3.

"अतोऽतीन्द्रियेऽर्थे शास्त्रमेव प्रमाणम्; तदुपबृंहणायैव तर्क उपादेयः ।"—Ramanuja's Bhashya to sutra 2-1-11.

Now it is clear that the whole system of the Vedanta has been founded on the revealed texts of the Sastras and reasoning has found only a secondary place in it.*

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* "What religion reports, you must remember, always purports to be a fact of experience : the divine is actually present, religion says, and between it and ourselves relations of give and take are actual. If definite perceptions of fact like this cannot stand upon their own feet, surely abstract reasoning cannot give them the support they are in need of. * * Philosophy in this sphere is thus a secondary function, * *." Professor James's "Varieties of Religious Experience" pp. 454,455.

Now a question arises, why does the Vedanta give such a prominent place to the Sastras, and even go the length of calling them the only proof to Brahman ? In the first place it may be remarked that not only Bādarāyana but almost all the great teachers of the world have shown great reverence for the Sastras. Srikrishna in the Geeta teaches that no one can attain to perfection without the ordinances of the Scriptures[1]. Jesus of Nazareth teaches,—"I am not come to destroy the law, or the prophets : I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.'[2] Hajarat Mahammad makes "belief in the Book and the Prophet,"[3] an essential feature of righteousness. Since some of the greatest teachers of the world have shown predilection for the Scriptures, it may be presumed that the matter stands on sound reasoning.

I have said before that according to the Vedanta there are two spheres of existence—the thinkable and the unthinkable. Our sense-perceptions aided or unaided put us in possession of the facts of the thinkable sphere and by means of systematic thinking we attempt to discover laws and principles of that sphere. But besides the thinkable sphere there is an unthinkable sphere —'Brahmaloka' or 'Kingdom of heaven.' All the teachers of the world have borne testimony to such a sphere.

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1 "य: शास्त्रविधिमुत्सृज्य वर्त्तते कामकारत:।
न स सिद्धिमवाप्नोति न सुखं न परां गतिम् ॥"—गीता १६।२३

2 St. Matthew, Chapter 5.

3 Quran, Surá II, v. 172.

Eminent European thinkers like Plato, Plotinus, Kant, Jacobi, Lotze, and Prof. James have repeatedly pointed men to a 'larger world.' The tendency of modern science and the investigatons of the Psychical Research Society are also towards this invisible Kingdom[1]. To put the same thing in the words of Spencer,—

"The belief in the omnipresence of something which is beyond our intelligence is the most abstract of all beliefs and one which all religions possess in common. This belief has nothing to fear from the most inexorable logic."[2]

Now, if there is an unthinkable world, how can we know the facts of that world? Our sense-perceptions and thinking cannot help us in that direction. Our sense-preceptions supply us the facts of the sensible world and our thinking classes them, defines them, and interprets them. As Sully puts it,—

"Like imaginative production, thinking is nothing but the sum of processess of separation and combination carried out on sense-material."[3]

Thinking cannot go beyond the materials supplied by sense-preceptions and so evidently has nothing to do with the region which lies beyond senses and thinking.

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1 Vide my Bengalee work "Soundaryya-Tatwa" in which the subject has been treated in some detail.

2 Spencer, quoted in "History of the Problems of Philosophy," Vol. II. p. 343.

3 Sully's "Outlines of Psychology," p. 243.

The same matter has been formulated by Badarayana in the sutra—

"अव्यक्तमाह हि।"—3.2.23.

The Sruti declares that Brahman is beyond all senses, words, and understanding. Is it then to be concluded that Brahman is altogether unknowable as the Sceptics of Europe declare? The next sutra removes that doubt. The next sutra runs as follows:

"अपि संराधने प्रत्यक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ॥"—3.2.24.

Acharya Sankara in his commentary says,—"संराधनं च भक्तिध्यानप्रणिधानाद्यनुष्ठानम्"। All other commentators have also interpreted the sutra in the same way. In the above sutra it is expressly declared that Brahman can be known through *bhakti* or love. Call it '*bhakti*,' '*vijnana*,' 'love,' 'faith,' or 'belief', as you like, no body objects. The rose smells as sweet by whatever name it may be called. What I want to establish is that all the saints and teachers of the world declare in unquivocal terms that God—the unthinkable can be known face to face by a divine eye which develops in man under certain conditions.* We have filial affection, but it is developed in a man who has seen the face of a child. One who has got no child cannot realise what filial affection is. The attraction which a man experiences for the child of another man is not filial affection. A faculty never develops unless

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* Cf.—"न तु मां शक्यसे द्रष्टुमनेनैव स्वचक्षुषा।
दिव्यं ददामि ते चक्षुः पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् ॥"—गीता ११।८

it comes in contact with the object for which it is meant. The faculty of *bhakti* or love is only developed in a saint who has the fortune of seeing the loving face of God.* All the mysteries of the Kingdom of God can be known when this divine eye—this sense of intense love for God is developed. Thus it is clear that there is a stage in the life of a man when through *bhakti* he can see God face to face and know all about the mysteries of the universe. The seekers who have

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* *Cf.*—"We discover sensible things by our senses, rational things by our reason, things intellectual by understanding; but divine and celestial things he has reserved for the exercise of our faith, which is a kind of divine and superior sense in the soul."—Pilgrim's Progress, Part III.

"You will not enter Paradise until you have faith; and you will not complete your faith until you love one another."—Sayings of Muhammad. "In addition to reason, man has a certain faculty (taur) whereby he perceives hidden mysteries." Gulsha-i-Raz, Sowál VI.

"But the natural man receiveth not the things of the spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." —Corinthians I, Chapter 2.

"अपरेर सन्तान देखिले ताहार प्राणे एक प्रकार भालवासार उदय हइते पारे किन्तु ताहा अपत्य-स्नेह नय। सन्तानेर मुख ना देखिले येमन अपत्यस्नेह जन्मे ना, सेइरूप भक्तवत्सल सेइ परमेश्वरके ना पाइले, ताँहार प्रसन्न मुख ना देखिले, भक्तिलाभ हइते पारे ना। ये ईश्वर ये विषय, ताहा ना पाइले सेइ ईश्वर विश्वास हइते पारे ना।"— "Lectures and Sermons" by Paramaguru Srimadācharya Bijoykrishna Goswami.

reached that stage are called by the Sastras *rishis* or seers or prophets. Yaska in his Nirukta says that *rishis* are those who see into things supersensible.[1] Amarasingha—the oldest lexico-grapher of modern Sanskrit, says that *rishis* are those whose words are true.[2] The Geeta inculcates that seers of *tatwas* or realities are the persons who can alone instruct us in true knowledge.

"तद्विद्धि प्रणिपातेन परिप्रश्नेन सेवया ।
उपदेक्ष्यन्ति ते ज्ञानं ज्ञानिनस्तत्त्वदर्शिनः ॥"—गीता, ४।३४

Rishis are also known as *áptas*. Charaka-samhita—one of the oldest works on Indian medicine, details the characteristics of the *áptas* or seers.[3]

"रजस्तमोभ्यां निर्मुक्तास्तपोज्ञानबलेन ये ।
येषां त्रैकालममलं ज्ञानमव्याहतं सदा ॥
आप्ताः शिष्टा विबुद्धास्ते तेषां वाक्यमसंशयम् ।
सत्यं वक्ष्यन्ति ते कस्मांन्नसत्यं नीरजस्तमाः ॥
चरकसंहिता, सूत्रस्थानम्, ११ अध्यायः

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1 "ऋषिर्दर्शनात् ।"—निरुक्तम्, २।३।२

2 "ऋषयः सत्यवचसः"—इत्यमरः ।

3 "The prophet is endowed with qualities to which you possess nothing analogous, and which consequently you cannot possibly understand. How should you know their true nature, since one knows only what one can comprehend? But the transport which one attains by the method of the Sufis is like an immediate perception, as if one touched the objects with one's hand."—The Sufi Saint Al-Ghazzali.

Those who have become free from *gunas* by communion with God, who by their true knowledge can see into the past, the present, and the future, who are dispassionate and are ever awake, whose words are of undoubted significance, and who being free from *gunas* speak nothing but truth are *āptas* or seers.

Guru Nānak—a well-known saint of India, says that the Lord's words are true. He himself reveals them. His will is true, one who hears His praises is also true. Those who see unto truths become true as well. The Lord is true, nothing but truth.

"ग्रवद सत, सत प्रभु वकता ।
सुरत सत, सत यश शुनता ॥
वुझनहार की सत सभ होय ।
नानक, सत, सत, प्रभु सोय ॥"—

सुखमणी साहिव

Jesus of Nazareth says,—

"Verily, verily, I say unto thee, we speak that we do know and testify that we have seen ; and ye receive not our testimony."—St. John, Chapter 8.

Most of the commentators of the Brahma-sutras have also viewed the question in the same light. As the words of the *āptas* or seers, the Sastras are also regarded by them as infallible.[1] Words of rishis or seers

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1 "आप्तवाक्यलक्षणः शब्दस्तु न क्वापि व्यभिचरति हिमालये हिमं रत्नालये रत्नमित्यादिः। स हि तदनुग्राही तन्निरपेक्षस्तदगम्ये साधकतमश्च ।"—Baladeva's Bhashya to sutra 2.1.27.

contain nothing but truth. Unto them it is given to know the mysteries of the Kingdom of heaven.[1] Those that are without cannot understand them, they are foolishness unto them ; for by understanding we cannot receive the things of spirit of God. Truths of the unthinkable world can be discerned by the inner sense of the spirit alone. Sastras or Scriptures are simply the records of the spiritual experiences of the rishis or seers. They contain nothing but truths of the unthinkable world. As the records of the spiritual experiences of the rishis, as the records of their testimony, they have ever commanded respect and reverence, and have afforded peace and happiness unto mankind. This is the reason why the Sastras have been regarded as the only guide to the unthinkable world—Brahman Himself.

In Europe any one possessing strong commonsense and power of thinking has an inherent right to philosophize about God. But the Vedanta teaches otherwise. The search for God is a very solemn affair and any one carrying on honest search for Brahman must pass through certain preparatory stages—moral and religious. The sutra 3.4.27 [2] of the Brahmasutras is

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1. *Cf.* Plato : "And he who employs aright these memories is being initiated into perfect mysteries and alone becomes truly perfect. But, as he forgets earthly interests and is rapt in the divine, the vulgar deem him mad and rebuke him ; they do not see that he is inspired."—Phaedrus, Jowett's Translation.

2 "शमदमाद्युपेतः स्यात्तथाऽपि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामवश्यानुष्ठेयत्वात्"—३।४।२७

founded on a text of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad which teaches that a disciple, tranquil in mind, with the senses restrained, having given up desires, resigned and patient, and absorbed in communion, can see the Highest Self in the self.[1] The Geeta, which, according to Sankara, contains all that is best in the Vedas, inculcates that a person having faith in the revealed words and the spiritual guide, totally sunk in devotion, having mastery over the senses, obtains true knowledge, and swiftly goes to the supreme peace.[2] The great Sankara expresses the same truth somewhat differently thus :

"तस्माद्यथोक्तसाधनसंपत्त्यनन्तरं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा कर्त्तव्या।"—Bhashya to sutra I.I.I.

According to Sankara a student desirous of having true knowledge regarding Brahman must have the following attainments—(1) power of discriminating the eternal and the non-eternal, (2) indifference to the rewards of virtues here and hereafter, (3) restraint over the senses inner and outward etc., and (4) desire for final release.[3]

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1 "तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति"—बृ४।४।२३

2 श्रद्धावाँल्लभते ज्ञानं तत्परः संयतेन्द्रियः।
ज्ञानं लब्ध्वा परां शान्तिमचिरेणाधिगच्छति॥"—गीता ४।३९

3 "नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकः, इहामुत्रार्थभोगविरागः, शमदमादिसाधनसंपत्, मुमुक्षुत्वं च।"—
Sankaracharya's Bhashya to sutra I-I-I.

It is the express teaching of all the saints of the world that in order to obtain true knowledge of God we must go through certain moral and religious preparations. They are indispensably necessary, and no one can see God without them. The Vedanta Philosophy expressly lays down that any one earnestly seeking Brahman must have these requisites. The Vedantic method, to my mind, is quite on a par with the method of the sciences. The Vedantic and scientific verifications though superficially distinct are alike in kind. The observations made by Dr. Schiller with regard to the pragmatic claim for religion are equally applicable to the Vedantic method. "The pragmatic claim for religion," says Dr. Schiller, "therefore, is that to those who will take the first step and will to believe an encouraging amount of the appropriate verifications accrues. It is further pointed out that this procedure is quite consonant with the practice of science with regard to its axioms. Originally these are always postulates which have to be assumed before they can be proved and thus in a way 'make' the evidence which confirms them. Scientific and religious verifications, though superficially distinct are alike in kind."*

To sum up : The Vedanta aims at the attainment of true knowledge regarding Brahman—the all-intelligent cause of the universe, omniscient and omnipotent, entirely pure and abundantly full of bliss and other

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* Vide Dr. Schiller's Article on "Pragmatism" in Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th Edition.

qualities unsurpassed in excellence. True knowledge aimed at by the Sutras is not speculative knowledge but direct and immediate knowledge arising from the vision of Brahman Himself. The Sastras are the only guide with regard to Brahman who is beyond all thinking, and reasoning exercises only a secondary function with regard to His knowledge. As the records of the spiritual experiences of the rishis or seers, the Scriptures have ever commanded respect and reverence. The Vedantic and scientific methods though superficially distinct are alike in kind.

Let us now pass on to the scope and method of Hegel—in whom European Philosophy has reached its culminating point.

European Philosophy is simply 'reflection, the thinking consideration of things.' † All the sciences supply materials for philosophy, and philosophy attempts to find out the connective tissue underlying the empirical body of facts. Like the sciences,

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† *Cf.*—"Philosophy is the acquisition of true knowledge." —Plato.

"Philosophy is the science of principles and causes."—Aristotle.

"Philosophy is an activity that realizes a happy life through ideas and discussions."—Epicurus.

"Wisdom or Sophia is the knowledge of things human and divine."—Stoics.

"Philosophy is the knowledge of effects as dependent on their causes."—Hamilton.

philosophy does not take facts as they stand before our senses, as we find them in experience, but tries to find out the underlying link—the so-called 'diamond net' supporting, nay in a manner, constituting, the empirical facts, by means of thinking. But Hegel with whom European History of Philosophy ends,

Scope.

has conceived the scope of his philosophy somewhat differently. Hegel seeks an idealistic principle to which he may reduce all. He finds that idealistic principle in the Logical Idea—the highest category of his Logic. Hegel applies this principle to all things in such a manner as demonstrates its presence in all things, as reduces all things to its identity. Hegel has taken nothing as an existent fact, but has attempted to show that everything exists by a necessity of thought. It is not enough for him to show that the Logical Idea constitutes

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"Philosophy is a critical inquiry into foundations and limits of mind's faculty of knowledge."—Kant.

"Philosophy is the attainment of truth by the way of reason."—Ferrier.

"Philosophy is completely unified knowledge."—Spencer.

"To find out the ultimate meaning of the universe is the quest of philosophy."—Lotze

"Philosophy is the systematisation of the conceptions furnished by science."—Lewes.

"Philosophy is the science of principles."—Euberweg.

"It is the business of philosophy, as science of the whole, to expound the chief relations that constitute its complex nature."—Pringle-Pattison Seh.

the soul of Nature and Mind, but he thinks it incumbent on him to show that they evolve out of the very thought-nature of the Logical Idea. In other words, it must be shown that they cannot not be. Hegel himself defines the scope of his own philosophy thus :

"Philosophy has to consider its object in its necessity, not, indeed, in its subjective necessity or external arrangement, classification etc., but it has to unfold and demonstrate the object out of the necessity of its own inner nature."

Hegel demands that everything must be constructed as a necessity of thought, and it is this characteristic which particularly marks out his own system from those of his predecessors.

Method.

Now to the method of Hegel. In order to understand the method of Hegel better, we must go back to Kant and his predecessors. Descartes demonstrates the antithesis of thought and reality, mind and matter. Thought is the essence of mind, extension is the essence of matter. They are essentially of opposed nature and have nothing in common. Though they are essentially diverse, yet mind acts upon matter, and matter upon mind. How is it possible ? He attempts a solution of the interaction of mind and matter, but it succeeds ill with him. Nor does the solution succeed better in the hands of his immediate successors. Spinoza tries to obviate the dufficulty by affirming that spirit and matter, thought and extension are one in the infinte substance; but still he looks on mind only

as mind, matter only as matter. So as a matter of fact the one excludes the other, and they do not become one in themselves. A true solution of the difficulty lies in the removal of the inner opposition of mind and matter. There are, therefore, two ways possible,—either to explain the ideal from the side of the material, or to explain the material from the side of the ideal. Both these attempts have been made by thinkers almost simultaneously under the names of Empiricism and Idealism, which have divided the philosophical world since. The explanation of the ideal from and by the material initiated by Locke, consistently followed by Hume, has ended in thorough-going empiricism, in the reduction of spirit to matter, in the denial of spirit generally. The explanation of the material from and by the ideal was attempted both by Leibnitz and Berkeley in their own way. It has culminated in Berkeley in the form of Dogmatic or Subjective Idealism, according to which, the matter has reality only in the mind of each individual person as a cluster of actual and possible sensations. Kant—the great restorer of Philosophy adopts a different line of thinking. To him the attempts of both the empiricists and idealists have appeared one-sided—dogmatic. He attempts to harmonize the special features of the schools. With the empiricists he holds, on the one hand, that experience is the only field of knowledge, that the *matter* of knowledge is supplied by experience. With the idealists he holds, on the other hand, that experience alone cannot explain the origin of knowledge and that

there are *a priori* factors, not traceable to experience, but provided for experience *a priori* in the mind which alone make experience—all connected knowledge possible. Kant's problem of philosophy is a humble one. It is simply an attempt to explain the origin of knowledge. With a view to explain the origin of cognition, he institutes a critical inquiry into our faculties both of the speculative and practical reason for the purpose of detecting *a priori* elements contained in our knowledge and as such his method is known as Criticism. It must be borne in mind that Kant taught that all knowledge is relative, and that 'things-in-themselves' are unknown to us. He consistently held that on grounds of pure reason we cannot demonstrate the ideas of God, free-will, and immortality. But though he banishes these ideas from the sphere of Pure Reason yet he restores them as postulates of Practical Reason. As mere practical presuppositions, they cannot afford any speculative certainty, and hence they remain open to doubt. Fichte steps in and questions Kant's dualism in ego as speculative and practical reason. He abolishes Kant's theoretical ego and conceives ego as exclusively practical—as will. He further conceives that the *matter* of knowledge is supplied by the ego itself. What we call the *matter* of knowledge is simply a limitation imposed by the ego itself. Fichte seeks an ultimate principle from which all others may be derived, and he finds that in his own ego. He starts from the ego—the fundamental thesis in which the opposites are sought by means of analysis

(antithesis), and these opposites are then re-united in a second, more concrete synthesis. But analysis discovers opposites in this second synthesis too. So a third synthesis becomes necessary, and so on,—till opposites are found which can approximately be joined together. This Fichtean method (Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis), is a combination of the analytic and synthetic methods.* As Fichte deduces all from the ego, his Idealism is pure and simple subjective Idealism. Schelling endeavours to escape from this subjectivity by restoring reality to the world which is conceived by him only as another pole of the Absolute. The Absolute of Schelling is a principle of identity of the ideal and real—pure indifference. This Absolute, which in its indifference embraces and reconciles the subject and object, is apprehended by us in an intellectual perception of our deepest being. That which in our minds arrives at self-consciousness is the very activity which in nature created the universe. The subject and object, however, are but the poles of one and the same Absolute, and they mutually seek each other. For attaining cognition of this absolute identity, Schelling attempts a new method. His method is neither analytic nor synthetic, nor anything like the mathematical method of Spinoza which influenced the previous period of his intellectual life. The logical forms, nay, even the metaphysical categories were considered beside his

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*Vide Schwegler, Erdmann, and other Histories of Philosophy.

purpose. He finds his method in the intellectual perception, which is absolute cognition—which is the absolute subject-object. In the intellectual perception, the opposition of thought and being disappears, and the identity of the ideal and real takes place. His method of intellectual perception is named by him construction. His method of construction is nothing else than a demonstration of how, in every particular object, the whole—the inner structure of the absolute, expresses itself. In short, he attempts to show that the absolute is in all, and all is in the absolute.* Schelling's philosophizing appeared to Hegel very defective. In Hegel's estimation, Schelling conceived his absolute in an abstractly objective manner. It is pure indifference, identity, from which there is no possibility of transition to the definite,—the real. As Hegel himself puts it,—"It is but the night in which all cows are black." Hegel's absolute is neither any individual—the ego like that of Fichte, nor is it pure indifference—identity like that of Schelling, but it is rather a universal in which the principle of difference is immanent, and which unfolds the entire wealth of the actuality exhibited by the worlds of mind and matter. In other words, it is a principle which unfolds and demonstrates "the object out of the necessity of its inner nature." Logic is the centre of the Hegelian system. The chain of categories unrolled in the Logic, forms, as it were, the foundation of all natural and

*Vide Schwegler's History of Philosophy.

spiritual life. To use Hegel's own words, "the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind take the place, as it were, of an applied Logic, and Logic is the soul which animates them both." * In the Logic every higher category is looked upon as the truth of the lower, and the Absolute Idea – the supreme category of the Logic is regarded as the full truth of which all the preceding categories are merely the imperfect expressions. The logical Idea - the abstract immaterial thought out of its own inner necessity passes into 'otherness' or externality in the form of nature and then comes back out of this self-externalisation as actual, self-cognisant thought—the Absolute Spirit. In the words of Schwegler, "This immanent spontaneous evolution of the notion is the method of Hegel." It appears to me that Hegel has drawn his conception of the immanent evolution from the evolution of a seed. As an acorn out of its own inner necessity passes into a full-grown oak, so the logical thought evolves the entire wealth of the worlds of spirit and matter out of its own inner necessity. Hegel's dialectical process starts with pure unification (thesis), which then passes out of its own inner necessity into opposites or divergent elements (antithesis), and finally returns as an internally articulated whole of divergent elements (synthesis).

"For example, the seed of the plant is an initial unity of life, which placed in its proper soil suffers disintegration into its constituents, and yet in virtue

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*Hegel's Logic, Wallace's translation p. 50.

of its vital unity keeps these divergent elements together, and reappears as the plant with its members in organic union. Or again, the scientific induction is a three-fold chain; the original hypothesis (the first unification of the fact) seems to melt away when confronted with opposite facts, and yet no scientific progress is possible unless the stimulus of the original unification is strong enough to clasp the discordant facts and establish a reunification. Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, a Fichtean formula, is generalized by Hegel into the perpetual law of thought.' *—Dr. Wallace's Article on Hegel, Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th Edition.

Though Hegel has taken his conception of development from that of a seed, he seems to have entirely misinterpreted the development of a seed. He conceives the development as a movement from aspect to aspect, from moment to moment, till it reaches its completion in the shape of a full-grown tree. In other words, the evolution of a seed has simply been taken by him

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* *Cf.*—"What Hegel attempts to show is just that the categories by which thought must determine its object are stages in a process that, beginning with the idea of 'being,' the simplest of all determinations, is driven on by its own dialectic till it reaches the idea of self-consciousness." Caird's Kant, iv, 443. Here Dr. Caird evidently borrows ideas from Kant, and puts them in the mouth of Hegel. This does not seem to be the true exposition of the dialectic.

as a differentiation of parts, of organs and functions, which go on developing in its own line, until they are re-united as a coherent whole in the shape of a fully developed tree. But this is far from the truth. "The real is", truly says Dr. B. N. Seal—the King George V. Professor of Philosophy in the University of Calcutta, "always a whole ; the abstraction of phases, aspects, moments, is unhistorical ; and organs and functions evolve, never independently, but always as participating in and dominated by the life of an organism as a whole. Development must therefore be conceived and explained as a passage from the whole to the whole, from an implicit to an explicit, from a less coherent to a more coherent, whole." * But Hegel follows quite a different process. He has viewed the earlier stages as abstract and negative, and only the later ones as concrete and positive. In fact he has passed from the abstract to the concrete which is a great blot of his system. Hegel's dialectical method has appeared to us very defective on the following grounds :

1. According to Hegel's own account, his method begins with an abstraction. In abstraction we forcibly hold apart the elements of thought which are found intimately united in their original form. The elements being only torn parts of a whole must strive to escape from this forced separation. In this way a self-evolving process will go on until the whole of which they are the parts, is completely restored. Among the critics of the

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* Vide Dr. Seal's Preface to "New Essays in Criticism."

method, the names of Hartmann and Trendelenburg stand foremost. I give below the criticism of Trendelenburg :—

"The dialectic," says Trendelenburg, "begins according to his declaration with abstraction ; for if 'pure being' is represented as equivalent to 'nothing', thought has reduced the fulness of the world to the merest emptiness. But it is the essence of abstraction that the elements of thought which in their original form are intimately united are violently held apart. What is thus isolated by abstraction, however, cannot but strive to escape from this forced position. Inasmuch as it is a torn part of a whole, it cannot but bear upon it the traces that it is only a part ; it must crave to be completed. When this completion takes place, there will arise a conception which contains the former itself. But inasmuch as one step of the original abstraction has been retraced, the new conception will repeat the process ; and this will go on until the full reality of perception has been restored.*" To our mind, Trendelenburg has truly discovered the secret of the so-called "inner necessity" of thought. But the matter does not end here. The question is, how can the abstract thought out of its own inner necessity evolve the concrete reality in the form of nature ? Dr. Stirling fully realises the difficulty. So he has, in his "Secret of Hegel," and Notes to Schwegler, tried to

* Trendelenburg quoted in Seth's' "Hegelianism and Personality."

explain away the above difficulty by pointing out that the starting-point of the Hegelian system is simple apprehension—"the pulse of actual living thought, and being and nothing, nor any mere abstract formula about synthesis, antithesis, position, negation, etc.[1]" But any one going through Hegel's Logic with an unbiassed mind cannot but conclude that Hegel's Logic begins with an abstraction—the pure being and also ends with an abstraction—the Absolute Idea. Logic, according to him, is "the Science of the Pure Idea," and he himself points out, "pure that is, because the Idea is in the *abstract* medium of thought.' The Absolute Idea, to quote him again, is "the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence, before the creation of nature, or any finite spirit." It is further admitted by Hegel himself that his whole system stands on his Logic, and the logical Idea—the supreme category of his Logic unfolds itself "in a process from the *abstract* to *concrete*.[2]' In face of such express declarations, I think, it is unreasonable to hold that his system begins with the living pulse of thought and not with an abstraction—the pure being. Dr. Stirling himself sees the untenableness of his position,

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1 Vide Dr. Stirling's Notes to Schwegler.

2 "As the logical Idea is seen to unfold in a process from the *abstract* to the *concrete*, so in the history of philosophy, the earliest systems are the most abstract, thus at the same time, the poorest." Hegel's Logic, Wallace's translation.

Hence is the following confession in his last Notes to Schwegler :

"Whether that Notion be really the pulse of thought—that is what is still to be verified—that is what I still doubt. So long as that doubt remains, I am not properly an Hegelian."

2. Some thinkers maintain that Hegel cannot be so foolish as to deduce nature from abstract thought. They say that his real meaning is that he regards nature as part of Absolute Experience. We may quote from one of Hegel's latest expositors, Dr. H. Haldar. "In passing on from Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel does not pretend to *deduce* nature but only draws attention to the element of particularity implied throughout the Logic, but abstracted from, for purposes of exposition. Thought is embodied in Absolute Experience and nature is a part of Absolute Experience*.' With due deference for Dr. Haldar who has made a special study of Hegel and the allied English school, I must say that his explanation is hardly tenable. Such a high authority as Dr. Wallace does not see this meaning in Hegel. "The natural world," says Dr. Wallace, "proceeds from the idea, the spiritual from the idea and nature. * * * But the thought thus regarded as the basis of all existence is not consciousness with its

* Dr. Haldar's "Hegelianism and Human Personality," pp. 56-57.

distinction of ego and non-ego. It is rather the stuff of which both mind and nature are made, neither extended as in the natural, nor self-centred as in mind.*" Prof. Sir Pringle-Pattison in his memorable work on "Hegelianisn and Personality," has established with reasons that, according to Hegel, thought out of its own inner necessity evolves the reality of things. "In fact, strive against the idea as we may," says Sir Pringle-Pattison, "it seems indubitable that there is here once more repeated in Hegel that extraordinary but apparently fascinating attempt to construct the world out of abstract thought or mere universals. The whole form and structure of the system, and the express declarations of its author at points of critical importance, combine to force this conviction upon us. The language used can only be interpreted to mean that thought out of its own abstract nature gives birth to the reality of things."—Hegelianism and Personality pp. 117-118.

I need not cite more authorities. Let Hegel himself corrborate my statement. I take the following passages from Wallace's translation of Hegel's Logic, (Second Edition) :—

1. "The real nature of the object is brought to light in reflection ; but it is no less true that this exertion of thought is *my* act. If this be so, the real

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* Vide Dr. Wallace's Article on Hegel, Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition.

nature is a product of *my* mind, in its character of thinking subject—generated by me in my simple universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences, in one word, in my Freedom."—Wallace, p. 44.

2. "And it is altogether wrong, it should be added, to call the categories of themselves empty, if it be meant that they and the logical Idea, of which they are the members, do not constitute the whole of philosophy, but necessarily lead onwards in due progress to the real departments of Nature and Mind. Only let the progress not be misunderstood. The logical Idea does not thereby come into possession of a context originally foreign to it: but by its own native action is specialized and developed to Nature and Mind."—Wallace, p. 91.

3. "If, (in pursuance of the foregoing remarks) we consider Logic to be the system of the pure thoughts, we find that the other philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind take place, as it were, of an applied Logic, and Logic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that case is only to recognise the logical forms under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind—shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought."—Wallace, p. 50.

4. "Enjoying however an absolute liberty, the Idea does not merely pass over into life, or as finite cognition allow life to show in it: in its own absolute truth

it resolves to let the 'moment' of its particularity, of the first characterisation and other-being, the immediate idea, as its reflected image, go forth freely as Nature." —Wallace, p. 379.

The passages quoted above are enough for my purpose. They unmistakingly show that, according to Hegel, the logical forms out of their own necessity give birth to nature. Dr. Haldar also admits that Hegel has nowhere said that nature is part of Absolute Experience, but is of opinion that this addition alone can save his system from utter stultification. I respectfully submit that the addition proposed is not only opposed to the express declarations of the author but also to the whole form and structure of the system. Such unwarranted addition cannot save the system from utter stultification. A host of thinkers from Schelling and Weisse downwards has pointed out that the system consistently can have no other meaning, and their powerful criticisms have almost tended to bring about the breakdown of the system. The whole of Germany, if one may so say, has rejected Hegelianism. In other parts of the continent, it has practically no influence. In Great Britain and America too, recent years have witnessed a violent reaction against Hegelian influence. Memorable criticisms of Hegelianism by Prof. Sir Pringle-Pattison, Prof. Fraser, and Prof. James have practically arrested its progress in these countries, and have led thinkers to reconsider its fundamental problems in relation to the fundamental

problems of religion.* "The Romantic attempt, "says Dr. Hoffding, "to reach a purely idealistic construction of the world-conception, concludes with Hegel. History dealt out to him the fate prescribed by his own dialectic, when once it was understood what a thorough-going speculative idealism involved, thought returned away in search of other starting-points and other methods."—History of Modern Philosophy vol II, p. 183.

3. The identity of thought and reality is the tacit presupposition of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel's doctrine of the Absolute Idea teaches us that all reality is spirit. The Absolute Idea—the last result of the Logic, forms the beginning of 'another sphere and science.' This abstract Idea craves for completion and gives rise to 'Idea as Being,' which is Nature†. The abstract categories of thought are regarded by him as "essentialities which can develop themselves according to their own inner laws." To use the words of Hegel himself, the "problem of the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind is to recognise the shapes which these categories assume in Nature and Mind." In fact Hegel has swept 'existential reality off the board altogether,' and has apparently acted under the logical

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*Vide Prof. Muirhead's Article on "Hegelianism in England," in the Encyclopedia Britannica 11th edition, and Prof. James' "Varieties of Religious Experience."

† "We began with Being, abstract being : where we now are we also have the Idea as Being : but this Idea as Being is Nature."—Wallace, p. 379.

bias that 'a full statement of all the thought-relations that constitute our knowledge of the thing is equivalent to the thing itself.'[1] In Hegel's opinion, logical categories are all in all, and men and things are merely types or exemplifications of these logical notions. As Dr. Stirling has it, Hegel 'demonstrates the presence of the notion in the most crass, refractory, extreme externality—demonstrates all but a concretion of the notion.'[2] Thus according to Hegel the thought is identical with the reality in the sense that the reality is but a concretion of the thought. The agreement of thought and reality in the sense preached by Hegel has never been accepted as the tacit presupposition either of philosophy or of science. Kant, Fichte, Lotze, Spencer, Pringle-Pattison and others have not seen their way to assert the identity of thought and being in the way taught by Hegel.[3] Knowledge is one thing, existence is another. The meanest thing that exists has a life of its own. The Knowledge we gain by reading the description of a living being, say a worm, in a work of zoology, is certainly not the living being itself. The description of the inner life in the pages of a work on psychology, is certainly not the inner life itself. To use Kant's words, 'the logical exposition of thought

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1 Vide Sir Pringle-Pattison's "Hegelianism and Personality."

2 Secret of Hegel, Vol I.

3 Vide the article "Philosophy" in the Encyclopedia Britannica 11th edition.

in general' must not be 'mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object.' Knowledge as knowledge, as Fichte puts it, is *ipso facto*, not reality. Let us look at the question from the standpoint of Psychology. Our sense-perception brings us in contact with the real—gives us knowledge of concrete objects or events. In order to carry the process of thinking to the last stage of unification, we take these concrete percepts and resolve them into as many abstractions (qualities or attributes of things, relations between things.) * It is one thing to view a particular object, or an event, another thing to elaborate an abstract idea, such as the scientific notion of force, fulcrum, and so forth. In thinking we give a new and peculiar form to our sense-percepts, by the special exertion of the forces of attention. As it becomes altogether a new product in thinking, there cannot be anything like it in nature. For example, when we see a particular tiger, we apprehend it as a reality. But when we bring it into relation with other members of the feline group and form our notion of the group tiger it becomes altogether a new product. There is nothing in nature corresponding to our notion of the group tiger. In fact there cannot be anything analogous to our general conceptions in the world of realities. The real is inaccessible by our general notions. As Bradley puts it,—

"The real is inaccessible by way of ideas......we

* Vide Sully's "Outlines of Psychology."

escape from ideas, and from mere universal, by a reference to the real which appears in perception."—Principles of Logic.

Hegel identifies logical notion with reality. He hypostatises the abstract unity of thought into a self-existent reality, and then evolves both the worlds of matter and mind out of its inner necessity. This unwarranted deification of the notion of knowledge in general has been the source of all evils in Hegel. There is a sense, however, in which the agreement of thought and being can be accepted. The cosmos of ours is a rational cosmos. It bears evidence of being constructed on a rational plan. The cosmos being a rational one, it is possible for us to see the interrelations of things, to discover reason in the universe. "The main support, the unfailing clue, of physical science is," says Sir Joseph Larmor—the Lucasian Professor of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge, "the principle that, nature being a rational cosmos, phenomena are related on the whole in the manner that reason would anticipate."[1] In this sense the agreement of thought and reality may be accepted. But the agreement of thought and being in the manner held by Hegel is however far beside the truth.[2]

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1 Wilde Lecture at Manchester, 1908.

2. I am glad to notice that such a high authority as Dr. B. N. Seal has also viewed the agreement of thought and reality or the dialectical method in the same light.

4. The chief defect of the Hegelian method, I think, is that it does not recognise the distinction between a thinkable and an unthinkable world. According to Hegel, there can not be any unthinkable world. He had an inherent aversion to seeking God in a sphere lying beyond the stars. God must be found here, he argued, or not at all. The world of sense is his finite world and the world of thought is his supersensible world—infinite world.* He knows of no other supersensible world. But the unthinkable world to which all the teachers of the world have pointed is certainly not

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"The dialectical method, it is essential to understand, is only a method of codification, of systematisation, of rational explanation, not a method of discovery. The dialectical method enables us to follow, not to anticipate, the process of things or the movement of history."—New Essays in Criticism," p. 13.

This conception of the method certainly cures it of many of its defects, but I respectfully submit that Hegel has never adopted this line of thinking.

* "The rise of thought beyond the world of sense, its passage from the finite to the infinite, the leap into the supersensible which it takes when it snaps asunder the links of the chain of sense, all transition is thought and nothing but thought. Say there must be no such passage, and you say there is to be no such thinking ; and in sooth, animals make no such transition. They never get further than sensation and perception of the senses, and in consequence they have no religion."—Hegel's Logic, Wallace's translation.

the world of thought as conceived by Hegel. The Upanishads teach that Brahman is beyond all speech and thought. The Vedanta has repeated the same tale. Buddha—the Enlightened refers to "an eternal abode of happiness beyond all desires."[1] The peace of God, according to St. Paul, "passeth all understanding." Muhammad speaks of a "world which has never flashed across the mind of man."[2] Even spencer talks of "omnipresence of something which is beyond our intelligence." Is it not then mere effrontery to narrow down God to a series of events upon this world ? Is it possible, says Lotze, "that the creative cause of the universe issued from its darkness into the light of manifestation only by the narrow path of earthly life, and after having formed man and human life again retreated into infinity, as if with all its ends accomplished ? For this dialectical idyll we must substitute an outlook into the boundlessness of other worlds, not with the vain effort to know the unknowable, but with the view of letting the boundlessness of this background mark out the narrow limits of the realm of existence actually knowable by us."[3]

Even a staunch Hegelian like Dr. Halder has taken this to be a weak point of the system. Non-recognition of an unthinkable world is not only a weak point of the system but is fatal to the system itself. The object

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1 "अधिगच्छे पदं सन्तं सङ्खारूपसमं सुखं।"—धम्मपद।

2 Vide "The sayings of Muhammad."

3 Lotze, Microcosmus I (English translation).

of the Hegelian system is to unfold and demonstrate every thing out of the inner necessity of thought. To say that there are other worlds which cannot be evolved out of the pure necessity of thought is to give up the method altogether. Hegel has equated his Absolute with the world of our present consciousness and has conceived it as exhaustively manifested in it. The development traced by him virtually relates to man's actual achievement in the spheres of the Positive Sciences, Psychology, Law, History, Aesthetics, Religion, and History of Philosophy. The edifice of institutions, laws, and customs, constitutes his domain of the Objective Spirit, and art, religion, and philosophy constitute his domain of the Absolute Spirit. It is very difficult to say what according to Hegel, nature is, the man as a subjective spirit is, and God is. Different thinkers have come to different conclusions as to Hegel's real view on these vital problems of humanity. In nature Hegel has seen nothing but impotence and has even compared the awe-inspiring stars of the firmament to the eruptive spots of the face. Hegel's nature is the Idea in the form of otherness, in the form of externality to itself. He regards nature as 'petrified intelligence' or as 'the corpse of the understanding.' In Hegel, the "man appears only as the vanishing centre of a system of knowledge, an exemplification of the form of consciousness in general," and as "the philosopher's knowledge is God's knowledge of Himself," the absolute philosopher is God Himself. It is impossible to discriminate in the account given between

the absolute philosopher and God[1]. He alludes to no other kind of revelation than what is contained in history, and his religion exists simply in the consciousness of the worshipping community. Dr. Mc Taggart who has been given the praise for throwing new light on the interpretation of Hegel concludes that Hegel's Absolute "is a unity of persons, but it is not a person itself," and as personality forms the essential attribute of God, it comes to this that "the Absolute is not God, and in consequence, that there is no God."[2] These are the express results of the system. His starting-point, particularly his method is responsible for all these defects. They can not be regarded merely as the accidents of the system. If they are the accidents of the system, I do not know what the essential points of the system are. A very statement of these results, to my mind, is sufficient for discrediting the system.

Hegelianism, particularly its method has satisfied few. Confining our attention to Great Britain and

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1. "Man's thought of God is existence of God. God has no independent being or existence ; He exists only in us. God does not know Himself ; it is we who know Him. While man thinks of and knows God, God knows and thinks of Himself and exists. God is the truth of man, and man is the reality of God."—Hegel quoted in Luthardt, 'Fundamental Truths', p. 66.

2. Vide Dr. Mc Taggart's "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology," and Dr. Haldar's "Hegelianism and Human Personality."

America alone, we find that Green, Stirling, Wallace, Fraser, Pringle-Pattison, Mc Taggart, and James have taken serious exception to the method of Hegel. In the words of Dr. Stirling, "this Dialectic, has led to much that is equivocal both in Hegel and in others, and may become a pest yet."* The sad failure of the Dialectical Method in which European thinking has culminated, lends but an additional support to the Vedantic dictum that God can not be established by reasoning. The application of any method based on pure thinking to matters lying strictly beyond thinking leads to results which are simply ludicrous. Western thinkers are beginning to realise that pure intellectual methods hardly succeed in matters spiritual and that they must resort to some other method for their solution. I can not better conclude this Chapter than in the wise words of Prof. James :

"In all sad sincerity I think we must conclude that the attempt to demonstrate by purely intellectual processes the truth of the deliverances of direct religious experience is absolutely hopeless." †

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* Vide Dr. Stirling's Notes to Schwegler, Fifteenth Impression, p. 445.

† Vide James's Varieties of Religious Experience, Twenty-Fourth Impression, p. 455.

CHAPTER II.

Four-fold Classification of the Jivas.

The Vedanta divides all existences into two broad classes—the *chetana* (conscious), and the *achetana* (unconscious). The characteristics of the *chetana* class are unlike those of the *achetana* class[1]. Hence the one can not be identified with the other. Bādarāyana while combating the Sānkhyas who ascribe the origin of the universe to one unconscious material principle—the *Pradhāna,* has clearly indicated the differences between the *chetana* and the *achetana* classes. Acharya Sankara in his memorable Bhāsya to the Sutras has recognised this well-known distinction.[2] But he has by way of explanation pointed out that this distinction obtains in the sphere of *vyavahāra* or convention only; in the sphere of *paramārtha* or true knowledge there can not be any such distinction. The world's multiplicity in the shape of the knower and the known, the enjoyer and the enjoyed, the worshipper and the worshipped, can not be regarded as totally false. Men live, move, and have their being in these phenomena; they can have practical dealings with them, and hence they are viewed by Sankara as true from practical standpoint. But when true knowledge arises all distinctions disappear, and one undivided consciousness flashes forth. Hence according to Sankara and his school from the

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1 *Cf*—"सेन्द्रियं चेतनं द्रव्यं निरिन्द्रियमचेतनम् ।"—चरक संहिता, सूत्रस्थानम्

2 "प्रसिद्धश्चायं चेतनाचेतनविभागो लोके ॥"—Sankara's Bhasya 2-1-4

standpoint of *paramārtha* or true knowledge one unrelated consciousness is the only reality.[1] But according to the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Srikantha all objects, conscious and unconscious, constitute the body of Brahman,—are nothing but the outward manifestations of Him and Him alone, and so they are equally true, equally real from the standpoint of true knowledge as well.[2]

The Vedanta further subdivides the *chetana* class into four subclasses viz.—*jarāyuja* (born of uterus), *andaja* (born of egg), *svedaja* (born of moisture), and *udvijja* (plants).[3] The Chhandogya Upanishad in a text speaks of the three *vijas* or seeds of the living beings, viz.—*āndaja*, *jivaja*, and *udvijja*.

"तेषां खल्वेषां भूतानां त्रीण्येव बीजानि भवन्ति आण्डजं जीवजमुद्भिज्जम् ।"—(छा: ६।३।१)

The above text appraently leaves out the *svedaja* class. But other Scriptures are for the four-fold classification of the jivas referred to above. For instance the Aitareya Upanishad not only alludes to the fourfold classification of the jivas, but views all the living beings inclusive of plants as conscious as well.

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1 "तच्च सम्यग्ज्ञानमेकरूपं वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात्। एकरूपेण ह्यवस्थितो योऽर्थः स परमार्थः ।" Sankara's Bhāsya to 2-1-11.

2 "जीवस्याचिद्वस्तुनश्च ब्रह्म प्रत्यंशत्वम् ।"—Sribhāsya to sutra 3-2-29

3 "उद्भिज्जम्—उद्भिनत्तीति उद्भित् स्थावरम्, धाना वा उद्भित्, ततो जायत इत्युद्भिज्जम् ; स्थावरबीजं स्थावराणां बीजमित्यर्थः ।"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये

"वीजानीतराणि चेतराणि चाण्डजानि च जारुजानि च स्वेदजानि चोद्भिज्जानि चाश्वा गावः पुरुषा हस्तिनो यत् किञ्चेदं प्राणि जङ्गमं च पतत्रि च यच्च स्थावरं सर्व्वं तत् प्रज्ञानेत्रम्।"

—इति ऐतरेयोपनिषत् ५।३।

Thus there arises an apparent inconsistency which is explained away by Bādarāyana in the following sutra—

"तृतीय शब्दावरोधः संशोकजस्य।"—ब्रह्मसूः ३।१।२१

"'आण्डजं जीवजमुद्भिज्जम्' इत्यत्र तृतीयोद्भिज्जशब्देनैव स्वेदजोपसंग्रहः कृतः प्रत्येतव्यः। उभयोरपि स्वेदजोद्भिज्जयो भूम्युदकोद्भेदप्रभवस्य तुल्यत्वात्।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

"जीवजं जरायुजम् मनुष्यादि, भूमिमुद्भिद्य जायते वृक्षादिकं, उदकं भित्वा जायते यूकादिजङ्गममिति भेदः। संशोकः स्वेदः।"—इति गोविन्दानन्दविरचित-रत्नप्रभायाम्

The Brahma-sutras thus reconcile the apparently conflicting texts of the Sastras by pointing out that the subclass *svedaja* is really included within the subclass *udvijja*. The *svedaja* animals make their appearance out of water, and plants out of the earth. Thus in view of their mode of first appearance on earth, the former subclass has been included within the latter. This fourfold classification of the jivas

has been adopted by Manú[1] and the Srimadbhāgabata Mahāpurana[2] as well.

It has rightly been pointed out by Dr. Seal in his admirable work on the "Positive Scienees of the Ancient Hindus" that Charaka and Susruta view the *udvijja* as a kind of animal as well[3]. Frog has been taken as an instance of this subclass. But in the Vedanta the subclass *udvijja* undoubtedly stands for plants.

The Hindus of old have offered a very peculiar theory to the whole world. They maintain that all the living beings including plants are conscious. Wherever there is consciousness, there is the soul. So in their estimate all the living beings, nay even plants possess souls[4]. Owing to the preponderance of the quality *tamas*, plants though inwardly conscious can not give vent to their conscious

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1 Vide Manu Samhita, slokas 43 to 46 in Adhyaya I.

2 "अण्डेषु पेशिषु तरुष्वविनिश्चितेषु
प्राणो हि जीवमुपधावति तत्र तत्र।"—इति श्रीमद्भागवते ११।३।४०

3 जङ्गमास्त्वपि चतुर्व्विधा जरायुजाण्डजस्वेदजोद्भिज्जाः। तत्र पशुमनुष्य-व्याघ्रादयो जरायुजाः। खगसर्पसरीसृपप्रभृतयोऽण्डजाः। कृमिकीटपिपीलिका-प्रभृतयः स्वेदजाः। इन्द्रगोपमण्डूकप्रभृतयः उद्भिज्जाः।"
—सुश्रुतसंहिता, सूत्रस्थानम् १।२३

4 *Cf.*—"सुखदुःखयोश्च ग्रहणात् छिन्नस्य च विरोहणात्।
जीवं पश्यामि वृक्षाणामचैतन्यं न विद्यते॥"
—इति महाभारते, शान्तिपर्व्व १८४।१७

experiences ; though inwardly feeling, they can not express their own feelings*.

The Chhandogya Sruti teaches that when the jiva leaves a branch of a tree, it dries up. When it leaves a second branch, it dries up too. When the third branch is left by the jiva, it follows the same course. When the jiva quits the whole, the whole dries up. This is true of other jivas as well. When the body is left by the jiva, it perishes, but the jiva never dies.

"अस्य यदेकां शाखां जीवो जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति द्वितीयां जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति तृतीयां जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति सर्व्वं जहाति सर्व्वः शुष्यति एवमेव खलु सौम्य विद्धीति होवाच जीवापेतं वाव किलेदं म्रियते न जीवो म्रियत इति ।"

—छान्दोग्योपनिषत् ६।११।२

It is not out of place to note here that Sir J. C. Bose—a true inheritor of the wisdom of the rishis of old has proved with the help of the apparatus especially constructed for the purpose that plants not only respond to stimuli like other living beings, but they possess nervous system as well. It is through their nervous system that they send stimuli or impulses to different parts of the body. This is one of the greatest discoveries of the world, and it has almost

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* *Cf.* "तमसा बहुरूपेण वेष्टिता कर्म्महेतुना ।
अन्तःसंज्ञा भवन्त्येते सुखदुःखसमन्विताः ॥"—मनुसंहिता १।४९

gone the length of establishing the old Hindu theory that plants too possess consciousness.*

On referring to the History of European Philosophy, we notice nothing of the kind. Plato speaks of three parts of the soul, viz.—the *nous* (divine), the *epithumia* (having desire), and the *thumos* (having something of the nature of each of the two others). These three parts of the soul are representatives of three classes of living beings. To the *epithumia* correspond plants ; to the *thumos*, animals ; to the *nous*, men. But he makes a distinction between the mortal and immortal parts of the soul. According to him the divine part of the soul which is a gift peculiar to men, is alone immortal. So his theory has very little in common with the theory of the Hindus. His disciple—Aristotle also speaks of three kinds of souls corresponding to three forms of life found in nature, namely the vegetable, the animal, and the human. The soul of plants is nutritive, that of animal is nutritive and sensitive, and the human soul alone possesses nutrition, sensation, and reason. In his opinion, the souls of plants and animals are fleeting and mortal, and the perfect and immortal form of the soul as characterized by reason is possessed by the human beings alone. Descartes—the father of modern Philosophy in Europe has viewed all animals only as

* *Cf.*—"We may speak, indeed, of the plant as possessed of a rudimentary nervous system, by the aid of which necessary adjustments are brought about."—Vide the Article "Plants" in Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

unintelligent automatons. They are devoid of souls. Men are alone thinking beings and as such they possess souls. The German philosopher, Leibintz, makes mention of three kinds of living beings—viz. (1) beings having mere life, (2) animals, and (3) men. The perceptions of beings having mere lives are unconscious and so they are mortal. Animals are endowed with distinct perceptions, i.e., with feelings and so they possess souls. Men endowed with reason and reflection are alone spirits, and are characterized by the possession of universal truths. All monads except those characterized by reason and reflection return to a condition similar to one they had before they appeared on the theatre of the world, and so they are not imperishable in the proper sense of the term. Men are alone immortal in his view. Wolff is of opinion that whatever is conscious of its own self and also of other things possesses a soul. The lower animals cannot possess souls in this sense. Souls characterized by will and understanding are spirits, and men being spirits are alone immortal. The German philosopher, Hegel, also denies souls to animals. He makes a distinction between living beings possessing sensation and perception, and those possessing thought. In his own words,—"the animals never get further than sensation and perception of the senses, and in consequence they have no religion."[1] It appears

1 Vide Hegel's Logic, Wallace's translation.

that according to Hegel the living beings possessing thought are alone immortal.

Recently in Europe, a reaction has already begun in an entirely opposite direction. It has been found that many of the actions of the lower animals largely resemble those of the human beings. Sexual union is met with in all but the lowest metazoa. Pairing and courtship are frequent among insects, and the mad dance of male fishes around their female companions has often been observed and admired.[1] Birds and mammals educate their offspring, and their offspring in their turn imitate their parents. Thinkers have even talked of intelligence, reasoning powers, and the language of animals.[2] Modern Psychology has sifted all these theories and has concluded that the theory which regards the actions of animals as purely mechanical and automatic is absurd. It has further pointed out that the so-called proofs of the intelligence of animals furnished by observers not conversant with psychology do not bear investigation. Animals possess all the psycholgical conditions necessary for the development of logical thought, but they are wanting in that power of volition which directs and regulates presentations, and gives rise to generalisation, to concepts, and ultimately to thought

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1 Vide "Evolution of Sex" by Geddes and Thomson.

2 *Cf.*—"Even language or, at any rate the linguistic impulse, is not wholly absent among brutes."—Darwin's "Descent of Man."

proper.[2] Modern psychological investigation so far as it goes, does not help us in settling finally whether animals possess souls in the sense men possess them. But it has given a final blow to the opinion that they are mere unintelligent automatons.

A vital reaction has taken place in the conception of the vegetable kingdom as well. Previously it was held that an insurmountable barrier lies between the animal and vegetable kingdoms. But after the memorable discoveries of Sir J. C. Bose with reference to the response of plants through their nervous system, western biologists have been gradually changing their old views with regard to plants. They have already begun to realise that plants respond to stimuli through their nervous system like other living beings, and probably possess "a kind of perception or appreciation of the changing conditions which affect them."*

Now to the classification of the jivas. In Europe, Aristotle for the first time attempted a classification of animals on the basis of their backbones. He divided animals into two classes—blood-holding animals (vertebrata), and bloodless animals (invertebrata). Linnaeus

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2 Vide Villa's "Contemporary Psychology," and also Baldwin's "Story of the Mind."

* "That such adjustment shall take place postulates on the part of a plant a kind of perception or appreciation of changing conditions which affect it."—Dr. Vines's Article on "Plants" in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

who followed him attempted a more scientific classification. He too divided animals into two broad classes —vertebrata and invertebrata. But he was the first to introduce into his enumeration of animals and plants a series of groups, viz., genus, order, class, which he compared to the subdivisions of an army or the sub-divisions of a territory. Lamarck and Cuvier who succeded Linnaeus, based their classifications on the backbones or their equivalents as well, but they somewhat improved upon his classification. Cuvier's classification held the ground till the introduction of the theory of organic evolution by Darwin Upon the promulgation of the doctrine of organic development the zoologists' angle of vision was changed. They learnt to view the different classes of animals as so many branches of the same genealogical tree which they had hitherto failed to do. Terms were introduced to indicate the branchings of the same tree. Phylum stood for a large diverging branch. Secondary branches were termed classes, classes were again divided into orders, orders into families, families into genera, genera into species. The cell-theory was gradually propounded. This theory which is now-a-days accepted as the theory with regard to the structure and development of organism, teaches that every cell originates by a process of division from a previously existing cell. All animals whether of miscroscopic size or larger size begin their existence as a single cell, and attain their development by the multiplication of the original single cell, so that from it there comes to be a coherent mass of cells very

many millions in number. Thus all the cells of an organism may be traced back to a single parent-cell, the fertilized egg. The zoologists have further found out on experiment and observation that all the higher, and the great majority of the lower animals are composed of a vast number of these vital units or cells. But in the case of many microscopic forms, however, the entire organism consists of a single cell. Having regard to their possession of one single cell or many, the zoologists have divided the entire animal kingdom into two broad divisions—unicellular and multicellular.*

In the west from very ancient times plants were treated as unconscious. But when Sir J. C. Bose pointed out the exact similarity between animals and plants in respect of response to external stimuli and when it was further pointed out that plants too possess nervous system, the attention of the western biologists was drawn in that direction. The methods of histological investigation were carefully and systematically applied to the study of plant organism and they were attended with wonderful results. It is now

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* "All animals except the vertebrates are often grouped together as invertebrata, or invertebrates. Phylum I differs from the remaining phyla in consisting of animals composed of a single cell. The remaining eleven phyla are therefore often grouped as Metazoa, or multicellular animals."—Parker and Haswell's "Text-book of Zoology."

universally recognised that in plant organisms too protoplasm forms the essential basis of life, and that all the peculiarities of the cell-wall can only be interpreted in the light of the needs of the living substance. It has enabled the cytologists to classify plants too upon a genealogical basis from the standpoint of their gradual building up by cell-division. Thus the vegetable kingdom too has been divided into two broad classes—unicellular and multicellular.

Now to the basis of the classification of the Hindus. It seems to me that the fourfold classification of the Hindus is a highly practical one, and is at the same time not unscientific. It is simply based on the mode of the first appearance of the living beings on earth. It is a matter of everyday experience that some animals come out of the uterus in a living state such as men, cows, lions, etc. All the uterus-born animals go to form the first subclass of the Vedantists. There are other animals which make their first appearance on earth in form of eggs such as crows, ducks, serpents etc., and are subsequently developed into living animals. These animals constitute the second subclass. Some living beings such as mosquitos, worms etc., seem to be generated out of moisture in living states, and others, for instance plants, come into being out of the earth. Plants are either flowering or flowerless. In the flowering plants, the seed is formed and plants in living states come out of the seed. In the flowerless plants no seed is formed and plants are disseminated by means of

unicellular bodies termed spores. But plants of all kinds come out of the earth in some shape or other. The moisture-born animals constitute the third subclass, and plants, the fourth subclass of the Vedanta. This is a very simple classification based on observation, and is sufficient for all practical purposes. The scientific classification on the basis of the backbones or on the basis of the cells, is not for all. Only the animal physiologists can say which animals possess backbones and which not. The classification on the basis of the cells as well, is not at all easy to follow. People in general can not follow it. But the Vedantic classification has this advantage that it suits all intellects, it can be grasped by all.

The Vedanta asserts that all living beings come out of the *vijas* or seeds, and that the subsequent development of the *vijas* or seeds becomes possible only on account of their connexion with the *jivas* or souls. In fact it refutes *in toto* the theory that the living can come out of the nonliving. It may be contended that it speaks of a class of living beings which are apparently generated out of moisture or heat, and so it virtually maintains the theory of *abiogenesis*. But when we remember that it has laid particular stress upon the *vijas* of the *bhutas* and has stated in clear words that the subsequent development of the seeds is only possible on acount of their connexion with the *jivas*, we can not consistently maintain that it promulgates the theory of *abiogenesis*. These cases

of generation have been viewed by them as cases of coming out of the *vijas* or living forms as well, and not as cases of coming out of the non-living.*

In Europe, the great Greek philosopher Thales traced the origin of life in water, and Anaximander in primitive mud. Aristotle also believed in the spontaneous development of life, and cited cases of eels and frogs as cases of spontaneous generation. In the Middle Ages, the doctrine of spontaneous generation was the accepted theory. The famous physician Van Helmont was an upholder of the theory of spontaneous generation. In the seventeenth century, Francesco Redi, a native of Italy, demonstrated for the first time the hypothesis known as *biogenesis* which teaches that all living organism springs from pre-existing living organism. † Valisneri—another Italian scientist, supported the view of Redi. But Father Needham and the naturalist Buffon who were supporters of *abiogenesis* produced experiments which seemed to refute Redi's. At about the same time Abbé Spallanzani with the help of the microscope clearly demonstrated the fallacy of spontaneous generation by experiments which were as conclusive as those of Pasteur a century later. In 1858, M. Pouchet, a French scientist, re-opened the question of spontaneous generation by a paper which was sent to the

* Vide Dr. Seal's "Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus."

† Vide Huxley's "Biogenesis and Abiogenesis—Discourses, Biological and Geological."

Academy of the Sciences. This roused Pasteur, who, after four years' incessant labour, showed clearly the impossibility of the spontaneous birth of germs. In the nineteenth century, particularly towards its latter half, there was a fight among the scientists over the question of spontaneous generation. M. Pouchet, Naegeli, Haeckel, and Bastian pleaded in favour of the generation of life *de novo*. Naegeli and Haeckel observe that "to reject abiogenesis is to admit a miracle." But Pasteur, Huxley, Lord Kelvin, Helmholtz and Wiesmann denounced it. Lord Kelvin characterises biogenesis "as sure a teaching of science as the law of gravitation."* Tyndall goes the length of observing that "it is unlikely that the notion of bacterial life developed from dead dust can ever regain currency among the members of a great scientific profession." † Wiesmann points out, I think very rightly, that spontaneous generation can never be proved on account of the ultra-microscopic nature of elementary life. As a matter of fact, many attempts have been made to generate life *de novo*, by chemically combining suitable materials and keeping them pleasantly warm for a long time, but they have failed sadly. Where all germs of pre-existing life have been completely destroyed, the experiment hitherto has been a failure. ‡ The only observer of eminence who has claimed to have obtained

* Vide Moore's "Origin and Nature of Life," p. 173.

† Vide Burke's "Origin of Life," p. 193.

‡ Vide Lodge's "Life and Matter," pp. 195-96.

experimentally the living from the nonliving, even to the present day, is Dr. Charlton Bastian. * But his views have been rejected by other biologists. The net result of the discussion has been well summarised by Dr. Mitchell thus:

"No biological generalization rests on a wider series of observations, or has been subjected to a more critical scrutiny than that every living organism has come into existence from the living portion or portions of a pre-existing organism." †

Thus there seems to be an impassable gulf between the inorganic and the organic which cannot be got over on the basis of the Evolution Theory. Failing in their attempts to explain life on the strength of Evolution, the scientists have resorted to the theories of *cosmozoa* or *pan-spermia* for the advent of life on earth. Lord Kelvin and Helmholtz postulate the former, Richter and Arrhenius the latter. The former regards life as carried by meteorites or fragments of planets that had borne life at the time of their destruction, and the latter regards life as borne from one planet to another by impalpable dust or pan-spermia scattered through all space. These stellar and interstellar theories hardly help us in forming a correct conception regarding the actual mode of origin of life, but rather drive us to a conveniently inaccessible corner for the

* Vide his latest work "Origin of Life" (1911).

† Vide his Article on "Biogenesis," in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

investigation of the question. Professor Schäfer in his presidential address to the British Association, Dundee, 1912, rightly characterises "these cosmic theories as inherently improbable—at least in comparison with the solution of the problem which the evolutionary hypothesis offers."* We have said above that according to the cell-theory all the cells of an organism can be traced to a single parent-cell—the fertilized egg. The cell is simply "a unit mass of living matter," or "a nucleated mass of prostoplasm." When the egg-cell—the starting-point of the embryo is supplemented by the male-cell or spermatozoon, its development begins. A fecundated egg-cell when it once begins to develop, goes on developing. We know of no means by which transmission may be made to deviate from its course. In fact from the time of fertilization we can neither put in one particle of evil nor one particle of good.† But on what does the future development of the zygoite depend ? Does it depend on the minute and ultramicroscopic structure of the germ itself or on any vital principle, conscious or unconscious, distinct from the organisation of living bodies, which directs all their

* Vide Moore's "Origin and Nature of Life," p. 176.

† "We have no experience of any means by which transmission may be made to deviate from its course, nor from the moment of fertilization can teaching or hygiene or exhortation pick out the particles of evil in that zygoite, or put in one particle of good." Thomson's "Heredity," p. 507.

actions and functions? Those who look at the question from the materialistic standpoint, are of opinion that the future development of the zygoite is due to the inner structure of the germ itself. They hold that the *biotic* energy which guides the development of the ovum is merely a form of energy, which arises in organic structure, just as magnetism appears in iron, or radio-activity in uranium or radium. To this class of thinkers, life is nothing but "a series of metabolic actions," or "a specialized mode of motion." It is admitted by the biologists of this class that the fertilized ovum of one animal, is structurally indistinguishable from that of another, and that it does not contain any thing representative of the many diverse structures that arise in the course of development. But they are of opinion that the fecundated eggs, though structurally indistinguishable, can pass into many diverse structures by virtue of some blind *biotic* energy which arises out of the structures of the germs themselves. If we adopt the above view of life, we are inevitably driven to the conclusion that the material molecular aggregate out of its own unaided latent power can generate consciousness and individuality, may enter regions of emotion, and even evolve ideas of the loftiest kind. In fact, we have to assume that science, philosophy, poetry, morality, nay, even religion, are nothing but the products of the latent power of the molecular aggregate. But these materialists do not see the absurdities they are landed in. The latent power of the material molecular aggregate is only known through a knowing agent. Take away

the knowing agent, it is nothing to us. These thinkers explain the knower—who is the necessary presupposition of all knowledge, by something which exists only as known—which exists only as an object of knowledge of that knower. In truth, they attempt an explanation of the knower by the known, of the living by the non-living, of the superior by the inferior. To say the least, such explanation can satisfy few. But there are thinkers who recognise in this extraordinary development, a contact between this material frame and immaterial something belonging to a universe higher than the one known to us. In other words, they postulate that "life may be something not only ultra-terrestrial, but even immaterial, something outside our present categories of matter and energy," though as real as they are, yet other than anything known to our senses. * But they do not exactly tell us what that immaterial something is, and how it comes to be connected with the body. But the Sutras of Bādarāyana have answered the question more definitely. The *jivas* in the *samsāra* stage at least are viewed by them, according to the interpretation of all the schools, as very minute conscious agents.† The *jivas* are, in fact, according to the Vedantists, ultramicroscopic in size. When a *jiva* passes out of the body, it does so enveloped by the subtle senses, the *manas* and

* Vide Lodge's "Life and Matter," pp. 198-99

† "तत्रैवमेव समञ्जसं स्याद्यदौपचारिकमणुत्वं जीवस्य भवेत् पारपार्थिकं चानन्त्यम् ।"—इति २।३।२९ शाङ्करभाष्ये ।

the chief *prãna* *. When it is re-incarnated owing to the consequences of its remaining *karman*, it draws forth the subtle *bhutas*, the *manas* and the chief *prana* along with it. Now the question is, how is it re-incarnated ? The Vedanta proclaims that the soul as enveloped by the subtle *bhutas* and the *manas* enters the body of the male along with the food and gets itself connected with the germ-cell. At the time of fertilisation, it enters the uterus along with the germ-cell and fecundates the egg-cell.[1] Thus the *jiva* becomes embodied. All the future development of the fertilised egg becomes possible on account of its connexion with the *jiva*. This is why from the time of fertilisation we can neither pick out the particles of evil in that zygoite nor put in one particle of good. The sutras 3.1.6[2], and 3.1.27[3] embody the above truth. Manu confirms the same story. He tells us that when the *jivas* as covered by the subtle *bhutas* and the *pranas* enter the *vijas* of the living beings movable and immovable, they are said to be generated.

"यदाणुमात्रिको भूत्वा वीजं स्थास्नु चरिष्णु च।
समाविशति संसृष्टस्तदा मूर्त्तिं विमुञ्चति॥"

मनुसंहिता, १।५६

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* "तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम्॥"—3-1-1.

1 *Cf.*—"योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः।
स्थाणुमन्येऽनुसंयान्ति यथाकर्म्म यथाश्रुतम्॥" कठोपनिषत् ५,७।

2 "रेतः सिग्योगोऽथ॥—3-1-6.

3 "योनेः शरीरम्॥"—3-1-27.

The Geetā imparts the same lesson differently. It teaches that when the *jiva* acquires a body and abandons it, it seizes and draws forth the subtle senses and the *manas* along with it, as the wind carries the fragrances from their abode.

"शरीरं यदवाप्नोति यच्चाप्युत्क्रामतीश्वरः ।
गृहीत्वैतानि संयाति वायुर्गन्धानिवाशयात् ॥"

—गीता, १५।१८

Thus it is clear that according to the Hindu Scriptures all the future development of the fertilised egg is due to the contact of the egg and the *jiva*, and the *jiva* alone possesses the power of vitalising the complex material aggregates which constitute, as it were, the organs of the soul, and of utilising them for its own purpose. The animated material frame, in due course, begins to move about and strive after objects. It gradually becomes conscious of its own mental and spiritual existence, and forms conceptions of truth, goodness, and beauty. It either achieves things of permanent value or degrades itself below the beasts. This is the gist of the Vedantic theory on the origin of life. This much can be urged in its favour at this stage of scientific development that it explains facts better than any of the existing theories. This theory was advanced long before the birth of philosophical thinking in Europe, and it certainly deserves very careful consideration of thinkers all over the world.

It is necessary to point out that the Brahma-sutras also speak of a separate life-principle known as the *mukhya prāna*. The *mukhya prāna* of the Vedanta, is nothing but "a sort of subtle, rarefied ether-principle, but is all the same subtilised matter, like the *manas* itself."* Sankara in his *bhashya* to the sutra 2.4.9, thus defines, the *mukhya prāna* :

"उच्यते वायुरेवायमध्यात्ममापन्नः पञ्चव्यूहो विशेषात्मनावतिष्ठमानः प्राणो नाम भण्यते न तत्त्वान्तरं नापि वायुमात्रम् ॥"

It may be contended that as the Vedanta Philosophy alludes to a separate life-principle called the *mukhya prāna*, the *jiva* is not the real life-principle. The sutrakāra has foreseen the above difficulty and so has cleared it up in the sutra 2.4.10[1]. It has been formulated therein that the *mukhya prāna* like the senses and the *manas* is to be viewed simply as an organ of the *jiva*, and not as a separate guiding principle. The *jiva* has been proclaimed as the *karta* or the agent in the sutra 2.3.39[2], and as the *adhyaksha* or the owner in the sutra 2.4.2[3]. In fact,

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*Vide Dr. Seal's "Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus."

1. "चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ॥"—2-4-10.

"तथा मुख्योऽपि प्राणो राजमन्त्रिवज्जीवस्य सर्वार्थकरत्वेनोपकरणभूतो न स्वतन्त्रः ।"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये

2. "कर्त्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ॥"—2-3-39.

3. "सोऽध्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ॥"—4-2-4.

according to the Vedanta, neither the senses nor the *manas*, nor the *mukhya prāna*, possess any power or agency ; all power really belongs to the *jiva* in the samsāra stage at least. The *jiva* being the real vitalising principle according to the Vedanta, all future development of the fertilised egg becomes possible on account of its connexion with the *jiva*.

To sum up. The Vedanta Philosophy divides the *jivas* into four subclasses viz.,—*jarāyuja*, *andaja*, *svedaja*, and *udvijja*, and views all of them inclusive of plants as conscious. There is nothing like it in the history of European Philosophy. European thinkers have gradually been changing their views regarding animal and plant lives. In the west, animals have either been classified on the basis of their backbones or on the basis of their cells. Plants have been classified on the basis of their cells as well. The Vedantic classification which is based on the mode of their first appearance on earth is highly practical. According to the Vedanta, the *jiva* is at the basis of the development of the fertilised egg ; and it rejects *in toto* the opinion that the living can come out of the non-living.

CHAPTER III.

The Jiva in its Connexion with the Body.

Common observation tells us that the knowing subject or the *jiva* stands in intimate relation to our body. The soul sways and controls the body, and the body as well sways and controls the soul. We know, feel, and do work of various kinds. All our conscious states have corresponding bodily concomitants. Phenomena of our conscious life affect our bodily organism, and change in our bodily organism causes corresponding change in our mental life. Mental excitement or fatigue is attended by excitement or fatigue of the body, and injury to the brain produces unconsciousness. Administration of chloroform and other drugs induces insensibility. Mental activity is followed by a flow of blood towards the brain and generates waste-products which are known to be elements of nerve-cells. Serious diseases make us totally unfit for mental work. These and other similar facts unmistakingly show that our conscious life correlates with and conditions our body. But how does the connexion between soul and body take place? To explain the interaction between mind and body, European thinkers, both ancient and modern, have resorted to various theories. Some are of opinion that the connexion between soul and body takes place through a particular part of the body which they call the "seat" of the soul. Some have located the

soul in the heart, others in the nervous system, particularly in the brain, others in the arteries, and others in various portions of the brain. Plato locates three distinct souls in three parts of the body, viz.—the *nous* in the head, the *thumos* in the breast, and the *epithumia* in the abdomen. But his real view on the interaction between soul and body seems to be, as has been pointed out by Schwegler, that it is "brought about by a lower sensuous faculty which he calls courage (coeur, heart), which seems as an intermediating link between the rational and irrational parts of the soul."* His disciple Aristotle allots the seat to the heart. After Aristotle, the Peripatetics and the Stoics insisted that the seat was in the heart, and the Physicians, foremost among whom was Galen, declared that it was in the brain. Aristotle's successors of the Alexandrian school of medicine, taught that the arteries carried a subtle kind of air or spirit, and Descartes locates the soul in the small pineal-gland towards which the animal spirits unceasingly ascend. Most of the modern physiologists and psychologists regard the nervous system, particularly the brain, as the seat of consciousness. Phrenologists Gall and Spurzheim divided the skull into several organs and supposed each of them to cover a definite area for some particular mental aptitude. But their views have been exploded by the researches of Flourens, Magendie, Longet and others. All the above-noted theorists virtually assume that mind and body are

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* Vide Swchegler's "History of Philosophy."

not entirely of alien nature and so they can act upon each other through a particular part of the body. But there are thinkers to whom this way of thinking has appeared repugnant. They take mind and body as two distinct principles and as altogether alien. Thought—the essence of mind is non-extended, and extension is the essence of matter—the body. Mind and body being independent entities, their interaction is impossible. The appearance of interaction is simply due to the special interpositions of divine power. This doctrine is known as Occasionalism Guelinx and Malebranche are its chief advocates. Leibnitz also calls in divine assistance for the explanation of the interaction, but he calls in only once for a single act at the beginning. In his view, soul and body do not really influence each other, but both proceed like two clocks started together in a *divinely pre-arranged correspondence*.* These theories have satisfied few, and so thinkers have attempted to overcome the opposition of mind and matter by either resolving mind into matter or matter into mind. The former doctrine, Materialism, reduces all entity to matter, and views conscious mind as a product of the same. La Mettrie, Cabanis, Vogt, and Moleschott advocate it. This view is open to the objection that it reduces consciousness to material processes which are wholly disparate from it, and also to the objection that it explains that which is immediately known *i. e.*, consciousness, by something which is indirectly known *i. e.*, matter.†

* Vide Maher's Psychology, p. 554.

† Vide Sully's Outlines of Psychology.

The latter doctrine, Idealism, regards spirit as the only reality, and views the material body in its inmost nature spiritual as well. Spinoza, Berkeley, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Lotze are among its best representatives. Spinoza views soul and body as the same thing, but expressed in the one case as consciousness in the other as extended matter. Berkeley views matter as a cluster of ideas existing in God, and further tells us that we receive these ideas from God. So the real interaction takes place between spirit and spirit, and not between spirit—the nonspatial—and matter—the spatial. Fichte holds that 'all that is, is ego,' inclusive of the external world which is but the self-limitation of the ego. Thus ego and matter being essentially one, they can not contain any inner diversity. Schelling regards spirit and nature as but the poles of one and the same spirit, and Hegel views both spirit and matter as manifestations of one idealistic principle—thought. Lotze holds that the living spirit of God and the world of living spirits, are alone real, and the material world has only reality in so far as it is the appearance of the spiritual substance which underlies it. Thus it appears that according to all the idealists, mind and matter are not opposed in nature, and that there is no bar to the interaction between mind and matter. But they do not exactly point out in what way the actual interaction takes place. The latest attempt to grapple with the problem is known as Monism. Monism in all its forms, teaches that "mind and matter are not two distinct realities but merely

two 'aspects,' 'sides,' or 'phases,' of one being, and that there is no real interaction between mental states and bodily states."* Clifford, Bain, Spencer, and Höffding are among the best advocates of the theory. Monism assumes that every particle of matter has its quasi-mental aspect, and that there is a parallelism between bodily facts and mental facts, but there is no interference of one with the other. But it is a matter of everyday experience that mental states and bodily states do not simply run parallel to one another, but they act on one another. When I will to raise up my hands I can immediately do so. When I want to see anything, my eyes are immediately directed towards the same. These and similar experiences cannot be regarded simply as cases of parallelism, but they are undoubtedly cases of interaction. From Plato and Aristotle downwards most of the philosophers have viewed them as cases of interaction and have tried to explain them from the same standpoint. So to deny the interaction between mind and matter is to deny one fact of the facts. Further, these monists fail to explain why one series of alien nature should run parallel to another. Their attempt to explain that every particle of matter has a quasimental aspect, is hardly worth any explanation. We have no experience of matter having a mental aspect. It is a pure guess. "It is no explanation," says Tyndall, "that objective and subjective are two sides of one and

* Vide Maher's Psychology, p. 505.

the same phenomenon. Why should the phenomenon have two sides ? There are plenty of molecular motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does water think or feel when it rises into frost ferns upon a window-pane ? If not, why should the molecular motions of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion, consciousness ?"* Further, conscious life, according to best thinkers, is an indivisible unity. It is, therefore, difficult to see how it can form an aspect of bodily life which is other than indivisible.† Harald Höffding—the ablest exponent of the doctrine of Psycho-physical parallelism fully realises the difficulty. And hence is his following honest confession :

"Concerning the inner relation between mind and matter, we teach nothing ; we suppose only that one being works in both. But what kind of being is this ? Why has it a double form of manifestation, why does not one suffice ? These are the questions which lie beyond the region of our knowledge.‡" If the Double-

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* Tyndall quoted in Maher's Psychology, p. 510.

† Fifty million molecules, even when they are highly complex and unstable phosphorized compounds gyrating in the most wonderful fashion with inconceivable rapidity, certainly do not constitute *one thing*. They do not, then, by molecular constitution and activities, constitute a physical basis conceivable as a representative or correlative one thing."—Ladd, Physiological Psychology, p. 595.

‡ Vide his Outlines of Psychology, p. 67.

Aspect theory cannot explain the interrelation of mind and matter, it virtually explains nothing. Further, it is unreasonable to explain a thing by something of which you know nothing. To use the words of Dr. Hodgson, "Whatever you are totally ignorant of, assert to be the explanation of everything else."* It is contended that the psychologists have propounded this theory from an apparent difficulty. If we assume that mind can act on matter or matter on mind, we have to suppose that the quantity of matter and energy in the universe is capable of being modified which is opposed to the doctrine of the conservation of matter and energy which teaches that the sum total of matter and energy in the universe always remains the same. In the words of Höffding, "at the point where the material nerve process should be converted into a mental activity a sum of physical energy would disappear without being made good by a corresponding sum of physical energy."[1] The monists assume that the principle of the conservation of matter and energy is applicable to living beings as well. But they hardly assign any reason in support of their dictum. According to well-known European thinkers, our conscious life has nothing in common with "matter and energy" known to the scientists. As Tyndall puts it, "the chasm between the two classes remains still intellectually

* Vide, Maher, *Psychology*, p. 524.

† Höffding, *Outlines of Psychology*, p. 55

impassable."[2] To put it in the words of Spencer, "That a feeling has nothing in common with a unit of motion becomes more than ever manifest when we bring them into juxtaposition."[3] If so, why do you then assume that both kinds of facts are governed by the same laws ? What possible objection can there be to take conscious life as a form of existence outside the scheme of mechanics capable of exercising guidance and control ? In fact, many eminent thinkers have done so. P. Couailhac in his Treatise on "The Liberty and the Conservation of Energy," (Paris, 1897), rightly points out that in every transition from potential to kinetic energy, the qualitative element or the direction is as real and important as the quantitative element—the velocity and mass. Given the quantity of energy, an infinite variety of paths lies open to it in the course of its transition. It is the directive element as distinguished from the quantitative element which determines the path it has to take. Take the case of a living organism. The fertilized egg contains the quantity of energy of the same. The biologists are of opinion that the fertilized eggs of different animals are structurally indistinguishable. Though at the outset they are of the same kind, yet in the course of development one passes into a dog, another into a serpent, and a third into a man. How does it come to pass ? It can not be the result of the quantity of energy contained in

1 Address to the British Association at Norwich.

2 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I.

the fertilized egg. Energy has no directing power. So there must be a directive principle distinct from the quantity of energy which determines the lines along which the embryo is to evolve in the course of its future development. This directive principle neither adds to nor reduces the quantity of the energy of the universe.* Sir Oliver Lodge also views the principle of the conservation of energy in a similar light. That eminent thinker observes that "philosophers have been far too apt to jump to the conclusion that because energy is constant, therefore no guidance is possible, so that all psychological or other interference is precluded." † In his opinion, this law of energy does not deny the possibility of guidance, control, or directing agency, but it relates to amount only. Physicists—Tait and Stewart have demonstrated that the doctrine of the Wilful School is not an absurdity. They are of opinion that it is possible for mind or will to produce all the consequences claimed by the Wilful School without adding energy to the universe.‡ Consequently the doctrine of the conservation of energy is really no bar to the interaction between mind and matter.

It is clear from the above short review that the majority of European thinkers have conceived mind as

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*Vide Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 522-523

† Vide his "Life and Matter," pp. 23-24, and also Chapter IX of the same work.

‡ Vide "The Unseen Universe" by Tait and Stewart, sections 111 and 112, and also p. 180.

non-extended and matter as extended and have virtually regarded them as of heterogeneous nature. Having thus conceived mind and matter they have experienced insuperable difficulty in bringing out the connexion between mind and matter. In order to get over the difficulty, some have resorted to divine assistance, others have either resolved mind into matter or matter into mind. We have seen above that all these attempts have hardly succeeded well. Being dissatisfied with all previous explanations, the monists have ultimately concluded that there is in fact no interaction between mind and matter and their seeming interaction is an illusion. It has been shown above that the interaction between mind and matter is a positive fact and that the monists have no right to treat the experience of so many thinkers as a mere chimera.* It seems

*cf.—"And all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely by the vibrations of this spirit (Ether), mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, from the brain into the muscles."—Newton's Principia, First Edition.

"I perceive, not as a theory, but as a fact, that life is itself a guiding principle, a controlling agency, i.e. that a live animal or plant can and does guide or influence the elements of inorganic nature."—Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p 134.

"In these and all other operations the office of man is, as has often been remarked, a very limited one ; it consists of moving things into certain places."—J. S. Mill quoted in the Article on "Art", Encyclopedia Britanica, 9th edition.

to us so long as we conceive mind and matter as entirely of opposed nature, there is no way out of the difficulty. So in order to explain the interaction between mind and matter successfully, the supposed heterogeneity must be removed. Kant suggests that "if we consider that both kinds of objects do not differ internally, but only in so far as the one appears externally to the other—consequently that which lies at the basis of phenomena as a thing-in-itself may not be heterogeneous, this difficulty disappears."* In Kant's opinion mind and matter as we know them are mere phenomena and we do not know anything of mind and matter as noumena or things-in-themselves. Kant's suggestions, though valuable, hardly help us in ascertaining how the actual union takes place. We are of opinion that in order to remove the supposed heterogeneity of mind and matter we must re-examine our starting-points somewhat on the lines of Kant. In other words, we must see whether mind is really non-extended and matter is extended as conceived by most of the European thinkers. Let us first begin with matter. According to European psychologists extension is the fundamental property of matter. By the word 'extension' they really mean 'extended magnitude.' As Dr. Bain puts it, "A tree or a river is said to possess extended magnitude. A pleasure has no length, breadth, or thickness it is;

* Critique of Pure Reason, Transcendental Dialectic, Book II, Chapter I.

in no respect an extended magnitude."* To express the same idea in the words of the physicists, we should say, matter possesses mass. Mass and matter are almost synonymous. Mass is defined as quantity of matter in any body, and it is proportional to its weight at any latitude. Every quantity of matter tends to remain for ever at rest when still, and in motion when moving. This property which is known as inertia is the true fundamental property of matter. Before the propagation of the electrical theory of matter the physicists could not conceive of any mass without this property. But since its enunciation they have changed their views. They are now of opinion that no property of matter is really and genuinely constant, and that matter in its primordial state loses all its known properties.† Before the discovery of radio-activity no less than eighty elements were known, none of which could be turned into any other, and each was therefore regarded as a fundamental form of matter, and the material world was thought as made up of various combinations and activities of all these elements. But when the property of radio-activity was discoverd by Becquerel in 1896, and when it was further demonstrated by Röntgen in 1905 that it was closely related to the X-rays, the conception of the material world underwent a vital change. Becquerel examined certain fluorescent substances and

* Bain's *Mental Science*, p. 1.

† Vide Sir Oliver Lodge's "Life and Matter," Chapter II, and Soddy's "Matter and Energy," pp. 69—70.

found that these substances also emit new kinds of rays, which, like the X-rays, pass through opaque substances like cardboard and thin metal foil and affect the photographic plate. He particularly proved that the element uranium exhibits this property under all cricumstances. Mme. Curie found that the element thorium possesses a similar property. She also succeeded in discovering a new element called by her radium which possesses radio-activity in a high degree. It resembles very closely barium and the other members of this family,—strontium and calcium. The radio-elements, uranium etc., exhibit an entirly new set of properties totally unconnected with the chemical properties hitherto known. When the different types of radio-activity produced either by an X-ray tube or a radio-active substance are examined they are found to consist of three types termed as alpha rays, beta rays, and gamma rays. They are distinguished, amongst other things, by their relative penetrating powers for substances such as the metals which are opaque to radiant heat or light. The metal aluminium is taken as a standard, and it has been found that the relative penetrating power of the alpha, beta, and gamma rays approximately are 1 : 100 : 10,000. The β-rays interest us most, for they affect the photographic plate powerfully and are capable of traversing metal foils. The beta particles are by far smaller than the alpha particles, and are identical with free-flying negative electrons. They carry negative electricity, and their velocity is, in some cases, almost that of light itself, the fastest velocity known. The mass of the electron

lies between the $\frac{1}{1000}$th and $\frac{1}{2000}$th of that of a hydrogen atom. As such electrons can be obtained either by spontaneous disruption of radio-elements, or, by means of electric energy from ordinary stable forms of matter, they are regarded as the constituents of ordinary atoms out of which such atoms are formed. The α-particle is many times larger than the β-particle, possessing nearly twice the mass of a hydrogen atom, and carries positive electricity. When the alpha-particle strikes against solid matter it enters some portion, loses its charge, and slowly diffuses out as an atom of helium. The γ-rays are very feeble and require active preparations for their production. They possess high penetrating powers and are regarded as irregular waves in the ether having the velocity of light. Ramsay and Soddy proved that radium is actually giving birth to the gas helium. The later experiments have shown that helium is the product not only of radium but most of the radio-active elements and that the α-particles are the same as the helium atoms. From the constancy of proportion between uranium and radium in minerals, the scientists presume that the former produces the latter. As lead is found in sufficient quantity in almost all uranium minerals it is generally conceded that lead is the final stable form of uranium. *

Lockyer in his "Inorganic Evolution," has shown that in the hottest stars the simplest forms of matter are present, and that the luminous bodies of the

*Vide Soddy, "Matter and Energy," Chapter IX.

heavens can be classified on that basis. * In the proto-hydrogen stars which are the hottest of all, a series of lines are met with which seem to stand in relationship to known hydrogen lines, and much fainter lines of helium, protomagnesium, and proto-calcium are also seen. In the proto-metallic stars, the precursors of such metals as iron, copper, manganese, nickel, tintanium, and calcium are met with. In the metallic stars the metallic spectra resembling those of calcium, iron, and manganese are visible, and in the fluted spectra, carbon or manganese with fainter metallic lines is found to exist. It is clear from spectroscopic investigation that the more primordial constituents are found to exist in the hottest stars and that as the temperature falls the ordinary elements make their appearance. The evidence of the heavens simply corroborates the results obtained from the investigation of the cathode rays, X-rays, and the radio-active disintegration of the atoms having high atomic weight. On the basis of these results, eminent scientists have come to the conclusion that atoms of matter are made up of positive and negative electrons which are always the same whatever source they are derived from, and the inertia of matter is probably only the inertia of the electro-magnetic medium. † On this theory, "molecular and atomic forces

* Vide Moore, "Origin of Life," Chapter III

†Vide Sir J. J. Thomson's Corpuscular Theory of Matter (1907), Sir Oliver Lodge's *Electrons*, 1905, Soddy's Interpretation of Radium (1909), and Rutherford's Radio-activity (1913).

would then be nothing but the manifestations of the electro-magnetic forces of the electrons and gravitation itself might be explained with these concepts as a basis." * But the electrons themselves require explanation. The only plausible theory which at present holds the field is "they are knots or twists or vortices, or some sort of either static or kinetic modification, of the ether of space." † Thus matter in its original state is nothing but knots or twists of frictionless, incompressible, and homogeneous ether which fills all space. This fluid as conceived does not possess any weight as it represents the zero of density or mass and can not be separated or weighed. It must not be supposed that the existence of this invisible fluid is purely imaginary. On the contrary, it is a necessity to the scientists in connection with the transmission of energy which can only be explained on the basis of such a medium. Thus we see that matter in its original state or as a thing-in-itself is not an 'extended magnitude,' and in the only sense it can be said to have extension in that state is that it occupies space. In that state it loses all its known properties and becomes, to use the words of Soddy, "mass without matter."

Let us now pass on to the conception of mind. European thinkers, generally speaking, conceive of mind as something non-extended. Known material

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* Vide Professor Augusto Righi's "Modern Theory of Physical Science."

† Vide Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 32.

things are extended magnitudes. They are inert, weighable, and composite. But no such properties belong to conscious phenomena. They may have reference to extended things but they are in no sense extended. To use the words of Dr. Bain,—"A thought or idea may have reference to extended things, but it can not be said to have extension in itself. Neither can we say that an act of the will, a desire, a belief, occupy dimensions in space. Hence all that comes within the sphere of the Subject is spoken of as the unextended.*"

Mind, as it is known to us, is undoubtedly other than inert, ponderable, and composite. It is a series of conscious states. But nevertheless it can not be treated as a mere series of conscious states without any bond of unity between them. If we regard it as a mere series of feelings, as the sensationists seem to maintain, we are inevitably driven to the absurd conclusion "that something which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings is aware of itself as a series." A series of feelings has no meaning except in relation to an abiding self which underlies the series. Our mental states are succeesive but the self of which they are the states is the same. To assert that our self is an 'indivisible unity,' or an 'unifying principle,' is not to explain it. We must not be deluded by words. But what kind of unity is this ? Is it a temporary unity or an everlasting unity ? Will it survive our bodily death ? Can this unity of consciousness exist apart from our

*Vide Bain's "Mental Science," p. 1.

bodily frame? These questions must be answered properly before we can understand mind as a unity. Their solution seems to lie beyond reasoning. These and other considerations have led eminent thinkers like Kant, Euler, Lodge and others to declare that mind as a thing-in-itself is unknown to us. Now to come to the point. Is mind extended or non-extended? Mind, as it is known to us, is certainly not extended in the sense of an 'extended magnitude,' like a chair and other material things. But a thing may occupy space without being an 'extended magnitude.' Ether as conceived by the scientists, is a homogeneous fluid without weight and inertia, but nevertheless it occupies space. Hence the question comes to this,—does mind occupy space or not? European psychologists hold that mental phenomena take place in time but not in space. Nevertheless they point out that mind is in the whole and every part of the body. That which is in the whole of the body certainly occupies the extended space of the body. That which *ex hypothesi* is non-extended can not occupy an extended sphere. Father Maher sees the difficulty. So he suggests that the soul is indeed present in the whole body but in a non-quantitative manner. By adding that it does so in a non-quantitative manner, he hardly improves the situation. The real difficulty remains as it is. The real difficulty is, how does something which is *ex hypothesi* non-extended exert its influence nonquantitatively throughout an extended sphere without actually occupying any part or whole of the

same? It is incorrect to say that which is present throughout an extended sphere non-quantatively, does not actually occupy it. Take the case of any energy, say light. Light, as conceived by the scientists at present, is nothing but the electro-magnetic wave-disturbance of the ether. When it acts throughout an extended sphere, it undoubtedly does so in a nonquantitative manner. It does at the same time occupy it. Such is also the case with the light of consciousness. Mind through its light of consciousness occupies the whole and every part of the body in a nonquantitative manner. Because it does so nonquantitatively, we must not say that it does not occupy it. Hence it appears to us that mental phenomena also take place both in space and time. Again, most of the European psychologists allude to the 'seat' of consciousness. They regard the nervous system, particularly the brain, as the 'seat.' By alluding to the 'seat' of consciousness they virtually regard the soul as a 'spatial simplicity akin to that of a mathematical point.'* If there is a focus in the nervous system from which light of consciousness radiates to different parts of the body, through the nervous channels, the soul can not be regarded non-extended as it is usually conceived to be. Further, on reference to the Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research we come across some cases at least, which, according to eminent men like Sir Oliver Lodge, Mr. Myers, Prof. Hyslop, Dr. Hodgson and others, can only be explained

* Vide Maher, *Psychology*, p. 562.

on the basis of spirit agency. We particularly draw attention of the reader to the case of the commercial traveller Mr. F. G. of Boston*, and to that of the Russian Baron Von Driesen[1]. The apparitions of the dead appeared before them in bodily form, and disappeared. The latter gentleman even shook the hand of the apparition. That the apparitions can assume forms under certain conditions prove that they have supersensible forms of some sort however fine or minute they may be. These forms can not be regarded as non-spatial. St. Paul[2] refers to 'natural body,' and also to 'spiritual body,' implying thereby the soul has a body or form of some sort. These considerations lead us to conclude that the soul can occupy space nonquantitatively, and that it has an immaterial form of some kind imperceptiple to the senses aided or unaided. Thus we see that not only matter occupies space but mind does so as well, and so there can not be any real difficulty regarding the interaction between mind and matter.

Let us now proceed to study the Vedantic conception of the *jiva* with special reference to the body. It is necessary to note in the first place that we can learn very little regarding the physiology of the

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* S. P. R Proceedings, Vol. VI, p. 16.

1 S. P. R Proceedings Vol. X, pp. 385-86.

2 "It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spritual body. There is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body." Corinthians, 15, 44.

body from the Brahma-sutras.* There are only three sutras in the whole of the Vedanta which contain references to the physiology of the bodily organism. For the convenience of discussion, I take up all these sutras together. The most important sutra on the subject occurs in the Adhyaya IV, Pāda II, where Bādarāyana describes the fate of the *vidvan* at the time of death. It is taught therein that there are hundred-and-one *nādis* in the locality of the *hridaya*. Out of them one termed *susumnā* passes up to the cranium. At the approach of death, the *vidvan* through the grace of the Lord and the power of the *vidyā* pursued breaks open the very fine knot of the *hridaya* and enters the path *susumnā* and moves upwards following a streak of light and ultimately passes out of the body by piercing the skull. The sutra runs as follows :

"तदोकोग्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात्तच्छेष-
गत्यनुस्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतः शताधिकया ॥"

—ब्रह्मसू० ४।२।१७

There is hardly any difference in the interpretation of the *sutra* and the commentators cite the following texts of the Upanishads by way of its elucidation :

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* Any one willing to study in detail the physiology of the ancient Hindus will do well to read Dr. Seal's admirable work on the "Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus," Chapter VI.

"तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति चक्षुष्टो वा मूर्ध्नो वान्येभ्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः।"—
(बृ० ४।४।२)

"शतं चैका च हृदयस्य नाड्यस्तासां मूर्धानमभिनिः-सृतैका। तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृतत्वमेति विष्वङ्ङन्या उत्क्रमणे भवन्ति।"—(छा० ८।६।६)

The second aphorism occurs in the Adhyāya II, Pāda III. Bādarāyana teaches that the *jiva* is very minute in size. The *purvapakshin* or objector contends that in that case the jiva cannot possibly occupy the whole of the body as it does. In reply, Bādarāyana points out that it does so just like the refreshing effect of a quantity of sandal-ointment applied to any part of the body. But it may further be objected that the analogy does not hold good, as the *jiva* has no particular abode. Bādarāyana points out that the analogy stands, as the Scriptures speak of *hridaya* as the abode of the *jiva*. Thus according to the Vedanta, *hridaya* is the seat of the *jiva*. We quote below the aphorism in question :

"अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदि हि॥"—
(ब्रह्मसू० २।३।२४)

The commentators cite 'हृदि ह्येष आत्मा' (प्रश्न० ३।६), 'स वा एष आत्मा हृदि' (छा० ८।३।३) and other scriptural texts by way of explaining the sutra under reference.

The third one occurs in Adhyāya III, Pāda II. After dwelling on the state of dream, Bādarāyana treats of the state of deep sleep. The *sutra 7* of the same Pāda teaches that when the *jiva* enters the *nādīs* and the Self, the state of dreaming ceases and the state of deep sleep comes in. The aphorism stands thus :—

"**तदभावो नाड़ीषु तच्छ्रुतेरात्मनि च।**"—(ब्रह्मसू० ३।२।७)

Sankarācharya quotes '**नाड़ीषु सृप्तो भवति**' (छा० ८।६।३), '**पुरीतति शेते**' (बृ० २।१।१८), and other scriptural texts for interpreting it.

The first aphorism refers to the hundred-and-one *nādis* of the *hridaya*. Out of these, one which has been identified by all the commentators with the *nādī susumnā*, is the most noteworthy; for it enables the *vidvan* to pass out of the body and finally to be united with *Brahman* - the Highest. The Vedanta only refers to the *nādī susumna*, but does not give any specific account of the same. We can have it from other Sāstras. The human body has two main parts—the upper and the lower. The head, trunk, and limbs constitute the upper part, and the legs and feet—the lower. In human beings particularly, the centre of the body lies at the base of the cerebro-spinal column where the legs begin. This column not only supports and controls the upper part of the body, but also the lower. The nerves and ganglionic masses of nervous matter in the human body are arranged in two great systems—the *sympathetic* and the *cerebro-spinal*. The brain and

spinal cord are the great centres of the cerebro-spinal system. They are contained within the bony cavity of the skull and spinal column. The *spinal cord* occupies the cavity of the latter, the brain (cerebrum) and cerebellum fill the cavity of the former. The *medulla oblongata* is but the portion of the cord within the skull, and swelling out in front of and above it, is the *pons varolii*, or the so-called bridge of the brain. The spinal cord extends in the spinal canal from the aperture in the cranial cavity above which it is continuous with the *medulla oblongata*, and ends below, about the lower border of the first lumbar vertebrata in a cone-shaped termination, from which passes a slender filament of grey substance (*filum terminale*), which lies in the midst of the roots of many nerves. *Brahmadanda* or *merudanda* of the Hindu physiology is the same as the spinal column of European physiology. It is the seat of the *nadi susumna* or *brahmanadi which extends* from the *muladhara* or root support situated at the base of the vertebral column in the perineum midway between the root of the genitals and the anus, to the *sahasrara* lying within the cerebral region. The spinal column is called *brahmadanda* as it contains the *nadi susumna* which really constitutes the path to Brahman – the Highest. It is also called *merudanda* as it is the axis of the body as Mount Meru is the axis of the earth. It is noteworthy that *filum terminale* which represents the position of the mulādhāra was formerly taken for a fibrous cord. Recent investigations have, however, dis-

covered the existence of highly sensitive grey matter which is undoubtedly a suitable vehicle for the transmission of psychic currents. The spinal column contains three *yoga-nadis* of special significance namely *ida*, *pingala*, and *susumna* among which *susumna* stands foremost. *Ida* lies on the left and *pingala* on the right of this master *nadi*. The *Yoga-sastras* of the Hindus lay special stress on this principal *nadi* and teach in effect that this *nadi* is the seat of all that is highest and best in the whole creation. This highest *nadi* which spreads from the *muladhara* to the *sahasrára* lying in the cerebrum, is in every way fit for the carriage of subtile forces. It is in fact the *cerebro-spinal* axis of the human body. The following texts deserve notice in this connection :—

गुदस्य पृष्ठभागेऽस्मिन् वीणादण्डस्य देहभृत् ।
दीर्घास्थि मूर्द्धपर्य्यन्तं ब्रह्मदण्डेति कथ्यते ॥ १३
तस्यान्ते सुषिरं सूक्ष्मं ब्रह्मनाड़ीति सूरिभिः । १४
इड़ापिङ्गलयोर्म्मध्ये सुषुम्ना सूक्ष्मरूपिणी ।
सर्व्वं प्रतिष्ठितं यस्मिन् सर्व्वगं सर्व्वतोमुखम् । १५

इति उत्तरगीता, द्वितीयोऽध्यायः

तिस्रः कोट्यस्तदर्धेन शरीरे नाड़यो मताः ।
तासु मुख्या दश प्रोक्तास्ताभ्यस्तिस्रो व्यवस्थिताः ॥ २८
प्रधाना मेरुदण्डेऽत्र चन्द्र-सूर्य्याग्निरूपिणी ।
इड़ा वामे स्थिता नाड़ी शुभ्रा तु चन्द्ररूपिणी ॥

श्रीदेवीभागवते देवीगीतायां षष्ठोऽध्यायः

"तालुमूले सुषुम्ना सा अधोवक्त्रा प्रवर्त्तते ।
मूलाधारस्थयोन्यन्ता सर्व्वनाड़ीसमाश्रिता ।
सा वीजभूता तत्त्वस्य ब्रह्ममार्गप्रदायिका ॥

श्रीशिवसंहिता, चतुर्थः पटलः

द्वासप्तति सहस्राणि नाड़ीद्वाराणि पंजरे ।
सुषुम्ना शांभवी शक्तिः शेषास्त्वेव निरर्थकाः ॥

हठयोगप्रदीपिका ४।१८

This illustrious *nadi* contains six subtile centres called *padmas* or *chakras*, invisible to our senses aided or unaided. They can be experienced through the eyes of *yoga* alone. These *padmas* or *chakras* beginning with the lowest are *muladhara*, *manipura*, *svadhisthana*, *anahata*, *visuddha*, and *ajna*.* The seventh region beyond the *chakras* is in the upper brain known as the *sahasrara*—the highest centre of manifestation of Brahman which can be reached only after the attainment of final release. According to some account there is another *nadi* called the *chitra* or *chitrinee* lying within the *nadi susumna* but the earliest Vedantists refer to the *nadi susumna* and *nadi susumna* alone.

"इड़ापिङ्गलयोर्म्मध्ये सुषुम्ना या भवेत्खलु ।
षट्स्थाने च षट्शक्तिं षट्पद्मं योगिनो विदुः ॥

श्रीशिवसंहिता २।२७

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* Vide Dr. Seal. *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*. *Chapter VI*, *sec. 5*, and Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shakta* pp. 70-75.

"अत ऊर्द्धं तालुमूले सहस्रारं सुशोभनम् ।
अस्ति यत्र सुषुम्नाया मूलं सविवरं स्थितम् ॥

श्रीशिवसंहिता ४।१६१

"तिसृष्वेका सुषुम्नैव मुख्या सा योगिवल्लभा ।
अन्यास्तदाश्रयं कृत्वा नाड्यः सन्ति हि देहिनाम् ॥
सर्व्वास्ताधोमुखा नाड्यः पद्मतन्तुनिभाः स्थिताः ।
पृष्ठवंशं समाश्रित्य सोमसूर्य्याग्निरूपिणी ॥
तासां मध्ये गता नाड़ी चित्रा स्यात् मम वल्लभा ।
ब्रह्मरन्ध्रञ्च तत्रैव सूक्ष्मात् सूक्ष्मतरं गतम् ॥

श्रीशिवसंहिता २।१६।१७।१८

तन्मध्ये चित्रिणी सा प्रणवविलसिता योगिनां योगगम्या ।
लूतातन्तूपमेया सकलसरसिजान् मेरुमध्यान्तरस्थान् ॥

इति षट्चक्रनिरूपणे

The *jiva* which is a very minute knowing principle having light of consciousness for its chief characteristic according to the Vedanta, has its seat in the *nādi susumna* which has been noted as the *hundred-and-first nādi* in the text cited above. We learn from other sources that it lies within that particular centre of the *nādi susumna* which is known as the *anāhata padma* or *hridpadma*. The word '*hrid*' referred to in the second aphorism quoted above is no other than the *hridpadma* or *hridpundarika* mentioned elsewhere.

"अनन्तैकोर्द्धगा नाड़ी मूर्द्धपर्यन्तमञ्जसा।
सुषुम्नेति समादिष्टा तया गच्छन् विमुच्यते॥
तत्रावस्थितचैतन्यं जीवात्मानं विदुर्बुधाः॥"

श्रीशिवगीता १०।३६

"सर्वतेजोमयी सा तु सुषुम्ना वह्निरूपिणी।
तस्या मध्ये विचित्राख्यं इच्छाज्ञानक्रियात्मकम्॥ ३१

* * * *

शब्दब्रह्ममयं शब्दानाहतं तत्र दृश्यते।
अनाहताख्यं तत्पद्मं मुनिभिः परिकीर्त्तितम्॥ ४१
आनन्दसदनं तत्तु पुरुषाधिष्ठितं परम्।
तदूर्द्धं तु विशुद्धाख्यं दलषोड़शपङ्कजम्॥ ४२

श्रीदेवीभागवते देवीगीता, ६ अः।

The centre *hridpadma* occupies a very prominent place in the Scriptures of the Hindus so much so that all the *nadis* lying within the spinal cord have been called the "*nadis* of the *hridaya*" in the revealed texts of the Upanisads. The Upanisads even go the length of enjoining that the Highest is to be contemplated in the *hridpundiraka.* An oft-quoted text of the *Chhandogya* runs as follows :

"अथ यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुण्डरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन् यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद् वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति॥"—छान्दोग्य० ८।१।१

Acharya Sankara in his commentary to the aphorism 1.2.7, tells us that God with attributes is to be meditated in the *hridpundarika*.

"स एवमणीयस्त्वादिगुणगणोपेत ईश्वरस्तत्र हृदयपुण्डरीके निचाय्यो द्रष्टव्य उपदिश्यते।"*

The *Siva Geeta* places the *daharakas'a* within *hridaya* and identifies the same with the seat of the *jiva*. *Hridaya* alluded to in the following text of the *Siva Geeta* is undoubtedly the same as *hridpadma* mentioned elsewhere.

"नाभेरूर्द्ध्वमधः कण्ठाद्व्याप्य तिष्ठति यत्सदा।
तस्य मध्येऽस्ति हृदयं सनालं पद्मकोशवत्॥ २४
अधोमुखञ्च तत्रास्ति सूक्ष्मं सुषिरमुत्तमम्।
दहराकाशमित्युक्तं तत्र जीवोऽवतिष्ठते॥ २५

इति श्रीशिवगीतायां दशमोऽध्यायः

Other Scriptures too teach the same lesson. For instance, the *Mahanirvana Tantra* instructs the devotee to offer the seat of *hridpadma* to God at the time of his worship. † Bhakta Rāmaprasāda of Bengal sings but the same tune. ‡

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* *Cf.*—"मन उपाधिकश्च जीवः, मनश्च प्रायेण हृदये प्रतिष्ठितमित्यतो जीवस्यैवेदं हृदयेऽन्तरवस्थानं स्यात्। दहरत्वमपि तस्यैव आराग्रोपमितत्वादवकल्पते॥" Sankara's commentary to sutra 1. 3. 14.

† "हृदपद्ममासनं दद्यात् सहस्रारच्युतामृतैः।
पाद्यं चरणयोर्दद्यात् मनस्त्वर्घं निवेदयेत्॥"—श्रीमहानि० ५।१४२

‡ "हृदि पद्म प्रकाशिये आमि सहस्रारे मन रेखेछि।
कुलकुण्डलिनी शक्तिर पदे आमि आमार प्राण सँपेछि॥"—प्रसाद-सङ्गीत

What has been said above is enough for my purpose. It is clear that in the Vedanta and in the Yoga-sāstras the word *hridaya* when spoken of as the seat of the *jiva* stands for *hridpadma* and not for that particular organ, heart, which keeps up the circulation of blood. The word *hridaya* has many meanings. In works on Indian medicine generally speaking, it stands for the organ, heart, which is connected with the circulation of blood. For instance in the compound 'हृद्रोग' it evidently means the organ heart. But when it is viewed as the seat of the *jiva* it undoubtedly signifies '*hridpundiraka* or '*hridpadma*' as pointed out above. European scholars misled by analogy have concluded that the Hindus have located the soul in the heart as well. Nothing can be far from the truth. On the contrary, the Hindus have located the soul in the nervous system and in that particular part of the nervous system which is known as the spinal cord. The cerebro-spinal axis of the Hindus as noted above spreads from the *chakra* or centre *muladhara* lying somewhere between the anus and the root of the genitals to the *sahasrara* – the highest centre lying within the cerebrum of modern physiology. There are other centres too in this axis. The *jiva*—a very minute conscious principle though located in the *hridpadma*—a centre lying higher up in the dorsal region of the cord passes its light of consciousness to different parts of the body through the innumerable nervous paths and channels connecting the different members of the body with the central nervous axis. Thus it

appears to us that the Hindus have viewed the nervous mass lying within the vertebral column only as a part of the great nervous structure and have never treated it as a separate entity. Eminent physiologists of Europe are of opinion that the spinal cord forms an important part of the nervous system and that it can not be regarded as a separate nervous structure. Modern researches have borne testimony to its importance as a nervous organ. The spinal cord is not only the seat of reflexes whose 'centres' lie wholly within it, but it is the *sole* path which all nervous currents, no matter whence they originate, must pass if they are to act on the muscle-fibres to which it leads. There is also evidence to show that the impulses contributory to 'muscular sense' also pass headward along it, and that the arcs of pain-nerves, broadly speaking, occupy the spinal cord in a peculiar degree. As the interference of unlike reflexes and the alliance of like reflexes lie at the very root of 'attention,' * it is believed that the nervous centres of the spinal cord are at the basis of that great psychical phenomenon which in a sense constitutes the essence of our conscious life. These conclusions lead us to conclude that the vertebral column is in no way an unsuitable locality for the habitation of the soul. But we are afraid that these conclusions will appear amazing to thinkers who regard the brain as the seat of consciousness and

* Vide Dr. Sherrington's able Article on "Spinal Cord," Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

not the spine. They are of opinion that the observations on "spinal animals" clearly show that the brain is the seat of consciousness and not the spine. The "spinal animals" are those in which the brain-stem has been severed just above the respiratory centre, so that they breathe and their heart beats, but according to these thinkers they show no consciousness. In a spinal frog, as often as the acid paper is laid on the left side, so often will the left hind leg be raised up to remove the irritation. Further, when the left side of a brainless frog is irritated with a drop of acid and you hold down its left leg so that it can not be used, its right leg will be brought up to do so. Phenomena of similar nature are exhibited by other brainless animals as well. In a decapitated dog, as often as the skin of its left flank is pinched, so as to imitate the biting of a flea, so often will its left hind leg be used to scratch the irritating spot.* Anyone observing these movements may say that the frog purposely moves its limb to avoid the irritation of the acid and the dog also intentionally does so to flick off the irritation. These cases look so full of design that one becomes tempted to take them for intentional activities. As a matter of fact some eminent physiologists (Pflueger, for example) have held that the spinal cord alone is capable of various purposeful activities and that it is the seat of consciousness of spinal

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* Vide Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, pp. 132-133, and Harris, *Nerves*, Chapter V (Home University Library.)

animals.* But a great majority of the physiologists assure us that they are not intentional, they are merely reflex actions.† In reflex actions, they concede, there is a definite adaptation of the muscular message to the afferent message, but nevertheless they are to be viewed as involuntary. But they hardly assign any reason for their assurances. The fact that requires elucidation is, how can this co-ordination between the incoming and the outgoing impulses in "spinal animals" noted above be explained ? To say that they are merely unintentional reflex actions is not to explain them. There is indeed some physical process, and there is combination or dissociation of something atomic. But the question is, what made them occur just then and in that way ? Such a high authority as Dr. Sherrington frankly admits that we have no satisfactory explanation of these reactionary movements in "spinal animals" as yet. But he is inclined to view in them "another agency working toward that plastic alternation of activities which is characteristic of animal life and increases in it with the ascent of the animal life."‡ Goltz's epoch-making experiments performed on dogs last century corroborate Sherrington's views. Goltz succeeded in keeping alive a dog for 18 months deprived of nearly all the brain-

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* Vide Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, pp. 249-250.

† Vide Harris, *Nerves*, Chapter V and Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, Part I., Chapter IV.

‡ Vide his Article on "Spinal Cord," Encyclopedia Britannica 11th edition.

substance. Goltz's conclusions are thus summarized by Ladd :

"It is not possible, by extirpating any amount of the substance of the cortex on either side or on both sides, to produce a permanent laming of any muscle of the body, or a total loss of sensibility in any of its parts. It is, however, possible, according to Goltz, by repeated removal of the cerebral substance on both sides, gradually to reduce an animal to a condition of almost complete idiocy—to an elaborate eating, drinking, and walking, 'reflex-machine.'"* Thus it appears that the seat of life is the spine and not the brain. If there is life in "spinal animals," the same can not be regarded as altogether destitute of counsciousness. Life, as it is known to us, is not a form of energy but a guiding principle. Intelligence alone can guide, and physical energy is directed and controlled†. As there is evidence of directing principle in "spinal animals," it is wrong to conclude that it is not the work of intelligence. If the adaptation to a desired end is a sign of consciousness, then there is undoubtedly evidence of consciousness in "spinal animals." Some physiologists contend that the cases of human beings who have been unfortunate to have thier spinal cord severed, say, in the middle of the back, also lend additional support to the view that the brain is the seat of consciousness and not the spine. When the lower half of the spine is severed by an

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* Vide, Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, p. 298.

† Vide, Lodge, *Life and Matter*, p. 169.

accident from the upper half, the man is totally unconscious of all sensations connected with feet and legs, though impulses from the lower limbs continue to ascend to the isolated half of the cord. This contention does not seem conclusive either. For those who maintain that the spinal cord is the seat of the soul locate it in the dorsal region of the cord about the centre of the chest behind the heart. In their view the seat of the soul is in the upper half of the cord. Hence we must not wonder if the lower half of such an unfortunate man does not manifest any sign of consciousness. It is further argued that as all our conscious activities are localized in the brain, the brain is the seat of consciousness and not the vertebral column. In this connection, I cannot do better than quote Professor Foster:

"The interpretation of the results," says the learned professor, "in which we have to judge of sensory effects, are more uncertain than when we have to judge of motor effects. We have to judge of signs, our interpretation of which is based on analogies which may be misleading."* This eminent thinker in another place of his able *Text-book of Physiology* reminds us that the cessation of particular sensations occasioned by lesions in particular parts of the cortex of the cerebral hemispheres "does not prove that the cortex of the hemispheres is the 'seat' of the sensation, ... it only proves that in the complex chain of events by which sensory impulses give rise to

* Text of Physiology, Part III, p. 1095.

full conscious sensations the events in the cortex furnish an indispensable link.*" So from the localization of our conscious sensations in the brain we can not conclude anything for certain with regard to the 'seat' of sensations. The well-known thinker Exner goes further. He holds that our feeling in no way immediately informs us that we think with the head, still less with the brain or the cortex of the cerebrum. Exner may be right or wrong. But what we want to point out is this that there is field for doubting the conclusion that cerebral functions have immediate connection with the phenomena of consciousness. Experiments in extirpation of "spinal animals" show that considerable areas of the cortical substance may be removed without perceptibly impairing any of the motor or sensory functions of the animal. The evidence from certain cases in human pathology is yet more astonishing and perplexing. Many cases of large lesions of the cerebral hemispheres in man, are recorded without any resulting impairment of the psychical functions.† Since the epochmaking experiments of Goltz upon the spinal cord of dogs, many functions which were formerly ascribed to the cerebrum have been shown to have their proximate centre in the spinal cord. Consequently there is field for drawing conclusions other than the generally accepted ones. It can not be too strongly emphasized that our knowledge of the physiological mechanism

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* Text-book of Physiology, Part III., p. 1094.

† Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, pp. 265-267.

of the brain is still very incomplete. Those physical and chemical processes of the cerebral substances, to which we must look for any strictly scientific understanding of its physiology are almost beyond our reach. When the physiologists examine the microscope sections that have been prepared by modern methods they are simply bewildered, and seem inclined to confess their inability to explain the working of the nervous system. In view of all these facts, it appears to us that many of the inferences drawn by physiologists with regard to the brain, are still pure guesses. We can not place too much reliance on them. Hence so far as the researches in modern physiology go, there is nothing against the position of the Brahma-sutras that the spinal cord is the seat of the *jiva*.

The third aphorism quoted above simply teaches that the *jiva* enters the *nadī puritat* and the Self at the time of deep sleep. The *nadī purītat* has been identified by Sankara and other commentators with '*hridayakasa*.' This aphorism too refers to *hridaya* as the seat of the *jiva*. So much about the physiology of the *Brahma-sutras*.

Next I pass on to the consideration of the *antahkaranas* or internal organs. These *antahkaranas* or internal organs just like the external organs of *jnana* and *karman* are regarded by the Vedantists as mere *karanas* or instruments of perception. *

* "यदेव ह्युपलब्धिसाधनं वृत्तिरन्यदा तस्यैव मनः करणत्वम् ।"—Commentery to sutra 2-4-7.

They are in fact very subtile material sheaths through which the light of consciousness passes and causes them to assume the forms of different mental states. These *antahkaranas* though unconscious appear conscious owing to the reflection of consciousness. When they are viewed as stript of consciousness they are undoubtedly very fine matter.* But they may be viewed also along with their reflected consciousness as has been done by Acharya Sankara and others. † When they are so viewed they become the same as the psychoses or mental states of European psychology.

From ancient times it has been customary to divide *antahkarans* or psychoses into a small number of general groups exhibiting special psychical activities. In the west, the science which particularly studies the operations of the human mind is known as psychology. This science investigates all mental phenomena, analyses them, classifies them, and seeks to reduce them to the smallest number of fundamental activities. The question of the classification of the mental states is very important in psychology. But there is no unanimity among European thinkers in

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* "चित्स्वभाव आत्मा विषयी, जड़स्वभावा बुद्धीन्द्रियदेहविषयाः। एते हि चिदात्मानं विषन्वन्ति अवबध्नन्ति स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्व्वन्तीति ॥"—इति भामती (introductory remarks).

† "तस्मादस्यावधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतस्तन्मनः।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra 2-3-32.

this matter.* The old mode of classifying mind as fixed by Aristotle is bi-partite *i.e.* intellect and will. St. Thomas followed him. Among modern writers Reid, Stewart, and very recently Father Maher have practically adopted the same classification. The tripartite division into cognition, emotion, and conation which was first introduced by Tetens—a German philosopher of the 18th century, was popularised by Kant Since its introduction though it has commanded general acceptance, yet there is disagreement among thinkers as to the question of regarding each of these three states as equally primordial. In Germany, Herbart and his school regard cognition as fundamental and view feeling and conation as secondary. A somewhat similar attitude is taken by Hegel in Germany, and Hamilton in Great Britain. Schopenhauer, Ravaisson, Wundt, Höffding, Stout, and others regard the phenomenon of conation as primordial and other constituents as derivative. Whereas Horwicz, Schleidler, and Spencer, regard feeling to be the primordial element on the ground that it makes its appearance first in infants and animals. Ward also adopts the three-fold classification of the mind but according to him *attention*, *feeling*, and *objects* or *presentations* are the three distinct and irreducible components of mind.†

*Vide Sully, *Outlines of Psychology*. pp. 36-37, Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 34-35, and Bain, *Mental Science*, Appendix pp. 88-91.

†Vide his Article on *Psychology* in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th edition.

Thus it is clear that there is disagreement among European thinkers even at the present day as to the number of primordial components of mind. But whatever may be their views as to the distinct states of mind, most of them however agree in thinking that there is a certain bond of unity among these mental states and that they are to be viewed as aspects or phases of one and the same mind.

Let us now take up the question of the *antahkarana* of the Vedantists. The *antahkarana* or internal organ just like other gross organs is viewed by them as a mere instrument of knowledge and hence all the *karanas* or organs have been treated of by them in the same Pāda. According to the Brahma-sutras, *karanas* or organs are 11 in number *i. e.*, 10 external organs and one internal organ—the *manas*.* These ten external organs are the five organs of knowledge viz.—ears, skin, eyes, tongue, and nose, having for their respective objects sound, touch, colour, and smell, and five organs of action viz., speech, hands, legs, anus, and genital organ, having for their respective objects, speaking, taking, going, evacuation, and begetting. The eleventh organ of the Vedanta, as noted before, is the *manas* or *antahkarana*. The *manas* though one, has various functions to perform. According to the distinct modes of activity it has to discharge, it has sometimes been classified as *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahankara*, and *chitta*. But the *Sruti* teaches

* "हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम्।"—ब्रह्मसू० २।४।६

that all these modes of activity are only the phases of one and the same *manas*.

"शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धविषयाः पञ्च बुद्धिभेदास्तदर्थानि पञ्च बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि। वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः पञ्च कर्म्मभेदास्तदर्थानि च पञ्च कर्म्मेन्द्रियाणि। सर्व्वार्थविषयं त्रैकाल्यवृत्ति मनस्त्वेकमनेकवृत्तिकम्। तदेव वृत्तिभेदात् क्वचिद्भिन्नवद्व्यपदिश्यते—'मनो बुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तं च' इति। तथा च श्रुतिः कामाद्या नानाविधवृत्तीरनुक्रम्याह 'एतत् सर्व्वं मन एव' (वृ० १-५-६) इति।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra II. 4. 6.

The *manas* along with its reflected consciousness constitutes, according to Sankara and his school, the subject of perception or non-perception of all objects. When the *manas* is directed upon an object of sight, it is seen and when it is taken away, it does not become the object of sight. Similarly when the *manas* is directed upon a sound, it is heard and when it is abstracted, we do not hear it.

"तस्माद्यस्यावधानानवधानाभ्यामुपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी भवतस्तन्मनः। तथा च श्रुतिः—'अन्यत्रमना अभूवं नादर्शमन्यत्रमना अभूवं नाश्रौषम्' (वृ० १-५-३) इति, 'मनसा ह्येव पश्यति मनसा शृणोति' (वृ० १-५-३) इति।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra II.3.32.

The word *manas* along with its reflected concious-ness when thus used in its widest sense as a generic term

for all the states of the mind is undoubtedly the same as the *mind* of European psychology. Be it noted that the word *manas* is often used in the Hindu Scriptures in a limited sense as contrasted with *buddhi*. When it is so used, it stands only for a particular mode of activity of the mind.

A careful study of all the texts bearing on the classification of the *manas* or *antahkarana* has led me to conclude that the original classification of the *antakarana* is a twofold one viz.—*manas* and *buddhi*. The later Vedantists indeed allude to a fourfold classification viz.,—*manas*, *buddhi*, *ahankara*, and *chitta*, but it is only an after-thought.

The following Scriptural texts support my contention :—

"इन्द्रियेभ्यः परा ह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धि र्बुद्धेरात्मा महान् परः ॥"—

कठ० १।३।१०

"आत्मानं रथिनं विद्धि शरीरं रथमेव तु ।
बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मनः प्रग्रहमेव च ॥"—

कठ० १।३

"इन्द्रियाणि पराण्याहुरिन्द्रियेभ्यः परं मनः ।
मनसस्तु परा बुद्धि र्यो बुद्धेः परतस्तु सः ॥"

गीता ३।४२

Even in the Brahma-sutras we find reference to this twofold classification. In sutras II. 3.15, we come across

the compound 'विज्ञानमनसी'. The compound 'विज्ञानमनसी' as interpreted by Sankara and others stands for *buddhi* and *manas* accompanied by sense-organs.*

It is well known that the theory of the *antahkarana* of the Vedantists is based on their theory of the *sukshma* or *linga-sarira* The *Brahma-sutras* contain reference to the *sukshma sarira.* The sutra 9 of the Adhyaya IV, Pada II, tells us that both the Scriptural texts and proof bear testimony to the *suksma sarira* of the jiva.† The next *sutra* points out that as it is very subtile, it survives the death of the gross body.‡ We learn from the immediately next *sutra* that its existence may be inferred from the heat of the body. For in a corpse there is no heat.§ Thus it appears that the Vedanta concieves of the *sukshma* body to consist of very subtile matter of the nature of heat. Modern science declares that all energies such as heat, light, electricity, and magnetism are nothing but wave-disturbances of the invisible ether which fills all space. Hence it is not improper to regard the *sukshma* bodies of the Vedanta as something partaking of the nature of the invisible ether of the scientists. The Vedantists

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*"सेन्द्रियस्य तु मनसो बुद्धेश्च सद्भाव: प्रसिद्ध: श्रुतिस्मृत्यो:। 'बुद्धिं तु सारथिं विद्धि मन: प्रग्रहमेव च इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहु:' (कठ० ३।३) इत्यादि लिङ्गेभ्य: ।"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये.

†"सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धे: ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।२।९

‡"नोपमर्देनात: ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।२।१०

§"अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरेष उष्मा ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।२।११

allude to two kinds of material bodies—*sthula* (gross), and *sukshma* (subtile). The *sthula sarira* consists of different parts called organs each of which not only does its special work, but acts in harmony with other organs The *sukshma sarira* likewise consists of different subtile parts each of which not only does its special work but acts in harmony with other subtile parts or organs. The name *sukshma* or *linga-sarira* is given to the subtile body which is complex of the three subtile envelopes—*vijnanamaya*, *manomaya*, and *pranamaya* comprising 17 members in all (*buddhi*, *manas*, five subtile sense-organs, five subtile organs of action, and five subtile vital functions). It is in fact the subtile invisible counterpart of the gross visible body.

"कोशत्रयं मिलित्वैतद् वपुः स्यात् सूक्ष्ममात्मनः ।
अतिसूक्ष्मतया लीनस्यात्मनो गमकत्वतः ॥"

इति सर्व्ववेदान्तसिद्धान्तसारः ३८६

"श्रोत्रादिपञ्चकञ्चैव वागादीनाञ्च पञ्चकम् ।
प्राणादिपञ्चकं बुद्धिमनसौ लिङ्गमुच्यते ॥"

इति सर्व्ववेदान्तसिद्धान्तसारः ३४१

Buddhi together with the organs of sense constitutes the *vijnānamaya kosa** or sheath. Manas together with

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* "विज्ञानमयकोशः स्याद् बुद्धिर्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सह ।
विज्ञानप्रचुरत्वेनाप्याच्छादकतयात्मनः ॥"

इति सर्व्ववेदान्तसिद्धान्तसारः ३५१

the organs of sense forms the *manomaya kosa*[1] or sheath. There are besides five currents of vital functions (*prāna, apāna, vyana, samana* and *udana*) forming part of the *sukshma* body. The Brahmasutras regard them simply as the five functions of the *mukhya prana*. The *mukhya prāna* is not mere 'air', as it is often called, but it is a specially transformed current of air.[2] More properly speaking as Sankara puts it, it is *adhyatma* counterpart of air having five functions.[3] These five currents of vital functions of the *mukhya prāna* together with the organs of action constitute the *prānamaya kosa* or sheath. They maintain the automatic and reflex activity of the body. Though they do not directly reflect consciousness, yet the presence of the conscions *jiva* with which it stands inseparably connected is essential for their activity.[4] As these *vayus* are not direct reflectors of consciousness, they have never been viewed as *antahkarana*.

Thus from the theory of the *linga-sarira*, it is clear that antahkaranas are two in number *i. e. buddhi*

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1 "मनो मनोमयः कोशो भवेज्ज्ञानेन्द्रियैः सह ।
प्राचुर्यं मनसो यत्र दृश्यतेऽसौ मनोमयः ॥"

सर्व्ववेदान्तसि० २५६

2 "वायुरेवावस्थान्तरमापन्नः प्राण इत्युच्यते ।"—Nimvarka's commentary to sutra II. 4. 9

3 "वायुरेवायमध्यात्ममापन्नः पञ्चव्यूहः ।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra II. 4. 9

4 "शारीरेणैव च नित्यः प्राणानां संबन्ध उत्क्रान्त्यादिषु तदनुवृत्तिदर्शनात् ॥"—Sankara's commentary to sutra II. 4. 16

and *manas*. Here a difficulty requires to be cleared up. Almost all the later Vedantists speak of four *antahkaranas*, *i. e. manas*, *buddhi*, *ahankara*, and *chitta*. Even Sankara, at times refers to this fourfold classification. But we have held above that the original classification of the *antakarana* is two-fold. How is it to be reconciled ? In the well-known work on the Vedanta called the *Sarva-vedanta-siddhanta-sāra-samgraha*, it has been pointed out having regard to the theory of the *lingasarira*, the *antahkaranas—chitta* and *ahankara* are to be viewed as falling within the *manas* and *buddhi* respectively.[1] Sadānandayogin—the wellknown author of the *Vedantasāra* also adopts a similar view.[2] Hence the fourfold classification referred to later on presents no real difficulty.

Another difficulty requires to be disposed of. The sutra 12 of the Adhyaya II, Pāda IV, of the *Vedanta-sutras* teaches that there are five functions of the *prana* just like those of the *manas*.[3] The *Brihadarnyaka Upanishad* refers to the five functions of the *prana*,[4] but more than five functions of the *manas* have been alluded to in the same.[5] There is no other text of the *Sruti* in

1 "मनस्यपि च बुद्धौ च चित्ताहङ्कारयोः क्रमात्।
अन्तर्भावोऽत्र बोद्धव्यो लिङ्गलक्षणसिद्धये॥" —सर्व्ववेदान्तसि० ३४७

2 "अनयोरेव चित्ताहङ्कारयोरन्तर्भावः।"—वेदान्तसार ५२

3 "पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवद्व्यपदिश्यते।"—ब्रह्मसू० II. 4. 12

4 "प्राणोऽपानो व्यान उदानः समानः"—(बृहदा० १।५।३)

5 "कामः सङ्कल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धाऽश्रद्धा धृतिरधृतिर्ह्रीर्धीर्भीरित्येतत् सर्व्वं मन एव"—(बृहदा० १।५।३)

which five functions of the *manas* have been referred to. If the aphorism is taken to refer to the five functions of the *manas*, it undoubtedly presents some difficulty. *Acharya Sankara* has offered three explanations of the text. In the first place, the *Acharya* suggests that the five functions of the *manas* are the five well-known ones arising in connexion with the five organs of knowledge. From the perusal of the whole Pāda, it appears to us that the word *manas* in the text has been used in its widest sense for *antahkarana*. But under Sankara's interpretation, it is to be taken in its limited sense to stand for perceptions arising through sense-organs. Hence this explanation seems beside the point. Secondly, he suggests that Bādarāyana may have in view the five functions of the *manas* enumerated in the *Yoga Aphorisms* of Patanjali.* This explanation too, is unsatisfactory. It appears from the wording of the aphorism and its context that, Bādarāyana while composing it, had in his mind some text of the *Sruti* and not that of the *Yoga-sutras*. Further, it is very doubtful whether the *Yoga-sutras* in their present form were at all in existence at the time of Bādarāyana. In the third place, the *Acharya* points out that the *sutra* may not really have in view the five functions of the *manas* at all, but simply quotes it as an analogous instance with reference to the plurality of its functions.† In our

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*"प्रमाण-विपर्यय-विकल्प निद्रा स्मृतयो ।" पात० यो० सू० १।१।६

†"बहुवृत्तित्वमात्रेण वा मनः प्राणस्य निदर्शनमिति द्रष्टव्यम् ।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra II. 4. 12

opinion it hits the right point, and as a matter of fact it has been adopted by most of the commentators. In any case it is clear that it has nothing to do with the classification of the *manas* or *antahkarana* and so it is, in no way, a bar to the one adopted by us.

Let us now consider the functions of the *manas* and *buddhi*. The *Tatvabodha*—a work traditionally ascribed to Sankara, enumerates the functions of the *antahkarana* thus :—

"संकल्प विकल्पात्मकं मनः। निश्चयात्मिका वुद्धिः। अहंकर्त्ता अहंकारः चिन्तनकर्तृ चित्तम् ॥"—इति तत्त्ववोधे

Not only the author of the *Tatvabodha* but most of the Hindu thinkers have treated of the functions of the *manas* and *buddhi* in the above way.* Thus it appears that according to the Hindus, the *manas* is concerned with conation or its negation and the buddhi with intellectual synthesis (*nischaya* or *adhyavasaya*). But we have seen above that the *chitta* falls within the sphere of the *manas* and the *ahankara* within the sphere of the *buddhi*. So it seems that the function of the *manas* is restricted to the sphere of *samkalpa* or *vikalpa* and simple apprehension, and that of the buddhi to thinking proper (conception, judgment, and reasoning), and to egoism or self-conscious-

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**Cf.*—'एतेषु कोषेषु मध्ये विज्ञानमयो ज्ञानशक्तिमान् कर्तृरूपः। मनोमय इच्छाशक्तिमान् करणरूपः। प्राणमयः क्रियाशक्तिमान् कार्य्यरूपः। योग्यत्वादेवमेतेषां विभाग इति वर्णयन्ति। एतत् कोषत्रयं मिलितं सत् सूक्ष्मशरीरमित्युच्यते ॥"—

वेदान्तसार ८४।

ness involved in a fully explicit logical thought about the world. *Samkalpa* is "conation as it appears in desire or motor impulse, in attention, even in objectification," and *vikalpa* is just the negation of this *samkalpa*, "appearing as aversion, hesitation, doubt or as consciousness of difference, the stress of the will in and beyond the negative judgment."* Now the question arises, do the feelings of pleasure and pain and emotions fall within the sphere of the *manas*, or the *buddhi*? In our opinion they fall within the sphere of the *manas* and not within that of the *buddhi* as contended by some. The following texts support our contention :—

"चिन्ताविषादहर्षाद्याः कामाद्या अस्य वृत्तयः ।
मनुते मनसैवैष फलं कामयते वहिः ।
यतते कुरुते भुङ्क्ते तन्मनः सर्व्वकारणम् ॥"—

सर्व्ववेदान्तसिद्धान्तसारसंग्रह ३५७

"सुखं दुःखञ्च विषयौ विज्ञेयौ मनसः क्रियाः ।
स्मृतिभीतिविकल्पाद्या बुद्धिः स्यान्निश्चयात्मिका ।
अहं ममेत्यहङ्कारश्चित्तं चेतयते यतः ॥"—शिवगीता ८।१८

Sridhara svamin in his commentary to the Geeta beginning with the line "इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखं संघातश्चेतना धृतिः"—(गीता १३।६) observes :

* Vide Professor K. C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 31 (Calcutta University Studies.)

"एते चेच्छादयो दृश्यत्वान्नात्मधर्म्माः। अपि तु मनोधर्म्माः एव। अतः चैवाऽन्तःपातिन एव। उपलक्षणं चैतत् संकल्पादीनाम्॥"

Hence it is clear that according to the Hindu Scriptures the *manas* is concerned with the conation, simple apprehension, and feeling, and the buddhi with thinking proper and egoism or self-consciousness connected with thinking. There is some justification for extending the sphere of the *manas* in the way the vedantists have done. When the *manas* comes in contact with the objects of senses through the instrumentality of our sense-organs, we are either drawn or repelled by them. When we are drawn towards them, desires arise in consequence, and we resolve to attain the objects of our desire. If we succeed in attaining our objects of desire, we obtain pleasure. But when we fail to attain the objects of our desire, we suffer pain. Further, in avoiding objects which repel us, we may feel pleasure as well. But when we can not avoid objects which repel us we are also affected by pain. Thus there seems to be an intimate connexion between our sense-perceptions, desires which are only phases of will, and feelings of pleasure and pain. The Vedantists having regard to their intimate connexion have classified them under the same head—*manas.* Mr. Spencer also includes almost all these phases of mind under the head—feeling.

Now how does the actual connextion between the *jiva* and the body take place according to the Vedanta ?

According to the Vedantists of all the schools, the *jiva* while under bondage is a self-luminous knower having consciousness for its chief quality. In the stage of *samsâra*, it stands enveloped by the *sukshma* or *linga-sarira*, which, as has been said above, is but a subtile organism consisting of three very fine material sheaths *i.e. vijnanamaya*, *manomaya*, and *pranamaya*--varying respectively as regards fineness and transparency. The sheath of the *vijnana* or *buddhi* is the first reflector of consciousness. When the pure light of consciousness passes through this sheath, it is coloured by the peculiar qualities of the sheath, and takes the form of intellect and egoism. When it reaches the next sheath of the *manas* because of its connexion with the buddhi, it is again affected by the peculiar characteristics of the sheath and takes the form of sense-perception, conation, and feelings of pleasure and pain. Then the light of consciousness becoming in some way connected with the sheath of the *prana* because of its connexion with the *manas*, makes it endowed with the activity necessary for the preservation of the life and the senses. Next the light of consciousness reaches the sense-organs because of their connexion with the *manas*, and last of all the gross body.

"वुद्धिस्तावत् स्वच्छत्वादानन्तर्य्याच्चात्मचैतन्यज्योतिः प्रतिच्छाया भवति, तेन हि विवेकिनामपि तत्राभिमानवुद्धिः प्रथमा ; ततोऽप्यानन्तर्य्यान्मनसि चैतन्यावभासता वुद्धिसम्पर्कात् ; तत इन्द्रियेषु मनःसंयोगात् ; ततोऽनन्तरं शरीरे इन्द्रियसम्पर्कात्।

एवं पारम्पर्य्येण कृत्स्नं कार्यकारणसंघातमात्मा चैतन्यस्वरूप-ज्योतिषा अवभासयति।" Sankara's commentary to Brihadaranyaka Upanishad IV. 3. 7.

In the west, the only thinker who has adopted a similar conception with regard to the passing of the light of consciousness through the brain is Professor James. That eminent scholar in his essay on *Human Immortality* points out that there exists throughout the universe, or rather behind the veil of matter, a reservoir of universal consciousness, which streams through the brain into living beings, somewhat as water through a tap, or light through a half-transparent lens. Each tap or lens, shapes or colours the incoming flow of thought with its various individualistic peculiarities. Finally, when a brain stops working altogether that special stream of consciousness which subserved it vanishes from this scene of natural world. But the sphere of being which supplied the consciousness still remains intact.* James's conception only bears a seeming resemblance to the Vedantic conception of the school of Sankara, but in reality it differs from it in important details. The Vedantic school of Sankara conceives of the *jiva* or soul while in bondage as enveloped by very fine material sheaths which survive death and follow the *jiva* after the destruction of the body. These fine material sheaths with which the *jiva* stands enveloped till final release, enable it to work

* Vide James, *Human Immortality*, pp. 37-38.

in the higher sphere of life which it enters after the completion of its work in the present sphere of life. Any such conception is altogether foreign to James, and so he has failed to explain the working of the soul in some more real world after death. On the theory of the Vedanta the connexion of the jiva first takes place with the *sukshma* or ethereal body and through the instrumentality of the *suksma* body with the gross body. The Vedanta thus supplies a missing link which enables us to explain the connexion between the soul and the gross body more satisfactorily. The Vedantic conception of the *sukshma* body can not be treated as a pure guess. The Society for Psychical Research has brought to light many facts which can only be explained on the basis of a *sukshma* body enveloping the *jiva* after bodily death. If the existence of ether is a necessity to the scientists for the explanation of the transmission of energy, the existence of a *sukshma* body is no less necessary to the Vedantists for the satisfactory explanation of the connexion obtaining between the *jiva* and its gross body, and its mode of working in a life to come after its bodily death.

European psychologists, generally speaking, while studying the question of the mental states, have passed from the outside to the inside, from their phenomenal manisfestations to their inner bond of unity. They have conceived of mind as composed of some irreducible and distinct components, and have subsequently tried to find out some unifying principle binding them all. In this attempt, they have encountered much

difficulty. But the Vedantists have followed a different method. They have started with one self-luminous conscious principle and have attempted to explain its variety in the shape of mental states through their theory of the *kosas* which, according to them, shape the incoming flow of consciousness with their various individualistic peculiarities. In this respect too, the Vedantic conception seems to be an advance upon the European conception.

CHAPTER IV.

A Critical Study Of The Principal Sutras Bearing On Jivatman.

We have noted before that various theories on *jivatman* have existed in India from old days. We find references to different schools of Indian Philosophy even in the Brahma-sutras themselves. The *Charvakas* or *Lokayatikas* were undisguised materialists. There were different branches of this school. One branch held that the body endowed with the quality of consciousness is the self, as is evident from such expressions as 'I am born,' 'I die', and so on. Bādarāyana refutes the views of this class of thinkers in sutra II. 3. 16.* It has been formulated therein that having regard to the

* "चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात् ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० २।३।१६

material embodiment of the soul, the Sāstras allude to the birth and death of the soul. In fact, the soul is eternal and never dies. Another branch of the same school, held that the senses endowed with the quality of consciousness are the soul. It is found that in the absence of the organs of sense, the functions of the body cease, and further we come across such expressions as 'I am blind of one eye,' 'I am deaf,' and so on. Another class of the *Charvakas* held that the chief *prana* is the *jiva* or the soul. It is a matter of common observation that the organs of sense become inoperative in the absence of the chief *prana*, and further we use such expressions as, 'I am hungry,' 'I am thirsty,' and so on. Another class of the same school holds that the internal organ or the *manas* is the jiva ; for when the manas sleeps we lose all consciousness, and also because of the use of such expressions as 'I resolve,' 'I doubt,' etc. The views of all the three classes of the materialists have in effect been repudiated by the *sutrakara* in sutra II. 4. 10.* It has been pointed out in the same that like the sense-organs and *manas*, the *mukhya prana*, though best among the pranas, stands entirely in a subordinate position to the *jiva* and is nothing but an organ of the *jiva*. In the *Prana-samvāda* of the Prasna Upanishad, the sense-organs, the manas, and the chief *prana* are classed together and all are called the *pranas*. It is usual to class together things which

* "चक्षुरादिवत्तु तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः ।"—ब्रह्मसू० २।४।१०

possess similar characteristics. The fact that the chief *prana* has been noted along with other *pranas* or organs shows that it is nothing but an organ.

"तुशब्दः प्राणस्य जीववत्स्वातन्त्र्यं व्यावर्तयति। यथा चक्षुरादीनि राजप्रकृतिवज्जीवस्य कर्तृत्वं भोक्तृत्वं च प्रत्युपकरणानि न स्वतन्त्राणि। यथा मुख्योऽपि प्राणो राजमन्त्रिवज्जीवस्य सर्वार्थकरत्वेनोपकरणभूतो न स्वतन्त्रः। कुतः। तत्सहशिष्ट्यादिभ्यः। तैश्चक्षुरादिभिः सहैव प्राणः शिष्यते प्राणसंवादादिषु। समानधर्म्मणां च सहशासनं युक्तं वृहद्रथंतरादिवत्।"—

Sankara's bhasya to sutra II. 4. 10.

It has further been taught by Bādarāyana in the sutras 33-39 *Adhyaya* II, Pāda III, that the jiva is really the *karta* or agent and the *buddhi* or *manas* is simply an organ of the jiva. If the *buddhi* is taken for the *jiva*, its instrumentality disappears and it becomes an agent. This inversion of power is wholly unjustifiable and is opposed to the injunction of the Sāstras. For all the Sāstras point to the agency of the jiva and not that of the *buddhi*. In the state of samādhi too there is an entire absence of the *buddhi* and not that of the agency of the soul.

Bādarāyana has combated the theories of the Buddhists in the sutras 18-32, Adhāya II, Pāda II. Acharya Sankara in his bhāsha to the sutra II. 2. 18, has divided the Buddhistic philosophers into three classes *i. e.*—Sarvāstitvavādin (सर्व्वास्तित्ववादी), Vijnānāstitvamātravādin (विज्ञानास्तित्वमात्रवादी) and Sarvasunyatva-

vādin (सर्व्वंशून्यत्ववादी). The first school maintains that objects both internal and external exist, but they are all momentary and flowing like the current of a river. Not only are our ideas transient, but our perception of external objects is transient too. When one perception arises, a second follows. With the appearance of a second, the first dies out and so *ad infinitum*. The appearance of continuity is due to the succession of a series of similar momentary objects connected together by a chain of causation. This school not only views all things as fleeting but views the percipient soul in the same light as well. The views of this class of thinkers have been combated by the *sutrakāra* in the sutras 18-27 Pāda II, Adhyāya II. The second class denies the existence of any thing external to consciousness. Our ideas though momentary are all in all. They constantly spring up and disappear. They may be fitly compared to the current of a river. These ideas are transient no doubt, but have real existence and they do, under certain circumstances, appear as external objects. The current of our ideas is twofold *i. e.*—(*a*) fixed and (2) continuous. Along with the rise of every idea, we feel that I am experiencing it,—'I am I.' This experience of fixed consciousness amidst variety goes by the name of fixed current. This fixed current of consciousness is simply a transformation of the *buddhi*. In this way, Vijnanavadins identify the *buddhi* with the self, which according to them, is transient and self-luminous. Bādarāyana has combated their views in the sutras 28-31, Pāda II, Adhyāya II. The third class

of the Buddhists holds that neither external objects nor ideas exist. It repudiates all forms of existence inner or outward. In their opinion everything is void or devoid of real existence. This doctrine has been controverted by Bādarāyana in the sutra II. 2. 32. The Brahma-sutras, according to most of the commentators, contain references to the Jaina Philosophy as well. The Jainas hold that the *jiva* has the same size as that of the body in the *samsara* stage. The view of the Jainas has also been disproved in the Sutras.* The Vaiseshika school holds that the jivas are many and all-pervading yet they are naturally unconscious like stones and other material things.† They become conscious in contact with the *manas* which is minute and unconscious as well. Thus according to the Vaiseshikas, consciousness of the jiva is mere by an accidental product. The sāmkhyas maintain that the jivas are many, all-pervading, and eternally conscious. In fact, out of the six well-known systems of Indian Philosophy, five systems at least viz. the Vaiseshika, the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Nyaya, and the Mimamsa, hold that the jivas are many and all-pervading.‡ According to most of the commentators, the sutra 2.3.18, and the sutra 50 53, Pāda III, Adhyāya II, contain references to the views of the

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* Vide the sutras 34-36, Adhyāya II, Pāda II.

† "ज्ञोऽतएव ।"—ब्रह्मसूत्र: २।३।१८

‡ Samkhya Darsana (Fourth Edition) p. 233. by Pandit Kaleevara Vedantavagheesa.

Vaiseshikas and Samkhyas at least regarding *jivatman*. The Sutras of Bādārayana as interpreted by Sankarācharya and his school teach that the jiva is in reality one all-pervading eternal consciousness free from all limitations and relations, and that the apparent plurality of the jivas is due to *avidya* or *maya*. But according to all the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva School of Sreekantha the Brahma-sutras inculcate that the jivas are really many and *anu* (very minute), and not all-pervading as contended by other schools of philosophy. According to them, the position that the jiva is not eternal knowledge or consciousness but a knower, has been taught by the *sutrakara* in the *sutra* 2.3.18, that the jiva is *anu* and not *vibhu* (all-pervading) has been formulated by him in the sutras 19-29, and also in the sutras 43-45, and that it is not all-pervading has been pointed out by Bādarāyana in the sutra 32, and also in the sutras 49-53, Adhyāya II, Pāda III.

On the contrary, Sankarāchārya and his school hold that the theory that the jiva is eternal consciousness has been dwelt upon by Bādarāyana in the sutras 17-18, that the jivas are *anu* and not many have been taught in the sutra 29, and that the jivas are many and all-pervading has been refuted by the *sutrakara* in the sutras 50-53, Adhyāya II, Pāda III. All other *sutras* bearing on *jivatman* have been interpreted by them in the same light as well. With these introductory notes let us now pass on to the consideration of the original *sutras*.

The Brahma-sutras contain many aphorisms which have direct or indirect bearing on *jivatman.* But a systematic treatment of the nature of *jivatman* is met with for the first time in the Adhāya II, Pāda III, beginning with the *sutra* 17. Having regard to the space at our disposal, it is not possible for us to discuss all the *sutras* in original with the commentaries of the different schools. Nor is it a necessity. All that can be attempted here is to present the important and contested *sutras* with the commentaries of the different schools in original and to give the gist of the unimportant ones in our own language. A critical study of the *sutras* will be reserved for the latter portion of the Chapter. Let us now take up the *sutras*.

The sutra 17, Adhyaya II, Pada III, runs as follows :

नात्माऽश्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः ॥

The *Srutis* teach that the *jiva* does not originate like the other *bhutas*. On the contrary, it is eternal and indestructible. Acharya Sankara holds that the jiva is in reality immutable and eternal Brahman Himself. Brahman in fact exists in the form of innumerable jivas by virtue of *upādhis* or limiting adjuncts. So in his opinion the word 'atman' in the sutra really stands for 'Paramatman.'

"एवं प्राप्ते ब्रूमः—नात्मा जीव उत्पद्यत इति। कस्मात्। अश्रुतेः * * * प्रतिज्ञानुपरोधोऽप्यविकृतस्यैव ब्रह्मणो जीवभावाभ्युपगमात्। लक्षणभेदोऽप्यनयोरुपाधिनिमित्त एव।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

But all the Vaishnava commentators, the Saiva commentator Sreekantha and Vijnana-bhikshu agree in thinking that the *sutrakara* in the *sutra* teaches that the jivas are really eternal and immortal. They further point out that the word 'atman' occurring in the sutra stands for 'jivātman' and not for 'Paramātman' as contended by Sankara.

"नात्मा उत्पद्यते, कुतः? श्रुतेः 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' [कठ० २।१८] 'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजौ' [श्वेताश्व० १।९] इत्यादिभि र्जीवस्योत्पत्ति-प्रतिषेधो हि श्रूयते। आत्मनो नित्यत्वं च ताभ्यः श्रुतिभ्य एवावगम्यते 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानामेको बहूनां यो विदधाति कामान्' [श्वेताश्व० ६।१३] 'अजो नित्यः शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे' [कठ० २।१८] इत्यादिभ्यः। अतश्च नात्मोत्पद्यते।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

"आत्मा न जायते ; 'न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चित्' इति श्रुतेः। 'नित्यो नित्यानां चेतनश्चेतनानाम्' 'ज्ञाज्ञौ द्वावजावीशनीशौ' इत्यादि श्रुतिभ्यः नित्यत्वावगतेश्च।"—इति श्रीकण्ठ-शिवाचार्य-विरचित-ब्रह्म-मीमांसाभाष्ये

"अत्रात्मशब्दो न परमात्मपरः अंशत्वस्य वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् आत्मा जीवो नोत्पद्यते कुतः अश्रुतेः॥" इति श्रीविज्ञान-भिक्षु-विरचित-विज्ञानामृताख्यभाष्ये

The sutra under discussion tells us in short that the jiva is permanent and eternal. Now a further question

arises—Is the jiva material or immaterial? If immaterial, is it personal or impersonal?

The *sutrakara* answers the above queries in the next *sutra*—

“ज्ञोऽतएव ।”

Acharya Sankara and his school hold that as the jiva does not originate it is eternal consciousness on that account. Unchangeable eternal Brahman exists in the form of the jiva owing to the super-imposition of the *upadhis* or limiting adjuncts.

“ज्ञो नित्यचैतन्योऽयमात्मातएव, यस्मादेव नोत्पद्यते परमेव ब्रह्माविकृतमुपाधिसंपर्काज्जीवभावेनावतिष्ठते ॥” —
इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

But according to most of the Vaishnava commentators and the Saiva commentator Sreekantha, the *sutra* teaches on the basis of the Scriptures that the jiva is a knower—a conscious person. It is neither a material object nor impersonal consciousness.

“ज्ञ एव अयमात्मा ज्ञातृस्वरूप एव, न ज्ञानमात्रं, नापि जड़स्वरूपः ; कुतः अतएव श्रुतेरेवेत्यर्थः ॥”—इति श्रीभाष्ये

“ज्ञ एवात्मा ज्ञानरूपत्वे सति ज्ञातृस्वरूप एव ।” इति श्रीगोविन्दभाष्ये

From the above sutras, it follows that the jiva is an eternal conscious person. Bādarāyana next turns his attention to the size of the jiva. Three theories are possible regarding the size of the jiva viz.,—

Deha-parimāna-vada, *Vibhu-vada*, and *Anu-vada*. The Jainas hold that the soul has the same size as that of the body. Their theory is generally known as the Deha-parimāna-vāda. The *sutrakara* has shown the untenableness of the theory in the sutras 34—36, Adhyaya II, Pāda II. Acharya Sankara and his school maintain that the soul is all-pervading. Their theory is known as the *Vibhu-vada*. All the Vaishnavācharyas and the Saivācharya Sreekantha hold that the jiva is really minute. Their theory is known as the *Anu-vada*. Bādarāyana has given an exposition of the Anu-vada in the sutras 19—28. According to Sankaracharya and his school all these sutras are merely *purva-paksha-sutras.** The real opinion of the *sutrakara* has been expressed in the sutra 29, which, according to them, refutes the Anu-vāda and establishes the Vibhu-vāda. But all the Vaishnava commentators and the Saiva commentator Sreekantha maintain that the sutras 19—29 contain the *sutrakara's* own opinion and that he has advocated the *Anu-vada* in all these *sutras*. Most of them further point out that the *Vibhu-vada* has been refuted by Bādarāyana himself in the sutras 49—50 of the same Pāda and Adhyāya. With these preliminary remarks let us now pass on to the discussion of the sutras. The sutra 19 teaches that as the Scriptures speak of the passing out, going, and returning

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* "A statement of objections that is given with an intention to meet them is called a purvapaksha."—Vide Rangacharya's English Translation of the Sri-bhasya.

of the soul, the soul must be of minute size. It may be said '*utkranti*' (passing out) does not necessarily imply its actual departure out of the body, it may simply imply cessation of its connexion with the body. Though it is possible to explain '*utkranti*' in that way, but the words '*gati*' (going) and '*agati*' (returning) can not be explained in the same way. That the Scriptures allude to the going and returning of the *jiva* proves that the jiva is really *anu* (sutra 20). In the next sutra, a further question has been raised and answered. In the Brihadāranyaka-upanishad *atman* is called *mahan* or all-pervading.* If 'atman' is really *anu* or minute why in the above Sruti 'atman' is called *mahan* or all-pervading. The *sutrakara* disposes of the above objection by saying that the context of the *Sruti* shows that the word 'atman' occuring therein really stands for 'Paramatman' and not for 'jivatman'. Though in the beginning of the topic the individual soul has been referred to, yet in the middle occurs the text 'यस्यानुवित्तः प्रतिबुद्ध आत्मा' which shows that the topic of the highest Self has subsequently been taken up. Hence the above *Sruti* presents no difficulty. Besides there are direct texts of the *Sruti* indicating the minuteness and very limited size of the individual soul. The Scriptures use the word '*anu*' and words signifying very small measure '*unmāna*' with reference to the jiva. Hence the jiva cannot be of any size other than the minute. The above point has been substantiated in the next sutra which runs as follows :

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* 'स वा एष महानज आत्मा योऽयं विज्ञानमयः प्राणेषु'—(बृ० ४।४।१२)

"स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्याञ्च ॥"—२।३।२२

"एषोऽणुरात्मा, वालाग्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च भागो जीव'—इति स्वशब्दोन्मानाभ्याञ्च जीवोऽणुः।"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

There is hardly any difference among the commentators with regard to the interpretation of this *sutra*.

Now a further question arises, if the jiva is really *anu*, why do we then experience pleasure and pain in all the body ? In reply to the above query, the *sutra* 23 points out that there is really no difficulty. As a drop of sandal-ointment, although actually applied to one spot of the body, produces a refreshing sensation throughout the body, so the *anu jiva* though dwelling in one spot of the body, produces sensation refreshing or otherwise all over the body. It may be said that the analogy does not hold good. For the drop of sandal-ointment occupies a part of the body, whereas the soul does not occupy any particular part of the body. The *sutrakara* disposes of the above objection in the sutra 24 by pointing out that there is also a particular abode of the soul known as 'hridaya', for the Scriptures expressly teach to that effect. We have shown above that 'hridaya' which is spoken of as the seat of the jiva is the same as the 'hrid-padma' of the *Yoga-sastras*, and that it lies within the spinal cord. It ought not to be identified with the organ heart which keeps up the circulation of the blood. In the sutra 25, the *sutrakara* states how, according to his own view the jiva though abiding in one place gives rise to

effects extending over the whole body. As a small lamp placed within a room illuminates the same by its quality, light, so does the soul by its quality, knowledge. Or the extending beyond of consciousness may be viewed in a different way also. As a flower occupying a small space sends out its quality, odour, to a distant place, so the jiva sends out its quality, knowledge, to the remotest spot of the body (sutra 26).* The same has been held by the Chandogya Sruti in the text 'आलोमभ्य आनखाग्रेभ्यः' (छा० ८।८।१). This is the sum and substance of the sutra 27. It has been explained above how the jiva—the knower by its quality, knowledge, illuminates the whole body. It must not be supposed however that there is no difference between knower and its quality, knowledge. The sutra 28 points out that there is distinction between knower and its quality knowledge. So the agent-knower cannot be identified with its quality knowledge (sutra 28). But if there is distinction between the knower and its quality knowledge, why do the Scriptures in some texts identify the knower with its quality knowledge ? This point has been elucidated in the next sutra 29. As Acharya Sreekantha puts it,—

"यदुक्तं 'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्' (बृहदा० ५।७।२२), 'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' [तैत्ति० आन० ५।१], 'ज्ञानस्वरूपमत्यन्त-

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* "गुणिनं जीवं परित्यज्य गुणस्य चैतन्यस्य वृत्ति-व्यतिरेकोऽप्युपपन्नः। किम्वत्, इत्यत आह, गन्धवत्, यथा केतक्यादेर्द्रव्यस्यातिदूरस्यापि तद्गुणस्यान्यतवृत्तिस्तद्वत्॥"

—इति श्रीशङ्करानन्दकृत-दीपिकायाम्

निर्म्मलं परमार्थतः' [विष्णुपु० १।२।६] इत्यादिषु ज्ञानमेवात्मेति व्यपदिश्यते इति, तत्राह ।"—Acharya Sreekantha's bhashya to II. 3. 28 *sutra*.

Thus we reach one of the most contested *sutras*. It ought to be noted that there is no difference worth naming among the commentators with regard to the interpretation of the sutras 19-28. We have stated before that Acharya Sankara and his school along with Bhaskaracharya and Vijnānabhikshu view the above *sutras* only as *purva-paksha-sutras* and the next one as the *siddhanta-sutra*. In their opinion the next sutra really points out that the soul is not *anu* but really *vibhu*. But all the Vaishnavacharyas and the Saivacharya Sreekantha do nothing of the kind. They regard the above sutras as *siddhanta-sutras*. Acharyas Baladeva, Ramanuja, and Sreekantha are of opinion that the next sutra removes the difficulty as to why the Scriptures in some texts allude to the jiva as 'knowledge,' though it is really the knower. In the opinion of Acharya Madhva and Vallabha, the next *sutra* simply removes the doubt if the soul is really *anu*, why in some texts such as '*tatvamasi*' and the like, Sruti identifies the jiva with Brahman. Acharya Nimvarka holds that the next *sutra* removes the difficulty as to why in some texts the Sruti calls the jiva *vibhu* though it is really *anu*. But all the *Vaishnavācharyas* and Saivācharya Sreekantha agree in thinking that the jiva is really *anu* and not *vibhu* as maintained by some schools. Now to the *sutra*.

The sutra runs as follows :

"तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्।"—

ब्रह्मसू० २।३।२९

We give below extracts from the commentaries of the different schools :—

"तस्या बुद्धे र्गुणास्तद्गुणा इच्छा द्वेषः सुखं दुःखमित्येवमादयस्तद्गुणाः सारः प्रधानं यस्यात्मनः संसारित्वे स तद्गुणसारस्तस्य भावस्तद्गुण-सारत्वम्। न हि बुद्धे र्गुणै र्विना केवलस्यात्मनः संसारित्वमस्ति। बुद्ध्युपाधिधर्म्माध्यास-निमित्तं हि कर्त्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिलक्षणं संसारित्वमकर्त्तुरभोक्तुश्चासंसारिणो नित्यमुक्तस्य सत आत्मनः। तस्मात्तद्गुणसारत्वाद् बुद्धिपरिमाणेनास्य परिमाण-व्यपदेशः।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

"उपाधिभूतादणु-गुणसारत्वात्तु अणुगुणव्यपदेशो जीवे यथा प्राज्ञ इत्यन्वयः।"—इति श्रीमद्विज्ञान-भिक्षु-विरचित-भाष्ये

"गृह्णीम एतत् संसारावस्थायामणुरात्मेति न तु तदेवास्य निजं रूपं * * तस्य गुणा रागादयोऽहंप्रत्ययाश्रयाः।"—इति श्रीभास्करभाष्ये

Thus it appears that all these commentators are of opinion that owing to the super-imposition of the qualities of the *buddhi*, the jiva appears as *anu* though in reality it is *vibhu*.

"स ज्ञानलक्षणो गुणः सारो यत्र तथात्वात्। सारो व्यभिचाररहितः स्वरूपानुबन्धीति यावत्। प्राज्ञवत् यथा यः सर्व्वज्ञ सर्व्वविदिति प्राज्ञत्वेनोक्तस्य विष्णोः सत्यं ज्ञानमिति

ज्ञानस्वरूपव्यपदेशस्तद्वत्। अत्र ज्ञाता ज्ञानस्वरूपो निर्द्दिष्टो।"
—इति श्रीगोविन्द-भाष्ये

"ज्ञानगुणसारत्वादात्मनो ज्ञानव्यपदेशः' न ज्ञानमात्रत्वात्। यथा प्राज्ञस्य विपश्चितोऽपि सत्यं ज्ञानमिति। ततो ज्ञानमात्रत्व-व्यपदेशदोषो न भवत्यात्मन इति।"—इति श्रीश्रीकण्ठ-भाष्ये

"तु-शब्दचोद्यं व्यावर्त्तयति; तद्गुणसारत्वात् आत्मनो विज्ञानमिति व्यपदेशः। विज्ञानमेवास्य सारभूतोगुणः, * * * यथा वा 'सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म' (तैति० आन० १।१।२) इति विपश्चितः प्राज्ञस्य ज्ञानशब्देन व्यपदेशः।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

Thus we see that Baladeva, Sreekantha, and Ramanuja agree in thinking that as all-knowing Brahman is designated as truth and knowledge for having knowledge and truth for His essential qualities, so the jiva is designated as knowledge owing to the possession of this essential quality.

'ज्ञानानन्दादिब्रह्मगुणाः एवास्य यतः सारः स्वरूपं अतोऽ-भेदव्यपदेशः। यथा सर्व्वगुणात्मकत्वात् सर्व्वात्मकत्वं ब्रह्मण उच्यते सर्व्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्मेति॥"—इति श्रीमाध्वभाष्ये

"ननु तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यैः परमेव ब्रह्म जीव इति कथमणु-त्वमितीमामाशङ्कां निराकरोति तु-शब्दः। तस्य ब्रह्मणो गुणा प्रज्ञा-द्रष्टृत्वादयस्त एवात्र जीवे सारा इति जड़वैलक्षण्य-कारिण इति अमात्ये राजपदप्रयोगवज्जीवे भगवद्व्यपदेशः।"
—इति श्रीमदणुभाष्ये

So it is clear that Mādhva and Vallabha are of opinion that the jiva having the qualities of truth, knowledge etc., similar to those of Brahman for its essence is spoken of as Brahman as in the case of the all-wise Brahman.

"बृहन्तो गुणा यस्मिन्निति ब्रह्मेति प्राज्ञवदात्मा विभुगुणत्वा-'न्नित्यं विभु'—मिति व्यपदिष्टः ; दृष्टान्ते बृहदेव प्राज्ञो गुणैरपि बृहद्भवति, दार्ष्टान्ते तु जीवोऽणुपरिमाणको गुणेन विभुरिति विशेषः ॥"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

Nimvarka points out that as Brahman is called 'great' on account of His possession of qualities unsurpassed in greatness, so the jiva is also sometimes spoken of as *vibhu* or great on account of its possession of qualities full of greatness.

Let us now pass on to the next *sutra*. According to Sankarāchārya and his school the sutra 30* teaches that so long as the jiva is in the transmigrating stage its connexion with the *buddhi* does not cease. But its connexion with the buddhi ceases only on the attainment of true knowledge. Here Sankarāchārya takes the word 'atman' occurring in the sutra to stand for '*buddhi*' which is not its usual sense. But Baladeva, Ramanuja, and others think that the sutra only confirms the view maintained in the previous sutra. In their opinion all that the sutra teaches is that the knower is called knowledge since it

* "यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तद्दर्शनात् ॥"—२।३।३०

has knowledge for its invariable attribute. Wherever the soul is, there also knowledge is. We cannot think of the soul without its inseparable quality knowledge. Hence there cannot be any objection to the soul being designated by its essential quality knowledge. They explain the word 'atman' in its usual sense, and take it to stand for jivātman.

Now a further question arises, if knowledge is the essence of the soul why do we notice its absence at the time of deep sleep and senselessness ? The next sutra, according to Ramanuja and others, removes the above difficulty.

The sutra 31 runs as follows :

पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ॥—२।३।३१

According to the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Sreekantha, the *sutra* means that as virile power potentially present even in a child becomes manifest only in youth, so knowledge of a person though potentially present even in the state of deep sleep becomes manifest only when he is awake.

"अस्य ज्ञानस्य सुषुप्त्यादौ सत एव जाग्रदादावभिव्यक्ति-संभवाद्यावदात्मभावित्वमेव। यथा पुंस्त्वादे र्बाल्ये सत एव यौवनेऽभिव्यक्तिः ॥"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

"इन्द्रियसंयोगरूपा कारणसामग्री तु तदभिव्यञ्जका। असतः सम्भवे तु क्लीवस्यापि तदापत्तिः। तस्मात् ज्ञान-स्वरूपोऽणुर्जीवो नित्यज्ञान-गुणकः सिद्धः ॥"

—इति श्रीगोविन्दभाष्ये

But Acharya Sankara and his school maintain just as the virile power which exists even in a child becomes manifest only in youth, so the connexion of the buddhi with the jiva though potentially present in the state of deep sleep as the seed of *avidya* becomes manifest only in the waking state. The Vedanta rejects *in toto* the theory of accidental origination. Anything which is altogether non-existent cannot possibly come into being.

"यथा लोके पुंस्त्वादीनि वीजात्मना विद्यमानान्येव वाल्यादिष्वनुपलभ्यमानान्यविद्यमानवदभिप्रेयमाणानि यौवनादिष्वाविर्भवन्ति, नाविद्यमानान्युत्पद्यन्ते षण्ढादीनामपि तदुत्पत्तिप्रसङ्गात्, एवमयमपि वुद्धिसंवन्धः शक्त्यात्मना विद्यमान एव सुषुप्तप्रलययोः पुनः प्रवोधप्रसवयोराविर्भवति ॥"

—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

The sutra 32 runs as follows :

"नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गोऽन्यतर-नियमो वाऽन्यथा ॥"

—२।३।३२

According to Sankarācharya and his school, all that the sutra teaches is that unless we admit the existence of the internal organ (अन्तःकरण), the theory of the perpetual presence or the perpetual absence of consciousness becomes inevitable. In the *samsara* stage, consciousness is neither perpetually present nor perpetually absent. If the soul is all-pervading as contended by them, how can that be ? In their opinion, on

the admission of the agency of the buddhi limiting Brahman, the above difficulty is easily overcome.

"तच्चैवम्भूतमन्तःकरणमवश्यमस्तीत्यभ्युपगन्तव्यम्। अन्यथा ह्यनभ्युपगम्यमाने तस्मिन्नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धिप्रसङ्गः स्यात्॥"

—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

But Ramanuja, Baladeva, Nimvarka, and Sreekantha have seen in the sutra a refutation of the all-pervading theory. According to them, the *sutra* means that if the soul is really all-pervading, then it will have to be conceived as ever-conscious or ever-unconscious or as both ever-conscious and ever-unconscious at the same time.

"अन्यथा (सर्व्वगतात्मवादे) आत्मोपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धौ बन्धमोक्षयो नित्यं प्रसङ्गः स्यान्नित्यबद्धो वा नित्यमुक्तो वाऽत्मेत्यन्यतरनियमो वा स्यात्॥"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

"अन्यथा—सर्व्वगतत्वपक्षे तस्य ज्ञानमात्रत्वपक्षे च नित्यं उपलब्ध्यनुपलब्धी सहैव प्रसज्येयाताम्; अन्यतरनियमो वा —उपलब्धिरेव वा नित्यं स्यात्, अनुपलब्धिरेव वा।"

—इति श्रीभाष्ये

Ramanuja further points out that the admission of the internal organs does not make the situation better. The soul being all-pervading and having its perpetual connexion with all the organs internal or external at the same time and there having no possibility for the *adrista* and the like to limit the perpetual connexion, the theory of the perpetual presence

of consciousness or its perpetual absence, or of both at the same time becomes inevitable.

"करणायत्तोपलब्धिरपि सर्व्वेषामात्मनां सर्व्वगतत्वेन सर्व्वैः करणैः सर्व्वदा संयुक्तत्वात् अदृष्टादेरप्यनियमादुक्तदोषः समानः ॥"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

I next take up the sutras 49 and 50 of the same Pāda and Adhyāya. The sutra 49 is :—

"असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः ॥"—२।३।४९

According to Rāmānuja, Sreekantha, and Nimvarka, the *sutra* points out that the jiva being *anu* and being different in different bodies, there cannot arise any confusion with regard to the enjoyments of actions, or the fruits of actions. But Acharya Sankara and his school have interpreted the *sutra* in a different way. In their opinion, the jivas appear innumerable owing to the super-imposition of the *upadhis* or limiting adjuncts. The *upadhis* are minute and not all-pervading. Each jiva being limited by the *upadhis* can not have connexion with other jivas limited by the *upadhis* as well. So there takes place no confusion with regard to work or fruits of work.

The next *sutra* is a highly contested one. The *sutra* runs as follows :

"आभास एव च।"—२।३।५०

Nimvārka and Bhāskara hold that 'आभासा एव च' is the correct reading. Ramanuja has accepted "आभासा एव च" as an alternative reading. Most of the commen-

tators have, however, accepted the reading given above as the correct one. Now to the meaning of the sutra. Ramanuja, Nimvarka, and Sreekantha have interpreted the *sutra* in the same way. In their opinion the *sutra* points out the fallacies of the upholders of the *Vibhu-vada* in general. For the upholders of the all-pervading theory have to assume that the *upadhis* or limiting adjuncts can conceal the self-luminous intelligence of Brahman which means nothing less than the destruction of the essential nature of Brahman. The word *'abhasa'* in their opinion means *'hetvabhasa'* or fallacious argument.

"अखण्डैकरसप्रकाशमात्रस्वरूपस्य स्वरूप-तिरोधानपूर्व्वकोपाधिभेदोपपादनहेतुराभास एव ।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

"सत्यमिथ्योपाधिभ्यां बद्धस्य ब्रह्मण एव जीवभाव इति पक्षद्वयेऽपि युक्तय आभासा एव ।"—इति श्रीकण्ठभाष्ये

"परेषां कपिलादीनां व्यतिकरप्रसङ्गात् सर्व्वगतात्मवादाश्चाभासा एव च ॥"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

According to Bhāskara, the *sutra* refutes the views of those who maintain that the souls are many and at the same time all-pervading.

"येषां बहव आत्मनः सर्व्वगताश्च तेषां मते व्यतिकर इति दर्शयिषन् सामान्यदूषणमाह अविद्या आभासा एव ॥"—इति श्रीभास्करभाष्ये

But Sankaracharya and his school have seen in the *sutra* an enunciation of the Prativimba-vāda. In

their opinion, the *sutra* maintains that the soul is a reflection of Brahman.

"आभास एव चैष जीवः परस्यात्मनो जलसूर्य्यकादिवत् प्रतिपत्तव्यः। न स एव साक्षात्। नापि वस्त्वन्तरम्। अतश्च यथा नैकस्मिञ्जलसूर्य्यके कम्पमाने जलसूर्य्यकान्तरं कम्पते, एवं नैकस्मिञ्जीवे कर्म्मफलसंबन्धिनि जीवान्तरस्य तत्सम्बन्धः।"—इति श्रीशङ्करभाष्ये

"तस्मादविद्यातत्कार्य्यबुद्ध्यादिप्रतिबिम्ब एव जीव इत्यर्थः।" इति श्रीगोविन्दानन्द-कृत-रत्नप्रभाटीकायाम्

Vallabha is of opinion that the word 'abhása' in the sutra stands for reflection. The jiva, in his opinion, is undoubtedly a reflection, owing to the absence of bliss, but it is a true reflection of Brahman. He repudiates the idea of a false reflection upheld by the school of Sankara.

"आभास एव जीव। आनन्दांशस्य तिरोहितत्वात्। चकारादाकारास्याप्यभावः। न तु सर्व्वथा प्रतिबिम्बवन्मि-थ्यात्वं जलचन्द्रवदित्येकस्यानेकत्वे दृष्टान्तः * * अतो न मिथ्यात्वरूप आभासोऽत्र विवक्षितः॥"—इति श्रीमदणुभाष्ये

According to Vijnāna-bhikshu the sutra teaches that the jiva is a pure self-luminous intelligence.

"आभास एव च स च जीवो ब्रह्मवदाभासमानः प्रकाश-मात्र चिन्मात्र इत्यर्थः।"—इति विज्ञानामृताख्यभाष्ये

Madhva and Baladeva have interpreted the sutra from a different stand-point. I leave out their views for the present.

Let us now take up the *sutras* in which Bādarāyana clearly enunciates the relation between the *jiva* and Brahman. The sutra 43 runs as follows :

"अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्व-मधीयत एके ॥"—२।३।४३

There is hardly any difference between the commentators with regard to the meaning of the *sutra*. The *sutra* teaches that there are some texts of the Sruti which declare difference between the jiva and Brahman. There are other texts which establish their non-difference. Members of a certain *sakha* of the Atharva-veda call even slaves and fishers Brahman. Having regard to all these conflicting texts, the *sutra-kara* concludes that the jiva is to be viewed as a part of the Highest Lord. Now the question arises, how can the jiva be regarded as the *amsa* of the Highest Lord ? The commentators differ as to the interpretation of the word '*amsa.*' Acharya Sankara in the first place observes that by 'part' we mean 'a part as it were,' for a being not composed of parts cannot have parts in the literal sense. But in the concluding portion of his *bhasya* to the sutra, he suggests the soul must be construed as a part of the Lord, just as a spark is a part of fire. There being both difference and non-difference between the jiva and the Highest Lord the jiva is to be viewed as a part of the Lord.

"चैतन्यं चावशिष्टं जीवेश्वरयो र्यथाऽग्निविस्फुलिङ्गयोरौष्ण्यम्। अतो भेदाभेदावगमाभ्यामंशत्वावगमः ॥"—इति शङ्कर-भाष्ये

Bhaskarāc harya and Ballavācharya also hold that the jiva is a part of Brahman just as a spark is a part of fire.

"कथं पुनर्निरवयवस्य परमात्मनोंऽशः सम्भवति। आगमात्तावदवगम्यते। यथाग्नेःक्षुद्राः विस्फुलिङ्गा इति दृष्टान्त-प्रणयनात् ॥"—इति भास्कराचार्य्य-विरचित-भाष्ये

"वैलक्षण्ये क्रमे च विस्फुलिङ्गश्रुतिरेव प्रमाणमिति वैलक्षण्यरूपात् कार्य्यादेवं कार्य्यविभागोऽनुमीयते ॥"—इति श्रीपुरुषोत्तम-महाराज-विरचित-श्रीमदणुभाष्य-प्रकाश-व्याख्यायाम्

But Ramanuja, Nimvarka, Baladeva, and Sreekantha hold that the jiva is a part of Brahman, just as light issuing from a luminous object such as fire or the sun is a part of that object. The word '*amsa*' must be taken in its primary sense. Vijnana-bhikshu also seems to hold the same view.

"परेशस्यांशो जीवः अंशुरिवांशुमतः तद्भिन्नस्तदनुयायी तत्सम्बन्धापेक्षोत्यर्थः ॥"—इति श्रीगोविन्दभाष्ये

"एवमुभयव्यपदेशमुख्यत्वसिद्धये जीवोऽयं ब्रह्मणोंऽश इत्युप-गन्तव्यः ॥"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

"नायं जीवः श्रीपुरुषोत्तमादत्यन्तभिन्नः, नात्यन्ताभिन्नः, किन्तु परमात्मनोंऽशः। 'अंशोह्येष परस्ये'ति श्रुतेः। अंशो हि शक्तिरूपो ग्राह्य 'एष परस्य शक्तिः जीवोऽल्पशक्तिरस्वतन्त्रः' इति श्रुतेः॥"—इति श्रीश्रीनिवासाचार्य्य-कृत-वेदान्तकौस्तुभे

"न केवलं भेदाभेदान्यथानुपपत्त्यैवांशत्वं कल्प्यते अपि तु साक्षात् श्रुतेरपीत्याह॥"—इति श्रीमद्विज्ञानभिक्षु-कृत-व्याख्याने

According to Acharya Madhva, the sutra means that the soul is a part of the Lord, on account of its being declared to be variously related to Him ; also declared otherwise (as unrelated) ; and because some *sakhins* differently record that Brahman is of the nature of slaves, fishers, and so on.*

"अंशो ह्येष परस्य योऽयं पुमानुत्पद्यते च म्रियते च नानाह्येनं व्यपदिशन्ति पितेति पुत्रेति भ्रातेति सखेति चेति॥"—इति श्रीमाध्वभाष्ये

I find that Acharya Madhva stands single in his opinion, and none else supports him.

Bādarāyana next supports his view by citing texts from the Sruti and Smriti. The Sruti also intimates that the soul is a part of Brahman (sutra 44). Almost all the commentators cite the following text of the Chandogya Upanishad:

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* Vide Mr. Subba Rau, English Translation, *Purna-prajna-darsana.*

"पादोऽस्य सर्व्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि।"—
(छा० ३।१२।६)

Acharya Sankara notes that the word *'bhutani'* used in the *mantra* stands for all the living beings, and the word *'pada'* for *amsa* or part. Acharya Ramanuja points out that as the individual souls are many, the *mantra* uses the plural—*'bhutani'*. The Smriti also regards the soul as an eternal part of Brahman (sutra 45).

"ईश्वरगीतास्वपि चेश्वरांशत्वं जीवस्य स्मर्य्यते 'ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः (१५।७) इति॥"—

इति शङ्करभाष्ये

Thus we see that Bādarāyana teaches on the strength of the Sruti and Smriti that the soul is a part of Brahman.

The next two sutras point out in what particular way the soul is to be viewed as a part of the Highest Lord. The sutrakāra refers to *'prakashadi'*. Thus it follows that the relation of the soul to Brahman is to be viewed just like the relation of the rays of light to their source. For the convenience of discussion we take up a few *sutras* more, from other parts of the Brahma-sutras having bearings on *jivatman*.

Let us next pass on to the *sutras* making up the so-called *Pratardanadhikarana*, of Adhyaya I., Pada I. We read in the Kaushitaki-brahman Upanishad that Pratardana—the son of Divodāsa, went to the favourite abode of Indra by virtue of his heroic deeds. Indra on

meeting Pratardana asked him to choose a boon. Pratardana in his turn desired Indra to choose such a boon for him as might prove most beneficial to mankind. Upon which Indra said "I am the Prana and the omniscient Self. Worship and meditate on me as life, as immortality."[1] Here the question arises, whether this Being whom Indra calls as the Prana and Highest Self is the individual self Indra or the Supreme Self. As the word Indra ordinarily stands for a particular individual self and the word Prana signifies but the same self, it is reasonable to take Prana for the individual self. But sutrakāra points out in *sutra* 28, that it is clear from a connected consideration of the passages referring to it, that the word Prana denotes *Brahman* and not the individual self. If it be said that as the speaker Indra declares himself to be the object of worship, the words Indra and *Prana* cannot signify the Highest Self.[2] We reply that as there is mention of a multitude of attributes in the text such as *ananda* (blissful), *ajara* (undecaying), and *amrita* (immortal), which can alone belong to the Highest Self, the contention of the objector can not be held as valid.[3] A further question arises, how can Indra who is well known to be of the nature of an individual self teach that he himself is the object of worship ? The next sutra clears up the difficulty. It

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1 "स होवाच प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा तं मामायुरमृतमित्युपास्स्व ।"—कौ॰ ३।१

2 "प्राणस्तथानुगमात् ।"—ब्रह्मसूत्र १।१।२८

3 "न वक्तुरात्मोपदेशादिति चेदध्यात्मसंबन्धभूमा ह्यस्मिन् ॥" ब्रह्मसू॰ १।१।२९

is taught in the same that the words of Indra may be viewed as those of Vamadeva, 'in accordance with the spirit of the Sāstras.* It is said of Vamadeva that on seeing *Brahman* he declared that "He has become Manu and the sun as well." So does also Indra. Indra on attainment of his unity with *Brahman* through divine vision declares himself to be the object of worship in accordance with the spirit of the Sāstras. In this aphorism Sankara sees an enunciation of his Advaitism pure and simple, but Ramanuja and others are of opinion that Indra declares himself to be the object of worship on realising all things including himself as Brahman. In their view, cases like these are not cases of absolute identity, but are simply cases of identity of nature.

Next I take up the *sutras* constituting what is known as the *Vakyanvyadhikarana* of Adhyaya I., Pāda IV. The aphorisms 19 to 22 form the same. In the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad (बृ० ४।५।६) some texts occur where it is taught in effect that husband, wife, son, and riches are not dear and loving by themselves, but they are dear and loving only for the sake of the self. Here a doubt arises, whether the self for the sake of which everything else is called dear is the individual self or the Highest Self. The *purvapakshin* contends that the self referred to is but the individual self. Husband, wife, son, and riches are worldly things, and they stand connected with the individual self. Hence

* "शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत् ।"—ब्रह्मसू' १।१।२०

the self for the sake of which everything else is called dear and loving is only the *jiva*. But the *sutrakara* tells us in sutra 1. 4. 19, that from the connected meaning of the texts, the self referred to, can be no other than the Highest Self.[1] For it has been stated in the latter part of the topic that the self for the sake of which everything else is called dear, is to be seen, heard, remembered, and contemplated, and when it is known everything else is known as well. As such characteristics cannot belong to the individual self, the self referred to is undoubtedly the Highest Self.

In the initial part of the texts, there is reference to husband, wife, son, and riches, and they have been enjoined to be viewed as dear and loving for the sake of the self. In the latter part, the self has been declared to be the object of contemplation, and we have further been told that when it is known everything else is known. Hence it is clear that the *Sruti* teaches that the individual soul is to be viewed as the Highest Self in some way or other. But how can the *jiva* be looked upon as the Highest Self? Different teachers have answered the question differently. According to Acharya *Asmarathya*, the *jiva* is to be viewed as the Highest Self for the sake of the fulfilment of the promissory statement—when the self is known every thing else is known.[2] Unless the *jiva* is viewed as the Highest Self, knowledge of one cannot pos-

1 "वाक्यान्वयात् ॥"—ब्रह्मसू १।४।१९ ।

2 "प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० १।४।२०

sibly convey knowledge of everything else. According to Acharya *Audulomi*, the jiva is to be looked upon as the Highest Self as it issues forth in its own form as one undifferentiated consciousness after final release.[1] According to Acharya Kāsakritsna as interpreted by *Sankara*, Brahman Himself exists in the form of the individual soul through *avidya* and so the *jiva* is none else than the Highest Self.[2] Acharya Sankara takes Kāsakritsna's opinion as the *siddhanta* view and supports the same.

"अस्यैव परमात्मनोऽनेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणमिति काशकृत्स्न आचार्यो मन्यते ॥"—

इति शङ्करभाष्ये

Ramanuja, *Nimbarka*, and *Sreekantha*, also accept Kāsakritsna's view as the *siddhanta* view but they interpret the aphorism differently. They are of opinion that as Brahman is the ruler and controller of the jivas as their inner self, which are nothing but His body or *sakti*, they are to be regarded as Brahman Himself.

"स्वशरीरभूते जीवात्मन्यात्मतयावस्थितेः जीवशब्देन ब्रह्मप्रतिपादनम्, इति काशकृत्स्न आचार्यो मन्यते स्म ।"—

इति श्रीभाष्ये

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1 "उत्क्रमिष्यत एवंभावादित्यौडुलोमिः ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० १।४।२१

2 "अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥" ब्रह्मसू० १।४।२२

" 'य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्' इत्यादिश्रुते जीवात्मनि परमेश्वरस्यात्मतया अवस्थानाज्जीवशब्दवाच्यत्वं परमेश्वरस्येति काशकृत्स्नो मेने ।"—इति श्रीकण्ठभाष्ये

"जीवात्मनि स्वनियम्ये 'अन्तःप्रविष्टः शास्ता जनानाम्' इत्यादौ प्रसिद्धस्य परमात्मनो नियन्तृत्वेनावस्थिते र्हेतोर्नियम्यपदेनोपक्रमादौ नियन्तृपरिग्रह इति काशकृत्स्नो मन्यते स्म।"—इति निम्वार्कभाष्ये

Baladeva and Vallabha explain the aphorism almost in the same way.

"उदके सैन्धवखिल्यस्यैव विज्ञानघनशब्दितस्य जीवेतरस्य महतो भूतस्य परमात्मनोऽस्थितेरुपदेशात् तन्मध्यगतं वाक्यं परमात्मपरमेव ।"—इति श्रीगोविन्दभाष्ये

"तत्र जीवो नाम स्वस्य भोगनिष्पत्त्यर्थं स्वांशो भगवता कृतो विस्फुलिङ्गवदित्याश्मरथ्यो मन्यते ॥"—इति श्रीमदणुभाष्ये

But Bhāskara supports Sankara :

"तर्ह्युत्क्रमणात् प्रागपि जीवरूपेण परमात्मनोऽवस्थानादभेदेनोपक्रम इति काशकृत्स्नो मन्यते स्म ।"—इति श्रीभास्करभाष्ये

Before passing on to the review of the commentators, I take up two *sutras* more of Adhāya II., Pāda I. In Adhāya II, Pāda I, the *sutrakära* teaches that God is not only the operative cause of the universe but He is the material cause of the same as well. But if Brahman

be regarded as the material cause of the universe as well, the distinction between the enjoyer (*jiva*) and the Lord passes away. Hence *the purvapakshin* contends Brahman cannot be regarded as the material cause of the universe. To this the *sutrakara* replies in *sutra* 13, that it need not be so. The distinction between the individual as enjoyer and the Lord stands, as is evident from examples of ordinary life.* According to Sankara and his school, the main object of the *sutra* is to illustrate the distinction between the enjoyer and the Lord in the sphere of *vyavahara* only, for the immediately next sutra 14, shows that this distinction does not obtain in the sphere of *paramartha* or true knowledge. But according to Nimvarka, Baladeva, and others, the truth conveyed in the *sutra* is meant for all stages of existence. According to the former school, all that the *sutra* teaches is that although the enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment are nothing but Brahman and on that account non-different, yet they may practically be distinguished and held apart as two sets, just as in ordinary life we distinguish as separate individual things, the waves, ripples, and foam of the sea, although at the bottom they are all identical as being nothing more or less than sea-water.† According to Ramanuja, this universe of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Lord and He is its ruling Self. It may

* "भोक्त्रापत्तेरविभागश्चेत् स्याल्लोकवत् ॥"—ब्रह्मसू २।१।१३

† Vide Thibaut, English Translation, Brahma-sutras with Sankara's Commentary—vol. xxxiv S.B.E.

be said that God as an embodied being is not different from other souls, and is subject to enjoyment as they are. The *sutrakara* replies that God's having a body does not subject Him to fruition any more than in ordinary life, a king, although himself an embodied being, is affected by the experiences of pleasure and pain which his servants have to undergo. Acharya Nimvārka points out that though God is the material cause of the universe, the well-known distinction of the individual soul and God stands, as is clear from the ordinary examples of the sea and its ripples, the sun and its rays. Acharya Baladeva illustrates his view by the example of a man armed with a sword. As a man armed with a sword which represents his energy is but a single man, so Brahman possessing *sakti* is nothing more than Brahman, though His *sakti* is different from Him.

The next *sutra* is a highly contested one.* Acharya Sankara has laid much stress upon it. He has in fact regarded it as the keystone to his whole system. There is hardly any difference in the interpretation of the *sutra*. But the conclusions drawn from the premises of the *sutra* are widely divergent. The *sutra*, in plain words, teaches the non-difference of cause and effect on the strength of the Scriptural texts beginning with the word *'arambhana'* and the like. The texts beginning with the word *'arambhana'* occur in the Chhandogya Upanishad Adhaya VI. † There

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* "तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० २।१।१४

† Vide Mahamahopadhyaya Pundit Ganganath Jha's English Translation, Chhandogya Upanishad.

lived one Svetaketu, the grandson of Aruna. His father Uddalaka asked him to live the life of a religious student and to study the Vedas. Accordingly he went when he was 12 years old and came back when he was 24, having studied all the Vedas, greatly conceited considering himself well-read. Upon which his father inquired of his conceited son if he had ever asked for that instruction "by which the unheard becomes the heard, the unperceived becomes the perceived, and the unknown becomes the known, just as by a single clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, all modification being only a name arising from speech and the truth being that all is clay." The topic ends with the words "that which is this subtle essence,— in That has all this its Self ; That is the True ; That is the Self. That thou art, O, Svetaketu."*

According to Sankara, this phenomenal universe consisting of sentient and non-sentient beings is the effect, and Brahman is the cause. This aphorism in teaching that this phenomenal universe is non-different from its cause—Brahman, virtually teaches that from the standpoint of *paramartha* or true knowledge the cause Brahman is true, and the effect—this phenomenal universe of the living and non-living is false or non-existent, as is clear from the texts of the *Sruti* cited above. The texts of the *Sruti*, according to Sankara, point out that as all pots, jars, etc. made of clay are mere names based

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* "स य एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो इति ।"—छान्दो ६।१४।२

upon words and have no existence apart from the clay which is the only truth, so this phenomenal world consisting of the living and non-living from the standpoint of *paramartha* is a mere name arising from speech and has no existence apart from Brahman who is the only truth.

"यतो वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं वाचैव केवलमस्तीत्यारभ्यते। विकारो घटः शराव उदञ्चनं चेति। न तु वस्तुवृत्तेन विकारो नाम कश्चिदस्ति। नामधेयमात्रं ह्येतदनृतं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति। एष ब्रह्मणो दृष्टान्त आम्नातः। तत्र श्रुताद्वाचारम्भणशब्दाद्दार्ष्टान्तिकेऽपि ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण कार्य्यजातस्याभाव इति गम्यते।"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये

According to Ramanuja, Baladeva, and others, the main object of the aphorism is to refute the view of Kanada, who maintains that effect is always different from its cause. As the Sruti by its texts beginning with the words '*arambhana*' and the like, teaches that this phenomenal world of sentient and non-sentient beings is non-different from its cause—Brahman, the view of *Kanada* is untenable. As jars, pots, and the like which are fashioned out of clay are nothing but different manifestations of clay based upon name arising from speech, and as such are non-different from clay which is the truth, so this phenomenal universe of the living and non-living having innumerable names and forms in its effected state is nothing but the manifestation of the *chidachit* body or *sakti* of Brahman from its

causal state, and as such is non-different from Him who is the only truth.

"अत्रेदं तत्त्वम्—चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरतया तत्प्रकारं ब्रह्मैव सर्व्वदा सर्व्व-शब्दाभिधेयम्। तत् कदाचित् स्वस्मात् स्वशरीरतयापि पृथग्व्यपदेशानर्हसूक्ष्मदशापन्न-चिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरम्, तत्कारणावस्थम् ब्रह्म; कदाचिच्च विभक्त-नामरूप-व्यवहारार्हस्थूलदशापन्नचिदचिद्वस्तुशरीरम्; तच्च कार्य्यावस्थम्; इति कारणात् परस्माद् ब्रह्मणः कार्यरूपं जगदनन्यत्॥"—

इति श्रीभाष्ये

"तस्मात् जीवप्रकृतिशक्तियुक्तात् जगदुपादानात् ब्रह्मणः अनन्यदेवोपादेयं जगत्। कुतः आरम्भणेति। आरम्भण-शब्द आदि र्येषां तेभ्यो वाक्येभ्यः॥"—इति श्रीगोविन्दभाष्ये

"तस्मात् परमकारणाच्चिदचिच्छक्तिमतोऽपरिच्छिन्नादेकाद्वितीयादिशब्दार्थात् कारणावस्थया कार्य्यावस्थया च स्वेच्छयैव स्थातुं समर्थात् सर्व्वप्रपञ्चपूर्व्ववर्त्तिनो ब्रह्मणः सकाशाच्चिदचिद्रुपस्य परिच्छिन्नस्यानेकनामरूपस्य परतन्त्रस्य कार्यस्यानन्यत्वमित्यर्थः॥"—इति श्रीश्रीनिवासाचार्य्यकृत-वेदान्तकौस्तुभे

"वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यमिति। तत्र विकारो वाङ्मात्रेणैवारभ्यते, न वस्तुत इत्यर्थः प्रतिभाति। तथा च सति कस्य ब्रह्म कारणं भवेत्। अतः श्रुतिवाक्यस्यार्थमाह। आरम्भणशब्दादिभ्यस्तदनन्यत्वं प्रतीयते। कार्य्यस्य कारणानन्यत्वं, न मिथ्यात्वम्।"—इति श्रीमदणुभाष्ये

Sreekantha follows Ramanuja. Bhaskara is of opinion that the *sutra* does not purport to teach the falsity of the phenomenal world.* According to him all that the sutra teaches is that cause exists as effect under certain conditions just as clay exists as pots under certain conditions and as such is non-different from them. According to Madhva, the *sutra* teaches that cause must be admitted to be none other than Brahman from the statement of challenge as to the means etc., and other arguments recorded in the Scriptures. Thus it is clear that with regard to the purport of the *sutra* the main contest lies between Sankara and his school on the one hand, and Ramanuja, Nimvarka, Baladeva, and Sreekantha on the other.

We bring our statement of the principal *sutras* to a close here and pass on to their critical study. It appears from what we have stated above that the real contest with regard to the meaning of the *sutras* lies between Sankara and his school on the one hand, and the Vaishnavācharyas and Saivācharya Sreekantha on the other. The contesting parties stand on opposed positions and so far as we see it is not possible to bring about any reconciliation between them. We must take one side or the other. There is no other alternative open to us. We have given our best consideration to the matter and have come to the conclusion that the interpretation of

* "कारणमेव कार्य्यात्मना घटवदवतिष्ठते मृत्समन्वितं हि कार्य्यमुपलभ्यते त्रिष्वपि कालेषु कारणाधीनं कार्य्यं नाश्वमहिषवद्देशत: कालतो वा व्यतिरिक्तमुपलभ्यते कारणस्यावस्थामात्रं कार्य्यम् ॥"—इति भास्करीय ब्रह्मसूत्रभाष्ये

the Vaishnava schools and that of Sreekantha, generally speaking, is more reasonable, and we therefore prefer the same. Our reasons are given below serially with reference to each of the sutras refered to above.

1. In *sutra* II. 3. 17, the *sutrakara* teaches in clear words that *jiva* is neither born nor dies, and that it is eternal and immutable. All the Vaishnava teachers, Sreekantha, and Vijnanabhiksu have failed to see any other meaning in it. But this plain meaning did not suit Sankara. For the sake of his preconceived theory he had to interpret it in a novel way and to import certain words in the aphorism which do not really find any place in it. According to him as noted above the *sutra* teaches that as *jivatman* is nothing but Brahman limited by the *upadhis*, it is eternal and immutable. But from the context it appears to us that the *sutras* beginning with 17, relate to the *jivas* and *jivas* alone and so the interpretation of Sankara seems beside the point.

2. The *sutra* 18 too has been interpreted by Sankara, Bhāskara and Vijnanabhikshu in a peculiar way. The word '*jna*' of the *sutra* according to them stands for 'knowledge' and not for 'knower.' But Ramanuja, Nimvarka, Baladeva, Madhva, and Sreekantha hold that the word '*jna*' stands for knower and not for knowledge as held by Sankara and others. Ramanuja very ably points out that knowledge has its existence, has its character as knowledge only with reference to a knower. Knowledge without reference to a knower is meaningless, altogether unthinkable. When this relation with

the knower ceases, knowledge itself ceases. Just as there can be no cutting without a cutter and the obiect to be cut. The *Srutis, Smritis,* and *Brahma-sutras* also allude to knower and not to pure knowledge as such.

"स्वसम्बन्धितया ह्यस्यास्सत्ता विज्ञप्तितादि च ।
स्वसम्बन्धवियोगे तु ज्ञप्तिरेव न सिद्ध्यति ॥
छेत्तुश्छेद्यस्य चाभावे छेदनादेरसिद्धिवत् ।
अतोऽहमर्थो ज्ञातैव प्रत्यगात्मेति निश्चितम् ॥
'विज्ञातारमरे केन' 'जानात्येवे'ति च श्रुतिः ।
'एतद्यो वेत्ति तं प्राहुः क्षेत्रज्ञ' इति च स्मृतिः ।
'नात्माऽश्रुते'रित्यारभ्य सूत्रकारोऽपि वक्ष्यति ।
'ज्ञोऽतएवे'त्यतो नाऽत्मा ज्ञप्तिमात्रमिति स्थितम् ॥"

इति श्रीभाष्ये । १।१।१

In this connection I cite below opinions of three western thinkers of repute. They have all held that a state of pure knowledge is inconceivable and that knowledge can be conceived only as a state of a knower. *Lotze* observes as follows :

"It is impossible to speak of a bare movement without thinking of the mass whose movement it is ; and it is just as impossible to conceive a sensation existing without the accompanying of that which has it, or rather, of that which feels it, for this also is included in the given fact of experience that the relation of the feeling subject to its feeling, what its other characteristics may be, is in any case something different from the

relation of the moved element to its movement. It is thus and thus only, that the sensation is a given fact; and we have no right to abstract from its relations to its subject because this relation is puzzling, and because we wish to obtain a starting-point which looks more convenient, but is utterly unwarranted by experience."*

Ward maintains much the same view. He says:

"It is not enough to talk of feelings or volition: what we mean is that some individual man or worm feels, strives, acts, thus or thus. Obvious as this may seem, it has been frequently forgotten or gainsaid."†

Ladd puts his case more forcibly yet. In his opinion to conceive of knowledge without reference to a knower is an impossibility.

"All states of consciousness involve a reference of the state to an "I," as the subject of the state; and, in spite of the constant change of states which goes on, so that in reality the same state never recurs, and even the same thing is never twice known, all are understood to be states of one and the same subject. This reference and this understanding enter into all our experience; they give conditions to experience and make it possible. Whatever changes experience may be conceived of as undergoing, they, as conditions of all possible experience, must be conceived of as remaining. To ask us to try to imagine

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* Lotze, *Metaphysic*, § 241.

† Vide his Article on "Psychology," Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition.

a mental state or act not involving this reference and understanding, with respect to the unit-subject of consciousness, is to ask us to try to be conscious and unconscious at the same time. The 'I' may become unconscious; that is, the phenomena of consciousness in that connected development which characterizes the individual may cease to exist. *But phenomena of consciousness can not be conceived of as occurring without being referable to some one subject as its modes or states.*"*

The context shows that the aphorism is meant for the individual self and not for the Highest Self. The Scriptures invariably conceive of the jiva as a knower, and not as pure knowledge. As the plain meaning of the word "jna" is knower and not knowledge as contended by Sankara and others, and as pure knowledge as such without reference to a knower is inconceivable, we do not think possible that Bādarāyana has taught anything in the *sutra* which is simply untenable.

3. In sutras 19 to 28, Adhyaya II., Pada III, as noted above, the question of the size of the soul has been discussed. It has been taught therein, according to the interpretation of the commentators of all the schools, that the *jiva* is very minute in size and not all-pervading as apparently held in a text of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad. The context shows that the text in question refers to the Highest Self and not

* Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, pp. 610—11. Italics are ours.

to the individual self. The centre *hridaya* lying in the dorsal region of the spinal cord is the seat of the *jiva*. It radiates its light of consciousness to different parts of the body through the innumerable nervous paths and channels connecting it with different parts of the body just as the cooling effect of a quantity of sandal-ointment placed in any part of the body does. Or it may be conceived as illuminating every part of the body just like a lamp kept in an enclosed space. Or it may, more fitly, be considered as spreading like the odour of a scented article. It must not however be supposed that there is no distinction between knower and knowledge. The distinction between the knowing subject and its knowledge has always been maintained in the Scriptures. The sutra 28 points to the distinction between knower and knowledge. But there are some Scriptural texts such as 'विज्ञानं यज्ञं' तनुते' 'यो विज्ञाने तिष्ठन्' and the like where knowledge has been spoken of as knower. It may be contended on the basis of such texts that there is in fact no distinction between knower and knowledge. The *sutra* 29 seems to be an explanation of the above difficulty. Acharya Sankara admits that in sutra 28 the distinction between the individual self and its quality, consciousness, has been upheld.* But he is of opinion that the sutra 29 is a reply not only to sutra 28 but to all the preceding sutras beginning with ṣutra 19. In his opinion

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* " 'प्रज्ञया शरीरं समारुह्य' (कौषी ३।६) इति चात्मप्रज्ञयोः कर्तृकरण-भावेन पृथग्व्यपदेशाच्चैतन्यगुणेनैवास्य शरीर-व्यापिता गम्यते ॥"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये

in sutra 29 the theory of the minute size of the soul has been refuted by the *sutrakara*. But we do not find any indication whatever in these *sutras* to regard them as *purvapaksha-sutras*. On considering all these *sutras* carefully we find that all the objections as to the minuteness of the soul have been raised in these *sutras* one after another and they have all been answered. Further, the text of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad where the soul has apparently been viewed as all-pervading has also been explained away. In these circumstances we do not see our way to support Sankara and his school. Any unbiassed student of the Vedanta cannot but come to the same conclusion.

4. In Sankara's opinion, in *sutra* 29 we come across the *siddhanta* view. His bhāshya on the *sutra* has appeared to us unsatisfactory. According to it the word 'tad' occurring in the aphorism stands for *buddhi* and not knowledge as interpreted by Ramanuja and others. But the topic of the buddhi, as far as we see, has not been raised in any of the preceding *sutras* looked upon by him as *purvapaksha-sutras*. If so,how are we to account for its sudden introduction ? In the immediately preceding *sutra*, according to his own interpretation, the distinction between the individual soul and its quality consciousness (चैतन्यगुण) has been pointed out. Even admitting for argument's sake that in the immediately preceding aphorism, the distinction between the soul and *buddhi* has been maintained, the sutra 29 can then be taken as a reply to the same only and not to all the preceding sutras in which the question of the

minuteness of the soul has directly been discussed. On the other hand, we find the topic of the *buddhi* has subsequently been taken up in sutras 36—39, Adhyāya II, Pāda III. As in the immediately preceding *sutra*, the distinction between knower and knowledge has been taught, and as there are texts in the Scriptures which can fitly raise the doubt as to why the knower has been called knowledge in those texts, we are of opinion that the word 'tad' stands for '*jnana*' and not for *buddhi* as contended by Sankara and his school.

According to Sankara, the individual soul has the qualities of *buddhi* for its principal qualities. It is a knower and an enjoyer because of them. Its minuteness is due to them as well. As a matter of fact its knowership or individuality is a fiction. Owing to the transference of the qualities of the *buddhi*, * it becomes an individual—an agent. But what are the qualities of the *buddhi* * according to Sankara ? Will, malice, pleasure, pain etc., are the qualities of the *buddhi* according to him. Buddhi transfers these qualities to the soul and makes it a minute agent though in reality it is all-pervading. Thus we see that Sankarāchārya endows *buddhi* with certain powers which are really foreign to it. But the *buddhi* is very fine matter according to Sankara and his school, and so it is difficult to see how it can possess the powers attributed to it by them. While combating the

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* Here the word 'buddhi' has been taken by Sankara in its widest sense for 'antahkarana' and not in its limited sense.

Samkhyas, the great Sankara has said in many places that any unconscious object like the *Pradhana* of the Samkhyas can not possess any motive-power or will (प्रवृत्ति)*. If this is true of the Pradhāna of the Samkhyas, this is equally true of unconscious *buddhi*. But Sankara in his commentary to sutra II. 3. 29, does not hesitate to ascribe to it the powers of creating individuality or knowership and even of enveloping all-pervading ever-conscious Brahman ! It is inconceivable how unconscious *buddhi* can have any such powers. †

In sutras 36-39, Adhyāya II, Pāda III, it has been taught in unequivocal terms that the *buddhi* can not be regarded as *karta* on any account. If the *buddhi* is treated as *karta* or agent and not as *karana* or instrument there is undoubtedly change of designation. In such expressions as 'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' the word 'vijnāna' stands for the soul and not for the internal organ buddhi. ‡

"जीवस्यैवैष निर्द्देशो न वुद्धेः। न चेज्जीवस्य स्यान्निर्द्देश-विपर्य्ययः स्यात्।"—इति शङ्कर-भाष्ये

It may be contended if the soul is really the agent both pleasant and unpleasant consequences cannot ensue. But the *sutrakara* points out that they can take place in consequence of the limited powers of the

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* "तस्मात् संभवति प्रवृत्तिः सर्व्वज्ञकारणत्वे नत्वचेतनकारणत्वे ॥"—
शङ्करभाष्य २।२।२

† "तत्र यथा चेतनस्याचेतनभावो नोपपद्यते विलचणत्वात्, एवमचेतनस्यापि चेतनभावो नोपपद्यते ॥"—शङ्करभाष्य २।१।६

‡ "व्यपदेशाच्चक्रियायां न चेन्निर्द्देशविपर्य्ययः।"—ब्रह्मसूं २।३।३६

individual soul.* Again, if the *buddhi* is held as *karta* or agent, its instrumentality will disappear and it will become an agent (कर्त्ता). This inversion of power is wholly unjustifiable. †

"यदि पुन विज्ञानशब्दवाच्या बुद्धिरेव कर्त्रीस्यात्तत: शक्ति-विपर्य्यय: स्यात्। करणशक्ति र्बुद्धे र्हीयते कर्त्तृशक्तिश्चापद्येत।"—

इति शङ्करभाष्ये

Besides, the state of *samadhi* as taught in the Vedanta is possible only on the supposition that the individual soul is the agent. For in the state of *samadhi* the individual soul realises its difference with *Prakriti* and its modifications. The *buddhi* being simply a modification of *Prakriti* cannot be the same as the individual soul which realises its difference with *Prakriti*.‡ Acharya Sankara admits in his commentary thereto that in the above *sutras*, the agency of the jiva has been taught and not that of the *buddhi*. But Sankara while commenting on sutra II. 3. 40, maintains that in such texts as 'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' the agency of the *buddhi* has been referred to, and that the inversion of power does not really take place if we take the buddhi for the agent.§

* "उपलब्धिवदनियम:।"—ब्रह्मसू॰ २।३।३६

† "शक्तिविपर्य्ययात्।"—ब्रह्मसू॰ २।३।३७

‡ "समाध्यभावाच्च।"—ब्रह्मसू॰ २।३।३८

§ "यस्त्वयं व्यपदेशो दर्शित: 'विज्ञानं यज्ञं तनुते' इति, स बुद्धेरेव कर्त्तृत्वं प्रापयति। विज्ञानशब्दस्य तत्र प्रसिद्धत्वात्। * * * न च बुद्धे: शक्ति-विपर्य्यय: करणानां कर्त्तृत्वाभ्युपगमे भवति। सर्व्वकारकाणामेव स्वस्वव्यापारेषु कर्त्तृत्वस्यावश्यंभावित्वात्।"—शङ्करभाष्य २।३।४०

Thus we see that Sankara even goes the length of explaining away the clear texts of the sutras in an evasive manner for the sake of his preconceived *advaita* theory. Bādarāyana holds that the *jiva* is the agent and not the *buddhi*. But Sankara virtually opposes him and says that the *buddhi* is the agent and not the *jiva*. But whom are we to follow—the *sutrakara* or the *bhashyakara* ? It is incumbent on the *bhashyakara* to bring out clearly and consistently the meanings of the *sutras* without adding anything which has never been intended by the *sutrakara*. But when we see that the *bhashyakara* says anything which has never been intended by the *sutrakara*, his interpretation must be rejected, however learned and scholarly it may appear. Having regard to such far-fetched and indirect interpretations, Sree-Chaitanya of Navadvipa—one of the great teachers of the world, rightly observes with reference to the *bhashya* of Sankarācharya :

"I understand the meanings of the *sutras* which are clear but your interpretations confuse me. It is the duty of the *bhashyakara* to bring out the meanings of the *sutras* but the *bhashya* you cite instead of clearing them up rather hides them."*

We have said above that knowledge is but a state

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* "प्रभु कहे सूत्रेर अर्थ बुझिये निर्म्मल ।
तोमार व्याख्या शुनि मन, हयत विकल ॥
सूत्रेर अर्थ भाष्यकार कहे प्रकाशिया ।
भाष्य कह तुमि सूत्रेर अर्थ आच्छादिया ॥"—
श्रीचैतन्यचरितामृत मध्यलीला षष्ठपरिच्छेद

of the knower and that knowledge as such is inconceivable without a knower. But according to Acharya Sankara knowership is created by the qualities of the *buddhi*, but knowledge cannot be so created. If it is possible for the qualities of the *buddhi* to create knowership we do not see why it is impossible for them to create knowledge as well. As a matter of fact it is not possible for them to create either knowership or knowledge, for the *buddhi* is according to his own admission unconscious. Further, the qualities of the buddhi, according to Sankara, can hide the true nature of all-pervading Brahman who is pure knowledge, and make Him appear as so many knowers and enjoyers. Nathamuni—a teacher of the Visishtādvaita School anterior to Ramanuja cogently points out if *avidya* is so very powerful as to hide the true nature of Brahman there cannot possibly be anything which can make Him free from it. If you contend that the Divine vision—that 'Brahman is knowledge' can make Him free from *avidya*, then you practically make Brahman an object of divine vision which is an impossibility according to your own theory.

"ज्ञानरूपं परं ब्रह्म तन्निवर्त्यं मृषात्मकम् ।
अज्ञानञ्चेत् तिरस्कुर्य्यात् कः प्रभुस्तन्निवर्त्तने ॥

* * *

ज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानमस्ति चेत् स्यात् प्रमेयता ।
ब्रह्मणोऽननुभूतित्वं तदुक्त्यैव प्रसज्यते ॥"—Nathamuni

quoted in Sreebhāshya to sutra I. 1. 1.

This much about untenableness of Sankara's interpretation. On the contrary, we prefer the following interpretation of the sutra. The immediately preceding sutra while pointing to the distinction between knower and knowledge raises a difficulty as well. If there is in reality distinction between knower and knowledge, why in some texts has knowledge been spoken of as knower? The sutra in question removes the difficulty by pointing out that as all-wise Brahman is called knowledge because it is His essential attribute so the *jiva*—the knower is called knowledge because knowledge is its essential attribute. Ramanuja, Sreekantha, and Baladeva have interpreted the sutra in the above way and we are decidedly of opinion it is the direct and true interpretation of the same.

5. Sankarācharya's interpretations of the sutras 30 and 31, appear to us forced. According to him, the sutra 31 teaches that *atman* stands enveloped by the *upadhi* of the *buddhi* till the attainment of final release. We have shown above that the immediately preceding *sutra* has nothing to do with the qualities of the *buddhi* and hence it is not possible to interpret it in the above way. Further, under Sankara's interpretation we have to take the word 'atman' occurring in the *sutra* in an unusual sense for 'buddhi.' In our opinion the sutra simply supports the immediately preceding *sutra* by pointing out that as knowledge is the inseparable attribute of the knower it can fairly be regarded as knowledge. The sutra 31, according to Sankara, teaches that as the virile power though potentially present in

a child becomes manifest in youth, so the qualities of the *buddhi*, potentially existing in the state of deep sleep and senselessness, become manifest when the jiva is awake. If the qualities of the buddhi are mere fictions when true knowledge is attained it is difficult to see how they can exist as the seed of *avidya* in the state of deep sleep when, according to Sankara, the jiva attains unity with the Highest and thus reaches the state of true knowledge.* It appears to us that the *sutra* only explains by reference to virile power the fact that if knowledge is an essential and invariable attribute of a knower how there can be its temporary absence in the state of deep sleep and senselessness.

6. The interpretation of the sutra 32 as given by Sankara is not satisfactory either. According to him, the soul is all-pervading consciousness. But through the *upadhi* of the *buddhi* it becomes minute and limited. Hence in his opinion on the admission of the agency of the *buddhi* the difficulty as to the perpetual presence or perpetual absence of consciousness is cured. But we think that Ramanuja has rightly pointed out that the defect is not cured on the admission of the agency of the *buddhi*. All-pervading soul having its connexion with all the organs internal or external at the same time and there being no other principle to limit this perpetual connexion, the theory of perpetual presence or perpetual absence of consciousness becomes inevitable. *Antahkarana* being only an unconscious

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*Vide Sankara's commentaries to sutras I. 1. 9 and IV. 4. 16.

instrument cannot possibly limit this perpetual presence or absence.

7. The sutra 49 as interpreted by Sankara seems to be far-fetched as well. According to him, though the soul is all-pervading, the *upadhis* are minute. The *jiva* being enveloped by the *upadhis* becomes limited in its sphere of work. Hence there cannot arise any confusion regarding work or fruits of work among the innumerable *jivas* so limited by the *upadhis*. But we donot think that the real difficulty is avoided on the theory of Sankara. According to Sankara, the *upadhis* are limited and minute. If so, it is difficult to see how they can limit Brahman—the all-pervading principle of knowledge and truth. But according to Ramanuja, Baladeva, Sreekantha, and others, the *jivas* being minute and different in different bodies, there cannot arise any confusion with regard to work or fruits of work. Their interpretation seems to the point.

8. The sutra 48 as commented on by Sankara is beside the point. The word *'abhasa'* occurring in the aphorism is taken by him to mean *prativimva*. We donot say that the word cannot mean *prativimva*. But the point to be considered is whether we ought to interpret the word in the way Sankara does having regard to the context. We have seen above that according to sutra 17, the jiva is eternal and indestructible, according to sutra 18 it is a knower, according to sutras 29 and 30, knowledge is its essential and inseparable attribute. In sutras 43, 44 and 45, the *jiva* has been shown to be the eternal *amsa* (part) of

Brahman, and the relation in which it stands to Brahman is one of difference and non-difference. But it becomes a reflection all on a sudden in sutra 50 ! We do not think that it is possible to make the jiva a *prativimva* without doing violence to the aphorisms noted above. According to sutra 29 as understood by Sankara, the qualities of the *buddhi* make the jiva what it is. But in sutra 50 as interpreted by Sankara, it is the reflection of Brahman. In the former case, superimposition takes place from the side of the *buddhi* and in the latter from the side of Brahman. The former doctrine is technically known as '*Avaccheda-vada*' and the latter as '*Prativimva-vada*'. Sankara in his commentary has in most places advocated the former theory but has occasionally advocated the latter as well. It is not possible to reconcile both these theories which seem to be of opposed nature. Hence it is difficult to see how Sankara can consistently preach both of these theories in one and the same breath.

Rupa Gosvamin of Bengal in his memorable work "*Shat-sandarbha*" has refuted these theories. According to Sankara and his school Brahman is beyond all relations. So it is not possible for Him to be limited by the qualities of the *buddhi*. Further, Brahman who is, according to them, attributeless, all-pervading, and formless cannot possibly have any reflection or reflected image. One who is attributeless cannot have any connexion with the *upadhis* or limiting adjuncts, one who is all-pervading and formless cannot have any reflection. Luminaries limited in space have reflection ;

but all-pervading *akasa* or ether being invisible can have nothing of the kind.

"तत्र यद्युपाधेरनाविद्यकत्वे वास्तवत्वं, तर्ह्यविषयस्य तस्य परिच्छेदविषयत्वासम्भवः। निर्धर्म्मकस्य व्यापकस्य निरवयवस्य च प्रतिविम्वत्वायोगोऽपि; उपाधिसम्बन्धाभावात्, विम्वप्रतिविम्वभेदाभावात्, दृश्यत्वाभावाच्च। उपाधिपरिच्छिन्नाकाशस्थज्योतिरंशस्यैव प्रतिविम्वो दृश्यते, न त्वाकाशस्य, दृश्यत्वाभावादेव॥" इति षट्सन्दर्भे श्रीभागवतसन्दर्भः, ३७

Acharya Baladeva—a well-known thinker of the same school rightly observes that scholars have shown the absurdity of the *Prativimva Theory* on the ground that what is all-pervading cannot have any reflection and that of the *Pariccheda Theory* on the ground that what is beyond all relations cannot have any *pariccheda* or limiting adjunct.• On the *Pariccheda Theory* the jiva is Brahman limited by the *upadhis* or the qualities of the *buddhi*.

The *upadhis* limiting Brahman may be viewed as unreal or real. If they are held as unreal, they cannot possibly limit Brahman who is without attributes and beyond all relations. That which is unreal cannot limit one who is pure intelligence and without any touch of *avidya*. The qualities of the *buddhi* limiting Brahman cannot be similar to the mistaking of a rope for a serpent or that of a shell for a silver. In these cases the things which

• "प्रतिविम्बपरिच्छेदपक्षौ यौ स्वकृतौ परैः।
विभुत्वाविषयत्वाभ्यां तौ विद्वद्भि र्निराकृतौ॥"—इति प्रमेयरत्नावल्याम्

produce the mistaken notion exist as a matter of fact. But the *upadhis* limiting Brahman by the very supposition are unreal and non-existent and so they cannot possibly produce any mistake of similar nature. If we take them as real even then they cannot possibly limit Brahman who is self-luminous and beyond all connections. One who is *ex hypothesis* beyond all relations cannot possibly be limited by the *upadhis* unreal or real. On the *Prativimba* Theory, the jiva is the reflection of Brahman. Brahman is like the sun, and the *jiva* is like its reflection in water. The sun is a luminary limited in space and so can have reflection. But Brahman, according to Sankara and his school, is all-pervading, invisible, and without attributes. Hence He cannot possibly have any reflection. It does not seem probable that the *sutrakara* has formulated any theory in sutra 50, which is physically impossible. Having regard to the context it appears to us that as in the sutra under review, the word '*abhasa*' can only mean '*hetvabhasa*' or fallacious argument, the theory that the souls are all-pervading and many as promulgated by Kapila and others has been controverted in the same.

9. There is hardly any difference among the commentators with regard to the meaning of the aphorism 43. The aphorism briefly teaches the relation in which jivātman stands to Paramātman. There are some texts of the Srutis in which the difference between the *jiva* and the Highest Lord has been indicated. There are other texts which establish their non-difference. The members of a certain sākhā

of the Atharva-veda even go the length of regarding the slaves, fishermen, and others as Brahman. Bādarāyana with a view to reconcile all these seemingly conflicting texts concludes that the *jiva* is to be viewed as *amsa* or part of Brahman. He does not stop here but goes further. He supports his position by reference to the *Sruti* and *Smriti.* The Chhandogya Sruti regards all beings animate or inanimate as the foot of Brahman.* The word '*pada*' occuring in the Mantra, according to Sankara, means '*amsa*' and the words 'सर्वा भूतानि' mean all beings living and non-living. Hence it follows that the *Sruti* views all the jivas as *amsas* of Brahman. The Smriti teaches the same lesson. The Geeta views the jiva as the eternal part of God.† So the sutra 43 in clear terms inculcates that the *jiva* is the eternal *amsa* of Brahman. Sankara states in the concluding portion of his commentary to sutra II. 3. 43, that as the sparks are non-different from the fire in the matter of heat, so is the jiva from the Lord in the matter of consciousness. Hence as there is both difference and non-difference between the jiva and the Lord, the jiva is to be regarded as the *amsa* of the Lord.

But Sankara contends that as a Being without any form cannot have any part in the literal sense of the term, by part we mean 'part as it were'.‡ Thus we see that Sankara cannot take the *sutra* as it is but

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* "पादोऽस्य सर्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि।"—छा० ३।१२।६

† "ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः।"—गीता १५।७

‡ "अंश इवांशो न हि निरवयवस्य मुख्योंऽशः संभवति।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

he has to add *'iva'* in order to get his own view out of the *sutra.* If by 'amsa' the *sutrakara* really meant *'amsa iva'* he could have easily added *'iva'* after 'amsa' in the *sutra.* The fact that he does not do so, shows that it is not his real intention. When it is possible to interpret an aphorism consistently and satisfactorily without adding anything to it, it is to be regarded as its best interpretation. But Sankara does nothing of the kind. The context of the sutra shows that it is the object of the sutra to regard the jiva as the primary part of Brahman. The sutra refers to the texts enjoining both difference and non-difference between the jiva and the Lord and on that basis concludes that the jiva is the *amsa* of the Lord. That there is reference to the non-difference between the jiva and the Lord which is the state of true knowledge according to Sankara conclusively proves that it is the object of the *sutrakara* to view the jiva as the *mukhya* (primary) part of Brahman. Further, in the sutra II. 3. 45, there is reference to the text of the Smriti which regards the jiva as the eternal *amsa* of the Lord. But how can the jiva be viewed as the *mukhya amsa* of the Lord ? In reply the *sutrakara* points out in sutras 46-47, that the jiva is the *mukhya* part of the Lord just as a ray is a part of the sun. Just as a ray of light is the *amsa* or part of the sun, so is the jiva that of the Lord. As Ramanuja puts it.

"प्रकाशादिवत् जीवः परमात्मनोंऽशः, यथा अग्न्यादित्यादि भास्वतो भारूपः प्रकाशोंऽशो भवति ।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

The *sutrakara* conceives of the relation of the jiva to the Lord as one between a ray of light to its source, but the *bhashyakara* will have us believe that it is to be conceived as one of a spark to its source (fire). The relation of a ray to its source is not of transient nature, but that of a spark to its source is. Consequently we see that in view of his preconceived *advaita* theory, Sankara has done no inconsiderable violence to the clear aphorisms of Krishna-dvaipayana.

10. In sutra I. 1. 30, Acharya Sankara notices a clear statement of his doctrine of the absolute unity of the Self.* But we fail to see how the aphorism supports the *advaita* theory as propounded by Sankara. According to Acharya Sankara and his school, the soul in its stage of true knowledge (*paramartha*) is above all specific cognitions and distinctions. The fact that Indra declares that he is the omniscient Self and asks Pratardana to worship and meditate on him as immortal proves that he did not attain the stage of absolute cognition in Sankara's sense. He further calls him the killer of Tvashtra and others. It is difficult to see how it is possible for one reaching absolute identity to do all these acts. Sankara suggests that as Indra became God Himself, such evil acts as the killing of Tvastra did not affect him. Sankara's

* "प्रतिपाद्यं तु शास्त्रार्थमात्मैकत्वमेव दर्शयति—'शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्' (ब्र० १।१।३०) इत्यादिना।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra 1. 3. 19.

explanation, it appears to us, misses the real point. One who has attained absolute cognition can have no knowledge of this phenomenal world. It is to him a mere fiction—it is altogether non-existent. If such a person can act, then he must be supposed to act with reference to something which has *ex hypothesis* altogether vanished. But Indra even after the attainment of his absolute cognition is found to instruct and even to do evil acts. This shows that Indra did not reach the stage of absolute identity in Sankara's sense. Similar remarks are applicable to Vamadeva. Vamadeva is said to have declared that he became Manu and even the sun. Vamadeva by his own words recognises Manu and the sun as entities different from him. But one attaining absolute cognition, according to Sankara, has nothing to experience. If so, how can Vamadeva be said to have attained absolute cognition ? Jesus of Nazareth teaches that "I and my father are one."* We learn from the account of Porphyry—the pupil and biographer of Plotinus that he attained complete union with the Good or God on four occasions in his life. We meet with the account of complete union with God in the Lives of the Sufi Saints as well. The Sufi poet Khusrau says :

"Let no one henceforth say
That I am distinct from Thee, and Thou from me."†

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* S. John, 10. 30.

† Vide Sell, Faith of Islam p. 112.

But none of these cases, to our mind, is one of absolute cognition. One who attains absolute cognition, if any such state is really attainable, cannot possibly narrate his experience. The fact that the seer can relate his experience, that he can instruct and act, proves that the seer has not really reached the state of absolute cognition as taught by Sankara. But if these are not cases of absolute identity what are they? Why do then the teachers allude to their identity with God? The religious teachers of the world refer to their oneness with God because they see God in all things and all things in God,—because they lose themselves in God like a drop of water in an ocean and are joined unto God as one spirit. They experience all including himself as God—nothing but God. As the power of seeing even in that stage is retained by the saints it cannot be called one of absolute identity. It is rather one of identity-in-difference. *Bhakta Pralhada* on experiencing such a state observes: "Since the Infinite One exists in all things, I am also none other than He; all things proceed from me, I am all things and all things exist in me who am eternal."*

11. In the *Vakyanvayadhikarana* we come across the reasons as to why in certain texts of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad the individual souls have been looked upon as the Highest Self. The views of three ancient teachers have been mentioned in that connection.

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* "सर्व्वगतत्वादनन्तस्य स एवाहमवस्थितः।
मत्तः सर्व्वमहं सर्व्वं मयि सर्व्वं सनातने ॥"—विष्णुपु० १।१९।८९

According to *Acharya Asmarathya*, the promise conveyed in the latter portion of the text to the effect that 'when the Self is known all this is known' becomes meaningless unless the individual souls are looked upon as the Highest Self. According to *Acharya Audulomi*, in the initial statement the individual soul has been regarded as the Highest Self on the ground that after the attainment of final release it appears in his own form as the Highest Self. According to *Acharya Kasakritsna*, as interpreted by Sankara, the individual soul has been viewed as the Highest Self as He Himself abides in the form of the individual self. But Ramanuja and others take Kāsakritsna to say that the individual self being the body or *sakti* of Brahman and Brahman being its self or ruler, Brahman abides within it as its self or ruler. Brahman being the self or ruler of the *jiva*, *jiva* has been viewed as the Highest Self. All the commentators including Sankara accept *Kasakritsna's* view as the *siddhanta* view. I am surprised to find that Sankara rejects *Audulomi's* view, in his commentary to *sutra* I. 4.22, as not being in keeping with the spirit of the *Sastras*. But in his commentary to *sutra* IV. 4.7, he has but given his full support to the view of *Audulomi* holding that the released after the final release appear only in the form of pure undifferentiated consciousness.* *Audulomi* practically maintains the same view in both of these places. It is difficult to see

* "चैतन्यमेव त्वस्यात्मन: स्वरूपमिति तन्मात्रेण स्वरूपेणाभिनिष्पत्तिर्युक्ता ॥"—इति शङ्करभाष्ये

why Sankara rejects him in one place and supports him in another. We have seen above that Bādarāyana in *sutra* II. 3. 43 has called the individual soul *'amsa'* of Brahman and has supported his view by citing texts from the *Mantra-varna* and *Smriti*. Further, in *sutra* II, 3. 17 the *jiva* has been viewed as eternal, in *sutra* II. 3.18 as knower, and in *sutras* II. 3. 19-27 as very minute. In face of all these aphorisms, I think it hardly possible to interpret *sutra* I. 4. 22 in the way Sankara has done it. The word **'अवस्थिति'** occurs in the aphorism. The word means 'permanent dwelling.' Acharya Sankara views this 'permanent dwelling' as one in the form of the individual soul and thus notices in the *sutra* an enunciation of his own view that it is nothing but the unmodified Highest Self. But Ramanuja, Sreekantha, Nimvarka, and others explain **'अवस्थिति'** as Lord's permanent dwelling within the individual soul, as related in the *antaryami-brahmana*. We do not say that the word **'अवस्थिति'** cannot have the meaning ascribed to it by Sankara, but so much must be urged in favour of the latter interpretation that in five other places where the words **'अवस्थिति'** and **'अनवस्थिति'** occur in the *Sutras*, they have invariably been taken to mean dwelling or non-dwelling within some thing.* For

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* 1. **"अनवस्थितेरसम्भवाच्च नेतरः ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० १।२।१७**

2. **"व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ॥"—ब्रह्मभू० २।२।४**

3. **"समवायाभ्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ॥" ब्रह्मसू० २।२।१३**

4. **"अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्धृदि हि ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० २।३।२४**

5. **"यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ३।३।३२**

the reasons stated above we are unable to side with Sankara.*

12. According to Acharya Sankara in sutra I. 1. 13 the distinction between the enjoying soul and Brahman has been recognised in the sphere of *vyavahara* only and in the immediately next *sutra* 14 which teaches the non-difference of cause and effect and as such the falsity of the world of effects shows beyond doubt that no such distinction obtains in the sphere of *paramartha* or true knowledge. Sankara is almost single in his interpretation of the *sutra* 14. According to most of the commentators, the *sutra* simply points to the non-difference of cause and effect and not to the falsity or absence of one of the terms. In Sankara's opinion, the *sutrakara* by his reference to the words '*arambhana*' and the like expressly treats the cause as real and the world of effects consisting of sentient and non-sentient beings as mere names based upon words. Ramanuja, to my mind, very pertinently observes that if one term is treated as false, the talk of non-difference becomes an absurdity. A thing cannot be non-different from another which is unreal and as such non-existent. If something false or non-existent may be considered as non-different from something true or existent, then anything may be non-different from anything false or true. In such a case the necessity of treating Brahman as true and the phenomenal world as false does not arise. It equally serves our purpose if we

* Vide Dr. Thibaut, Introduction, S. B. E. Vol. XXIV.

treat Brahman as false and the phenomenal world as true.

"ये तु कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं कार्य्यस्य मिथ्यात्वाश्रयेण वर्णयन्ति, न तेषां कार्यकारणयोरनन्यत्वं सिध्यति, सत्यमिथ्यार्थयोरैक्यानुपपत्तेः; तथा सति ब्रह्मणो मिथ्यात्वं जगतः सत्यत्वं वा स्यात्।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

We are decidedly of opinion that the words beginning with the 'arambhana' and the like of the Chhandogya Upanishad do not teach the falsity of the phenomenal world. All that they teach is that the effect is the cause under a different form and as such is non-different from it. Pots, jars etc., are indeed modifications of the earth but the material out of which they are formed is nothing but the earth, and as such they are non-different from it, though their modifications may be regarded as mere words based upon speech. Let us take an example from modern science. The science of chemistry tells us that hydrogen and oxygen when chemically combined produce water. But when water is decomposed we get nothing but hydrogen and oxygen. Hence we can rightly view water as non-different from hydrogen and oxygen. But by asserting that water is non-different from hydrogen and oxygen we do not imply that the effect water is false and that the cause hydrogen and oxygen is only true. What we imply thereby is that hydrogen and oxygen may under certain conditions take the form of water and as such may be viewed as non-different from them. Consequently we see no valid reason to

hold that the *sutra* teaches that the effect is false and that the cause only is true.

Acharya Sankara in his commentary to the *sutra* says that in the Sruti texts beginning with the words *arambhana* and the like, it has been taught that this phenomenal world is false and the *jiva* is nothing but Brahman. When the conventional knowledge of multiplicity ceases, the distinction between the ruler and the ruled passes away. Agency, work, and fruits of work can have no meaning from the standpoint of true knowledge. Knowledge derived from the *Sastras*, and the distinction between the master and disciple are meaningless as well. Sankara further points out that Brahman can be called all-knowing and all-powerful only with reference to this phenomenal world of *maya*, but no such distinction obtains in the sphere of *paramartha* or true knowledge which is above all distinctions created by *maya*.* These are the express conclusions drawn by Sankara from the premises of non-difference between cause and effect formulated by the *sutrakara*. We are decidedly of opinion that Sankara has said much that has never been dreamt of by the *sutrakara*. The *sutrakara* has expressly taught that knowledge regarding Brahman can be had from the *Sastras* alone. But Sankara *adds* that the knowledge derived from the Sāstras and knowledge of the *acharyas* or seers of the Sastras being based on multiplicity are false as well. If so,

* Vide Sankara's commentary to sutra II. 1. 14.

where are we to stand ? How are we to have any knowledge regarding Brahman who is beyond all other proofs ? The Sāstras, accordig to Sankara, can not testify to any thing lying beyond multiplicity. So they can not possibly establish the existence of Brahman, much less the existence of any absolute all-pervading consciousness alluded to by Sankara as the state of *paramartha* or true knowledge. Acharya Ramanuja very pertinently observes that some thinkers hold that the *acharyas* and teachers are false, the *Sastras* are false, the *rishis*—the seers of the *Sastras* are false, and the knowledge from the *Satras* is false as well, yet they are of opinion that the knowledge regarding Brahman and the falsity of this phenomenal world of multiplicity can be attained through these false Sastras !

"**आचार्य्यो ज्ञानोपदेष्टा मिथ्या, शास्त्रं च मिथ्या, शास्त्रप्रमाता च मिथ्या, शास्त्रजन्यं ज्ञानं च मिथ्या, एतत्सर्व्वं मिथ्याभूतेनैव शास्त्रेनावगमयत इति वर्णयन्ति ॥"—इति वेदार्थसंग्रहे**

The acharya sees the above difficulty and so he tries to meet it in his commentary to sutra II. 1. 14. In one place he says that it is not true that such a state of absolute identity is really unattainable ; for the Chhandogya Sruti tells us that such a state was attained by Svetaketu.* In another part of his

* "न चेयमवगति नोत्पद्यत इति शक्यं वक्तुं, 'तद्धास्य, विजज्ञौ' इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः। अवगतिसाधनानाञ्च श्रवणादीनां वेदानुवचनादीनाञ्च विधानात्।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

commentary, he says that it is not unreasonable to hold that the state of absolute identity is attainable on the basis of the false Sastras. In his opinion as in the state of dreaming, the things dreamt appear as true till the state of waking is attained, so all this conventional knowledge holds good till the state of absolute identity is attained.* But we are afraid this is no answer to the point that we have raised. Even conceding that it is possible for the false *Sastras* to testify to this phenomenal world of variety, it is not easy to see how they can testify to anything lying beyond. Can anything in the state of dreaming convey any knowledge with regard to the state of waking ? We humbly submit that for the sake of his theory of absolute identity the great Sankara has been driven to an untenable position. If there is such a state as one of absolute identity, it is really unknowable. Neither can the revealed texts nor the *rishis* nor the sages say anything of it, for they are all of the domain of multiplicity.† In view of the above considerations, we are unable to hold with Sankara and his school that in sutra II.1.14, the falsity of the phenomenal world of variety has been promulgated by the *sutrakara* from the standpoint of *paramartha*. We are further unable to support Sankara's view to the effect that in the

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* "कथं चानृतेन मोक्षशास्त्रेण प्रतिपादितस्यात्मैकत्वस्य सत्यत्वमुपपद्येतेति। अत्रोच्यते। नैष दोषः। सर्व्वंव्यवहाराणामेव प्राग्ब्रह्मात्मताविज्ञानात् सत्यत्वोपपत्तेः, स्वप्नव्यवहारस्येव प्राक्प्रबोधात्।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

† "तथा विधिप्रतिषेधशास्त्रमपि भेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याहन्येत, मोक्षशास्त्रस्यापि शिष्यशासित्रादिभेदापेक्षत्वात् तदभावे व्याघातः स्यात्।"– इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

immediately preceding *sutra* the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed has been maintained by the *sutrakara* in the sphere of *vyavahara* only. It will appear later on from our discussion of the state of final release (Chapter VI.,) that the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed continues in some shape or other even after the attainment of final release. We are at one with Nimvarka, Baladeva, and others that in sutra II. 1. 13, the distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed has been enunciated by the sutrakara generally without reference to any particular state, and that in sutra II. 1. 14, in opposition to the view of Kanada—that the effect is different from the cause, it has been pointed out by the *sutrakara* that the effect is non-different from the cause and that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance.

We conclude from our short review of the principal sutras that according to the Vedanta-sutras, the *jivas* are very minute eternal knowers having their seat in *hridaya* and that they are to be viewed as eternal *amsas* of Brahman just as the rays of light are *amsas* of a source of light, and they are not in reality one eternal all-pervading conciousness appearing as many, owing to the super-imposition of the qualities of the *buddhi* as maintained by Sankara and his school.

CHAPTER V.

Phenomenon of Sleep.

It is the lot of all living beings to pass through the state of sleep. It has lessons of its own. The Sutras of Bādarāyana have culled them. It is my object here to see what light, if any, it throws on the nature of the *jiva*. Phenomenon of sleep consists of two states *viz.*, those of dreaming and deep sleep. The sutras 1-6, Adhyāya III, Pāda II, treat of the state of dreaming. According to Acharya Sankara, the first three *sutras* raise the question whether the soul when dreaming can produce anything real by its activity analogous to that of the waking state. The sutra 3, according to Sankara, answers the question in the negative by noting that the creations of dream are mere fictions (*maya*), and that they possess nothing in common with real objects.* Pointing to the unreality of the creations of dream, the Sruti teaches that 'there are neither chariots, nor horses, nor roads'.† Though the dreams are *maya*, yet according to experts they have a prophetic character. The Acharya does not explain how the dreams which are viewed by him as mere fictions can have a prophetic character. A further question arises,—how can the dreams be regarded as mere unreal creations of the soul having in view the fact that the soul according to Acharya Sankara is Brahman

* "मायामध्येव सन्ध्ये सृष्टिर्न तत्र परमार्थगन्धोऽप्यस्ति ।"—शङ्करभाष्य ३।२।३

† " न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्ति ।"—बृ० ४।३।१०

Himself ? The Acharya meets the objection by saying that in the *samsara* state the soul's knowledge and power are limited by the *upadhis* and as such it can not produce anything real.

But Ramanuja, Baladeva, Nimvarka, and others hold that the above-noted *sutras* do not deal wtih the question of the reality or unreality of the creations of the dream at all. In their opinion these *sutras* are meant for ascertaining whether the creations of the dream are due to the individual soul or the Highest Lord. The third *sutra* which is taken by them also as the *siddhanta sutra* answers the question. It teaches that the creations of dream being of a wonderful nature* cannot be effected by the individual soul. They also point out that as the real nature of the soul remains hidden owing to the will of God and because of its connexion with the body, the individual soul cannot possibly create things dreamt in the dream. So they can only be regarded as the creations of the Highest Lord. Further, according to the Upanishads and the experts, the dreams possess a prophetic significance and as such they can hardly be the creations of the individual soul. The interpretation offered by Ramanuja and others has the advantage of connecting the sutras more closely with each other and it further offers an explanation of the fact how the dreams can have a prophetic quality as taught in the Scriptures, which is left altogether unexplained by Acharya Sankara and his school.

* "मायाशब्दो ह्याश्चर्यवाची।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

Bādarāyana next deals with the state of deep sleep in sutras 7-9. In the first place, it is taught that in the state of deep sleep the individual soul abides within Brahman in the *nadis* and in the *puritat* which is the covering of the '*hridpadma.*'[1] The *nadis* and the *puritat* may respectively be compared to the palace and the bed-stead, and Brahman to the bed itself. In fact Brahman is the direct abode of the soul in the state of deep sleep. As Ramanuja puts it,—

"तत्र नाड़ीपुरीतती प्रासादखट्वास्थानीयौ ; ब्रह्म तु पर्य्यङ्क-स्थानीयम् । अतो ब्रह्मैव साक्षात् सुषुप्तिस्थानम् ।"—

इति श्रीभाष्ये

The next sutra[2] declares that Brahman being the direct place of deep sleep, the souls awake from him too. Though they abide in Brahman during deep sleep they know not that they do so.

The next *sutra* intimates us that the soul rousing from sleep realises itself as the same self that went to sleep. It connects the present with the past and recollects that it is the same self that went to sleep and rouses from the same state.[3] As the *Sruti* puts it,—"Whether it is tiger, lion, crow, boar, worm, grasshopper, gnat, or mosquito, it returns as the self-same entity after deep sleep."[4]

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1 "पुरीतदिति हृदयपरिवेष्टनमुच्यते।"—इति शङ्करभाष्यम्

2, "अत: प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ३।२।८

3. "स एव तु कर्म्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्य: ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ३।२।९

4. "त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा वराहो वा कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्भवन्ति तदाभवन्ति ।"—छा० ६।९।३

Acharya Sankara in his bhāshya to the last *sutra* admits that the *jiva* does not attain absolute identity with the Highest in the state of deep sleep. The *upadhi* which binds down the *jiva* to the *samsara* stage does exist potentially even in the state of deep sleep.

"स एवायमुपाधिः स्वापप्रवोधयोर्वीजाङ्कुरन्यायेनेत्यतः स एव जीवः प्रतिवुध्यत इति युक्तम् ।"—Sankara's bhāshya to sutra III. 3. 9

It seems to us that here the Acharya evidently forgets what he has said in different places of his *bhashya*. He has indicated in unequivocal terms in some places of his well-known *bhashya* that in the state of deep sleep the connexion of the *jiva* with the *upadhis* ceases and it attains unity with the True. He has even compared the state of deep sleep to that of final release and has noted that in both these states there is entire absence of specific cognition. The following passages culled from different places of his bhashya will lend support to our contention.

"यः प्रकृतः सच्छब्द-वाच्यस्तमपीतो भवति अपिगतो भवतीत्यर्थः । ** स उपाधिद्वयोपरमे सुषुप्तावस्थायामुपाधिकृत-विशेषाभावात् स्वात्मनि प्रलीन इवेति 'स्वं ह्यपीतो भवति' इत्युच्यते ।"—Sankara's bhashya to sutra I. 1. 9

"स्वाप्ययः सुषुप्तम् 'स्वमपीतो भवति तस्मादनं स्वपितीत्याचक्षते' (छा० ६।८।१) इति श्रुतेः । संपत्तिः कैवल्यम्, 'ब्रह्मैव

सन्वह्माप्येति' (ब्रु० ४।४।६) इति श्रुतेः। तयोरन्यतरामवस्था-मपेक्ष्यैतद्विशेषसंज्ञाभाववचनम्।"—Sankara's bhashya to sutra IV. 4. 16

In the first passage cited above, the *Acharya* says that in the state of deep sleep the connexion of the soul with the *upadhis* ceases and that it is merged in the True. In the second passage it has been held that the state of deep sleep and that of final release agree in the fact of the want of special cognition. The Acharya has said nothing there by which one state can be distinguished from the other. But Sankara in his commentary to sutra III. 2. 9, tells us that the seed of *avidya* is retained even in the state of deep sleep. But in the state of deep sleep as in that of *moksha* as there is entire absence of special cognition, how and in what can a person profoundly sleeping retain the seed of *avidya* on account of which, according to the Acharya, the waking takes place ? We have learnt in more than one place that this universe is a mere fiction from the standpoint of *paramartha* just like a rope mistakenly identified with a serpent and that an absolutely homogeneous sleep-like consciousness is the only truth and that the principle of *maya* which is taken by him as the cause of this universe of appearances is neither *sat* nor *asat*. The Acharya has nowhere indicated in what way the principle of *maya* stands related to Brahman. Hence it is not improper to inquire, where does the seed of *avidya*, which developes into individuality in the waking state,

lie during deep sleep? It cannot of course rest in the Highest Lord, who is according to the Acharya without any taint of *maya*. It cannot abide in the jiva, for the jiva is its own product Then it must lie with its own self. If it is taken to lie with the principle of *maya* itself, which is according to Sankara, something unspeakable, incapable of being characterised either as *sat* or *asat*, we are forced to admit the existence of a second principle over and above Brahman. Even conceding that it can lie with its own self as the seed of *avidya*, we may further ask, how can that seed of *avidya*, turn one who has become the True during deep sleep into the untrue in the shape of an individual in his waking state? All these questions have been left unsolved by Sankara. Again, according to the Acharya the soul is merged in the True during deep sleep. Now the question is, if it once becomes the True by shaking off all egoism which is the essence of *avidya*, how can it come to possess it in the waking state? Perhaps it will be replied that it comes to possess it in the way it came to possess it before. But we are afraid this is no reply. What we want to know is, if God is altogether beyond all multiplicity and limitation, how can He come to be limited by *avidya*? It may be replied that as He is all-powerful He can cause Himself to be limited by *maya*. But as Sankara regards all-powerfulness as a sort of limitation on the part of Brahman in the *paramarthika* state, so the point raised really remains unsolved under the system of Sankara. Ramunuja and others,

on the other hand, maintain that even in the state of deep sleep the soul does not lose its individuality. Only the temporary suspension of the manifestation of the individuality takes place during deep sleep. For anything which is lost for ever cannot be regained. On awaking from sleep we remember that "we slept well, but we were unconscious." This shows that absolute identity is not attained during deep sleep as Acharya Sankara and his school seem to contend. Further, if the state of deep sleep is really alike the state of final release, the Sāstras enjoining *moksha* become meaningless. During deep sleep the jiva does not put away the bondage of *maya*, for in that case awakening becomes impossible. The jiva having no connexion with sense-organs or their objects during deep sleep neither knows itself nor anything else. It seems that it has been destroyed, so to speak. But on the other hand, the released (*mukta*) issues forth as *atman* and is joined unto the Highest as one spirit. He sees God in all things, and all things in God and goes on enjoying His bliss for ever. Thus there is great difference between the state of deep sleep and that of *mukti*.

"विधयश्च मोक्षार्थाः सुषुप्तस्य मुक्तत्वेऽनर्थकाः स्युः। न चासौ सर्व्वोपाधिविनिर्मुक्त आविर्भूतस्वरूपः—'तद् यत्रैतत् सुषुप्तः' इति सुषुप्तं प्रकृत्य 'नाह खल्वयमेव सम्प्रत्यात्मानं जानात्यय-महमस्मीति, नो एवेमानि भूतानि, विनाशमेवापीतो भवति, नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामि' (छान्दो० ८।११।२) इति वचनात्। मुक्तस्य च 'परं ज्योतिरुपसम्पद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते'

(छान्दो० ८।३।४), 'स तत्र पर्य्येति जक्षत् क्रीड़न् रममाणः' (छान्दो० ८।१२।३) 'स स्वराड् भवति, तस्य सर्व्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति' (छान्दो० ७।२५।२), 'सर्व्वं ह पश्यः पश्यति सर्व्वमाप्नोति सर्व्वशः' (छान्दो० ७।२३।२) इति सर्व्वज्ञत्वादिः श्रूयते। अतः सुषुप्तः संसरन्नेव श्रायस्तसर्व्वकरणो ज्ञानभोगाद्य-शक्तो विश्रामस्थानं परमात्मनमुपसम्पद्याश्वस्तः पुनर्भोगायो-त्तिष्ठति।"—इति रामानुजभाष्ये

We are at one with the Acharya. We are decidedly of opinion that the state of deep sleep gives no support to the *adviata* theory held by Acharya Sankara. Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya's remark that the 'the psychology of waking, dream, and dreamless sleep constitutes the pivot of the Vedantic system', if at all true, is true, only with reference to the system of Sankara which he has in view.*

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* Vide Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya's *Studies in Vedantism*, p. 1.

CHAPTER VI.

The State of *Mukti* or Final Release.

Not only the Vedanta but all the religious Scriptures of the world promise to their adherents a state of beatitude in some form or other. The 'Kingdom of heaven,' according to St. Paul, 'is not meat and drink,' but is 'righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.'[1] Muhammad affords hopes of eternal happiness to believers in God. The world of God's beauty and bliss is the Paradise, according to Hafiz of Persia, and the beholding of that beauty for ever constitutes the highest end of man.[2] The state of final release—'*nirvana*' preached by Buddha—the ever-awake, is not merely a void but is one of positive bliss. *Dhammapada*, an authoritative work on Buddhism, states in unequivocal terms that the *bhikshus* free from desires, tranquil in heart, and fully realising the truth of religion obtain superhuman joy.[3] In the state of *moksha*, according to the Jainas, the soul robes itself in the body of bliss and yet retains its own individuality

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1. Romans, Chapter 14, 17.

2. "Necessary to all creation is the beholding of Thy beauty and beauteousness, Nay, an enjoined duty to all angels is the viewing of Thy face."

Clarke's Translation, Divani-Hafiz, Ode 340.

3. "सञ्ञागारं पविट्ठस्स सन्तचित्तस्स भिक्खुनो ।
अमानुसी रती होति सम्माधम्मं विपस्सतो ॥"—धम्मपद, भिक्खु वग्गो

as a conquering *jiva*.[1] But out of the six ancient schools of Indian philosophy three at least—the Sankhya, the Yoga, and the Nyaya seem to conceive of the state of final release as a negative state—as one of pure intelligence where there is absence of all specific cognition. According to the Sankhya school, the state of final release consists in complete detachment of the Purusha from Prakriti and in concentration of the Purusha in Himself.[2] It has rightly been pointed out by Baladeva that the state of final release as preached by Kapila is a negative state.[3] Similar remark is equally applicable to the state of final release of the Yoga school as well.'[4] According to the Nyaya school on the attainment of tatva-jnāna, suffering, transmigration, desires, evils, and false knowledge cease one after another, and the final release results in consequence.[5] The final release of the Nyaya school according to the ancient commentator Vātsyāyana consists in renunciation of all the pleasures of this life, and in the non-acceptance of, or indifference

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1. Champat Rai Jain, Key of Knowledge, p. 736.

2. "तत्प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकनिबन्धनं न च तदन्तरेण युक्तमिति कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते ॥"—इति सर्व्वदर्शनसंग्रहे सांख्यदर्शनम्

3. "स च कार्य्योऽपि नित्यः अभावरूपत्वात्। स एवानन्दावाप्तिरित्युपचरितः भारापगमे सुखी संवृत्त इतिवत्।"—इति श्रीबलदेव-विरचित-सिद्धान्तरत्ने

4. "सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यमिति"—योगसूत्रम् ३।५५

"तदा पुरुषः स्वरूपमात्रज्योतिरमलः कैवली भवति।"—इति व्यासभाष्ये

5. "दुःखजन्मप्रवृत्तिदोषमिथ्याज्ञानानामुत्तरोत्तरापाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः।" —न्या० सू० १।१।२

to, any rewards in the life to come. Thus it is also a negative state. According to the Vaiseshika school, the soul on the acquisition of true knowledge reaches an unconscious state like that of a stone.[1] Of course the Sānkhya and the Nyaya systems refer to the manifestation of the soul in its own form of pure intelligence after final release. But as there is absence of all specific cognition in that highest state too, which is called by them *kaivalya* or aloneness, it is hardly anything more than a negative state.[2] The state of final release as enunciated by Jaimini is undoubtedly as a positive state. According to him in the state of *moksha* one not only frees himself from all the sufferings of life but attains positive bliss.[3] According to Sankara, the state of final release as taught in the Brahmah-sutras is one of pure intelligence—the state of absolute identity with Brahman in which there is absence of all specific cognition. But according to the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Sreekantha, the Brahma-sutras proclaim that moksha is but a state of pure bliss. With these preliminary observations let us pass on to the consideration of the *sutras*.

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1. "उत कणभुगभिमतपाषाणकल्पस्वरूपम् अचित्स्वभावमेवागन्तुकचैतन्यगुणकम्।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये २।३।१८

2. सप्रपञ्चविनिःसम्बोधी मोक्ष इत्यौडुलोमेरभिप्रायः सांख्यवैशेषिकादीनामेव।"—इति श्रीपुरुषोत्तम-महाराज-विरचित-व्याख्यायाम् ४।४।६ ब्र० सू०

3. "वेदोक्तैः शुभकर्मभि दुःखहानिः सुखलाभश्चेति जैमिनिः।"—बलदेवकृत-सिद्धान्तरत्न, ९

The last Pāda of the Brahma-sutras deals with the state of the released. We find there that the released having obtained the Highest self, puts away all bondage and issues forth as *atman* which is its true nature and sees all in Brahman and Brahman in all. The sutra 4 is a highly contested one.* The plain meaning of the *sutra* is that the *mukta* realises himself as one with Brahman. According to Sankara, the aphorism points to the state of *mukti* as one of absolute unity with Brahman. But according to the Vaishnava schools and the Saiva school of Sreekantha, it does nothing of the kind. According to them, all that it teaches is that the released attains unity in nature with Brahman and so sees all in oneness with Him. According to St. Paul, a true Christian "that is joined unto the Lord is *one spirit*."† But he subsequently explains how a true Christian can be regarded as one *spirit* or spiritual body. He says that 'as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of that one body, being many are one body : so also is Christ."‡ Hence according to St. Paul, a true Christian attains unity with the Lord as *one spirit* only as a member or *amsa* of the Lord. The Geetā—a work of undoubted authority expresses in clear terms what the released experiences when it reaches the Eternal. It teaches that when the *yogin* becomes the Eternal he

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* "अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ।" ब्र० सू० ४।४।४

† I, Corinthians, 6, 17,

‡ I. Corinthians, 12, 12.

realises the diversified existence of beings as rooted in One, and spreading forth from Him.* The Bhāgavata—which is treated as the true Bhashya to the *Sutras* by the Vaishnavas of Bengal imparts but the same lesson. It says that he is the best among the *bhaktas* who sees all beings in the Lord and the Lord in all beings. Thus we see that when a devotee is joined unto the Lord as *one spirit*, his power of Divine vision does not pass away. So it hardly lends support to advaitism in Sankara's sense. The aphorisms following lend support but to the view we take. The *sutra* declares that the released attains non-division with Brahman. But in what does that non-division consist? According to Jaimini, the released attains unity in respect of auspicious attributes such as freedom from sin, truthfulness of intention, and so on. Audulomi holds that the *mukta* attains unity in matter of pure intelligence. For pure intelligence, according to him, constitutes the essence of the soul. But Bādarāyana maintains that the released attains unity not only in respect of pure intelligence but also in respect of attributes. Sankara sees the difficulty. So he resorts to a make-shift. He cannot take the *siddhanta* sutra as it is, but introduces the words 'पारमार्थिक' and 'व्यवहारापेक्षया' to have his desired meaning out of the *sutra*. He points out that the sutrakāra here refers to the attainment of unity in respect of attributes from the standpoint of *vyavahara*,

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* "यदा भूतपृथग्भावमेकस्थमनुपश्यति ।
तत एव च विस्तारं ब्रह्म सम्पद्यते तदा ॥"—गीता १३।३१

and to that in respect of pure intelligence from the standpoint of *paramartha*. The Vaishnavāchāryas, generally speaking, and the Saivāchārya Sreekantha have seen no such meaning in the *sutra*. Nor do we see it. The *sutra* gives us no indication to that effect. Consequently the sutras 1—7, to our mind, give no support to Sankara's *advaita* theory. The released, according to the *sutras*, attain their own essence after *mukti* when their relation with *prakriti* ceases. But how do they then accomplish their purposes? The next *sutra* (sutra 8) replies that they effect their purposes by mere will.[1] The released on that account become their own masters.[2] Hence there is no difficulty in that respect. A further doubt may arise. In the worldly stage we effect our purposes and desires through body and sense-organs. Are we then to conclude that the released also possess body and sense-organs in the state of release? Acharya Bādari concludes on the basis of the *Sastras* that the released are without minute bodies and sense-organs and so they accomplish their objects of desire by mere will.[3] Acharya Jaimini asserts that they possess minute bodies and sense-organs as there are texts showing that they can multiply themselves.[4] But Bādarāyana points out that they are of both character just like the twelve days' sacrifice.[5] They can

1. "सङ्कल्पादेव तच्छ्रुतेः।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।८
2. "अतएवानन्याधिपतिः।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।९
3. "अभावं बादरिराह ह्येवम्।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।१०
4. "भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात्।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।११
5. "द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।१२

have bodies and sense-organs or can be without them at their will. Now a further question arises,—when they are without body and sense-organs how do they effect their purposes? The *sutrakara* replies that the process may be analogous to that of the dreaming state. The *jivas* in the state of dream see and enjoy objects, though they are at that time without gross body and sense-organs. The released, when without body and sense-organs may be viewed to effect their purposes in a similar way.[1] But when the released come to have bodies and sense-organs, the objects of their desires present themselves just like things experienced during the waking state.[2] But how can the released multiply themselves i. e., become one-fold, three-fold, five-fold, and seven-fold? The *sutrakara* replies that they do so just like a lamp. As a lamp by its light multiplies itself and occupies a pretty large area, so does the *mukta* by his *divine* power.[3] It follows from the preceding sutras that the *muktas* possess specific cognition. But there is a text of the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad which seems to deny specific cognition to the released.[4] The sutra 16 has been framed by way of its explanation.[5] According

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1. "तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्ते: ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।१३
2. "भावे जाग्रद्वत् ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।१४
3. "प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४'१५
4. "एतेभ्यो भूतेभ्य: समुत्थाय तान्येवानु विनश्यति न प्रेत्य संज्ञाऽस्तीति ।"— बृ २।४।१४
5. "स्वाप्ययसंपत्त्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।१६

to Sankara and his school the word 'स्वाप्यय' means dreamless sleep and the word 'संपत्ति' means the state of final release (कैवल्य). In their opinion the Sruti having in view either of these two states refers to the absence of specific cognition (विशेष विज्ञान). But Ramanuja, Nimvarka, and others have interpreted the sutra in a different way. In their opinion the word स्वाप्यय indeed means dreamless sleep. But the word संपत्ति means death and not final release as contended by the former class of thinkers. Thus the text in question having in view either dreamless sleep or death refers to the absence of consciousness. For the *muktas* become all-knowing according to the Sruti and so the text cannot possibly refer to the absence of consciousness of the *muktas*.* It is needless to add that in the light of the context we prefer the latter explanation.

We have seen above that the *muktas* can accomplish their purposes instantaneously at their very will. Hence the question suggests itself, do they become all-powerful ? The next sutra, according to most of the commentators, is a reply to the same.† It is taught therein that the released possess all powers except those of creation, preservation, and dissolution of the universe. For the Upanishads have never attributed such powers to the *muktas*.‡ Most of the commentators

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* "सुषुप्तिमरणयोर्निःसम्बोधत्वं, मुक्तस्य च सर्व्वज्ञत्वमाविष्कृतं हि श्रुत्या ।"—
इति श्रीभाष्ये

† "जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसन्निहितत्वाच ।"—ब्रह्मसू ४।४।१७

‡ "जगदुत्पत्त्यादिव्यापारं वर्ज्जयित्वाऽन्यदणिमाद्यात्मकमैश्वर्यं मुक्तानाम्भवितु-मर्हति। जगद्व्यापारस्तु नित्यसिद्धस्यैवेश्वरस्य ।"—इति शाङ्करभाष्ये

virtually agree as to the interpretation of the aphorism. Acharya Sankara fully realises the force of this *sutra*. So he makes an attempt to explain away the difficulty, on the ground that the aphorism in question is meant for the worshippers of *saguna* Brahman and not for those of *nirguna* Brahman. The *nirguna* worshippers, in his view, become Brahman and as such become all-powerful. But most of the Vaishnava commentators and the Saiva commentator Sreekantha have failed to see any such meaning in the sutra. They are of opinion that the *sutra* refers to the released generally without any distinction. In fact no such distinction obtains anywhere in the *Sutras*. On the contrary, the *Sutras* state in clear words that different *vidyas* refered to in the *Sastras* lead but to the same result *i. e.* knowledge of Brahman.* A worshipper is required to practise any one of these for the attainment of Brahman and not all of them at the same time.† Sankara explains the sutra III. 3. 59 almost in the same way. But in his opinion the *sutra* is meant for the *saguna vidya* only and not for the *nirguna vidya*. From a careful consideration of the whole Pāda it appears to us that it is equally applicable to all the *vidya*s without any distinction and Bādarāyana in fact has made nowhere any such distinction among the *vidyas*. Further, Sri-Krishna in the Twelfth Discourse of the Geeta

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* "विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ।"—ब्रह्मसू ०३।३।५९

† "सर्व्वाश्च विद्या ब्रह्मानुभवविरोध्यनादिकर्म्माविद्या-निरसनमुखेन ब्रह्मप्राप्ति-फला,—इत्यविशिष्टफलत्वात् सर्व्वासां विकल्प एव ।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये

declares that both *saguna* and *nirguna upasanas* lead but to the same result. Moreover, those who meditate on the *nirguna* endure greater hardships and trials.* For the above reasons the attempt of Sankara to explain away the difficulty on the basis of the difference between *saguna* and *nirguna* worship seems to be a failure. The aphorism evidently is a bar to advaitism in Sankara's form.

If the released do not really become all-powerful as maintained in the aphorism, how is it that in such texts as 'आप्नोति स्वाराज्यम्' (तै० १।६।२) and so on, they have been endowed with all powers ? In reply, the next *sutra* states that the enjoyments and powers refered to in the *texts* have reference to the sphere of *hiranyagarbha* and not to those of all-powerful Brahman.† Hence such texts cannot render the released all-powerful.

According to the last two aphorisms the released cannot become all-powerful. If so, how do they stand related to Brahman ? Bādarāyana states in sutra IV. 4. 19. that he rises above all changes and goes on enjoying His bliss for ever.‡

"जन्मादिविकारशून्यं स्वाभाविकाचिन्त्यानन्तगुणसागरं सविभूतिकं ब्रह्मैव मुक्तोऽनुभवति। तथा हि मुक्तस्थितिमाह श्रुतिः। 'यदा ह्येवैष एतस्मिन्नदृश्ये अनात्म्येऽनिरुक्तेऽनिल-

* "क्लेशोऽधिकतरस्तेषामव्यक्तासक्तचेतसाम्।
अव्यक्ता हि गतिर्दुःखं देहवद्भिरवाप्यते॥"—गीता १२।५

† "प्रत्यक्षोपदेशादिति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।१८

‡ "विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह।"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।१९

यनेऽभयं प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते ; अथ सोऽभयं गतो भवति,' 'रसो वै सः। रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वाऽनन्दी भवति' इत्यादिका।"—इति श्रीनिम्बार्कभाष्ये

"तथा हि खल्वस्य स्थितिमाह श्रुतिः—'रसो वै सः। रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वाऽनन्दी भवति' इति।"—इति श्रीकण्ठभाष्ये

Ramanuja, Baladeva and others also follow the same line of interpretation. But Acharya Sankara offers an explanation, which appears altogether out of place. In his opinion the *sutra* refers to two forms of Brahman—changeable and unchangeable. Brahman must not be taken to have a changeable form only but He has a form which is above all change, for the Sruti refers to such form. It appears to us that the *sutra* cannot be interpreted in the way Sankara does. There cannot be any earthly reason for the sudden introduction of two modes of existence of Brahman in a Pāda which deals exclusively with the state of the released. In the next *sutra* Badarayana adds by way of confirmation that both the Sruti and the Smriti also refer to such abiding of the released in Brahman.* Though the released abide in non-division with Brahman they do not altogether lose themselves. They retain their power of enjoying eternal bliss. They attain full unity in the matter of enjoyment only but not in power. They are joined unto the Lord as His part and parcel and go

* "दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।२०

on drinking into His joy for ever. This is the teaching of the sutra 21.* The Vedanta-sutras emphatically proclaim that one who attains complete unity in enjoyment returns not—passes beyond the cycle of births and deaths.

The *jiva* begins his life as *karta* or agent. In the *samsara* stage, he feels that he is the principal actor in the field. He thinks, he acts, he desires and feels. But when he is reborn in Spirit through love, his egoism passes away. He becomes poor in spirit and realises God in all things and all things in God. He stands not in the wisdom of men but in that of his loving God. He goeth and selleth all he hath and buyeth joy and peace which passeth all reasoning.

"तद्विज्ञानेन परिपश्यन्ति धीरा आनन्दरूपममृतं
यद्विभाति ।"—मुण्डक २।२।७

Plato teaches that when the soul in herself beholds things in themselves 'she is drawn of herself to what is pure, and eternal, and immortal, and being of the same nature cleaves thereunto.'† But the Hindu Scriptures and the New Testament go a step further. The Upanishads not only enjoin that the released attain unity in nature (साम्य) with Brahman but further proclaim that 'theirs is eternal peace and 'tis not for others.'‡ The Geeta alludes to the attainment of union in respect

* "भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० ४।४।२१

† Phaedo, 37.

‡ कठ० २।२।१३

of godly nature (साधर्म्य) and promises supreme peace to devotees.* St. Paul speaks of union of true Chirstians with God as *one spirit* and of consequent attainment of peace passing all understanding. The Brahma-sutras have but the same teaching to offer in a more philosophical way. We read in the Brahma-sutras that the released attain union in respect of attributes and intelligence but not in respect of all-powerfulness and that they abide in God for ever in enjoyment of perfect bliss. Be it noted that Deussen's statement regarding the *moksha* of the Vedanta that "it is not the falling of the drop into the infinite ocean, it is the whole ocean, becoming free from the fetters of voice," is only true of Sankara's view.† Anything like it is foreign to Badarayana.

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* गीता १८।३२

† Vide Deussen's "Philosophy of the Vedanta"—an address delivered at Bombay, 1893.

CHAPTER VII.

Conclusions.

All the philosophical systems of the world have pre-suppositions of their own, and this is equally true of the system of Sankara, founded, as it is, on the revealed texts of the Upanishads. The philosophical system of Sankara starts with the presupposition that the revealed texts of the Upanishads are the only proof with regard to Brahman who passeth all understanding and reasoning and that they testify to the existence of one all-pervading consciousness above all relations. In other words, one all-pervading indivisible consciousness is the only truth or *paramartha* according to Sankara. This all-pervading intelligence which is Brahman of Sankara is one without a second. But there exists a phenomenal universe of variety consisting of sentient and nonsentient beings which requries explanation. How can its existence be explained? Hence arises the necessity of the doctrine of *maya* or *avidya* for Sankara. But what is *maya* or *avidya* according to Sankara? It is in his opinion something unspeakable which can be characterized neither as *tatva* nor other than *tatva* but still in some way or other it constitutes the seed of this phenomenal universe of names and forms.* This *maya* not only evolves a variety of names and forms but

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* "सर्व्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्यात्मभूत इवाविद्याकल्पिते नामरूपे तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्याम-निर्वचनीये संसारप्रपञ्चबीजभूते सर्व्वज्ञस्येश्वरस्य मायाशक्तिः प्रकृतिरिति च श्रुति-स्मृत्योरभिलप्येते ।"—Sankara's bhashya to sutra II. 1. 14

conceals the eternal Brahman and makes Him appear as so many knowers and enjoyers. It is important to note that Sankara views *maya* as the self, as it were, of the omniscient Isvara but not of the Highest Brahman. He nowhere tells us in what relation, if at all in any, it stands to the Highest Brahman. The Highest Brahman is all-intelligence and there cannot be anything but intelligence in Him.* But it is the function of māyā to give rise to this false universe of names and forms and to limit the Highest Self, without touching in any way His own essence. In short, creation of error in the shape of multiplicity is the precise duty of *maya* as enunciated by Sankara.† But Brahman of Sankara is all-intelligence and so according to his own showing there cannot be any tinge of *maya* in Him. Sankara evidently is in difficulty with regard to his conception of *maya*. He knows not where to place it in his scheme of existence. He cannot take it as something real. For that would go to make the universe of names and forms real as well. Nor can he take it as something unreal. If it is something unreal, then it cannot possibly limit the Highest Lord. One of his devoted disciples—Vidyaranya Svamin has of course come to his rescue but to no

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* "नास्यात्मनोऽन्तर्बहिर्वा चैतन्यादन्यद्रूपमस्ति चैतन्यमेव तु निरन्तरमस्य स्वरूपम्॥"

Sankara's bhashya to sutra III. 2. 26

† "अविद्या-प्रत्युपस्थापितनामरूपकृतकार्यकारणसङ्घातोपाध्यविवेककृता हि भ्रान्तिः।—

Sankara's bhashya to sutra II. 1. 22

purpose. Vidyaranya suggests that *maya* is really the *sakti* or power of Brahman as the power of burning is that of fire. It has no existence apart from Brahman; its reality can be inferred only from the effects it produces. As it exists only through Brahman, it is not real by itself. Nor can it be conceived as unreal for it is the *sakti* or power of Brahman.* Some scholars have lately adopted this view of *maya*.† We would welcome such a view if we could. This would certainly take away some of the serious differences between him and his opponents. But Sankara in his commentary has nowhere viewed *maya* as the *sakti* of Brahman. On the other hand, he is more inclined to regard māyā not as something real abiding in Brahman, but as "a mere illusion similar to a *mriga-trishnika*" as Deussen and Thibaut rightly point out. It is rather a sort of incomprehensible magical power which enables Brahman to produce these illusory appearances of animate and in-animate beings.‡ As a rope is mistaken for a snake apparently only and when the delusion ceases, the snake vanishes, such is also the case with this universe projected by *maya* or ignorance. One who becomes God no longer experiences this

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* Vide Panchadasi, Chapter II, slokas 47—53.

† Vide Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Vedantism* pp. 28-29, and Dr. P. N. Sen, *Philosophy of Vedanta*, p. 142.

‡ Vide Sankara's Bhasya to sutras I. 1. 17, I. 3. 19, and II. 1. 22.

delusion.* Sankara in his commentary to sutra III. 2. 11, while discussing the question of the two forms of Brahman states in plain words that one and the same reality by its very nature cannot be with varieties and without them. As a piece of transparent glass assumes redness owing to the juxtaposition of lac though in reality it has none—its redness being a pure delusion, so Brahman—the highest principle of pure intelligence assumes characteristics other than His own in conjunction with the *upadhis* though in reality He has none,—His assumption of the *upadhis* being a pure delusion. The Acharya concludes that Brahman is to be viewed without *viseshas* or varieties under all circumstances.† So how can then *maya* be regarded as a real *sakti* of Brahman in view of Sankara's direct teachings to the contrary? Ramanuja pertinently observes that this supposed *maya* can have no abode to reside in under Sankara's philosophical scheme. It cannot abide in Brahman, for Brahman according to Sankara, is self-luminous intelligence and so He cannot on his own supposition be the seat of *maya* or *avidya*. Neither can it have a seat in the *jiva*, for the selfhood

* Vide Swami Vivekanand's address on "The Vedanta Philosophy" in America, March 25th., 1896.

† "नह्युपाधियोगादप्यन्यादृशस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यादृशः स्वभावः संभवति। न हि स्वच्छः सन्स्फटिकोऽलक्तकाद्युपाधियोगादस्वच्छो भवति भ्रममात्रत्वादस्वच्छताभिनिवेशस्य। उपाधीनां चाविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितत्वात्। अतश्चान्यतरलिङ्गपरिग्रहेऽपि समस्तविशेषरहितं निर्व्विकल्पमेव ब्रह्म प्रतिपत्तव्यं न तद्विपरीतम्॥"—

शाङ्करभाष्य ३।२।११

of the *jiva* is its own product and so it cannot possibly support that which is the cause of its very existence. Thus the position of *maya* in Sankara's philosophical system seems to be anomalous. But the Vaishnava teachers and the Saiva teacher—Sreekantha view *maya* as something real and identify it with the inanimate *prakriti* of Brahman having the qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.* When the *jivas* stand enveloped by the qualities of *prakriti* they are in bondage and when perchance through *bhakti* or loving devotion these fetters are removed they attain unity in nature with Brahman and enjoy His bliss for ever. The *Vaishnavacharyas* particularly Ramanuja have shown that Sankara's doctrine of *maya* cannot be supported on the basis of the *Sastras*, whereas their own has the fullest support of the Scriptures.† Now to follow up. As Brahman is without *viseshas* or varieties, Sankara has been compelled to deny all reality to the *jivas*, though some teachers of his own school, according to his own statement, have done so.‡ We have stated above that he has conceived the *jiva* either as Brahman limited by the qualities of the *buddhi* or simply as a reflection of Brahman. In whatever way

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* "न मिथ्याभूत: कश्चित् विराजते। 'मम माया दुरत्यया' इत्यवापि गुणमयी वचनात् सैव त्रिगुणात्मिका प्रकृतिरुच्यते, इति न श्रुतिभि: सदसदनिर्वचनीयाज्ञान-प्रतिपादनम्।"—इति श्रीभाष्ये १।१।१

† Vide Ramanuja's masterly criticism of Sankara's doctrine of *maya* in his bhashya to Brahma-sutras I. 1. 1

‡ "अपरे तु वादिन: पारमार्थिकमेव जैवं रूपमिति मन्यन्तेऽस्मदीयाश्च केचित्।"—
Sankara's bhashya to sutra 1. 3. 19.

we may conceive of the *jiva*, the *advaitists* have no place for the individual soul. As Brahman according to them is without all *viseshas* there cannot be place for the *acharyas*, sages, *rishis*, or revealed Scriptures either in their philosophical scheme. Sankara has pointed out in some places of his bhashya that the revealed texts of the Upanishads are the only proof with regard to Brahman, but in other places he has maintained that the knowledge derived from the Sastras is false as well. If so, how are we to gain knowledge regarding Brahman who is without all *viseshas* according to Sankara ? This position of Sankara, we must say, is suicidal. As the *jiva* is Brahman Himself under the veil of the *upadhis* there can not be any necessity for *upasana* or worship. For *upasana* implies an object of worship which is wanting in Sankara's scheme from the standpoint of *paramartha*. Sankara has noted in different places of his *bhashya* that all forms of *upasana* enumerated in the Sutras stand connected with the *saguna vidya* and not with the *nirguna vidya*. He goes the length of stating that a devotee meditating on the Highest Brahman through the syllable *Om* reaches the abode of the *hiranyagarbha* or lower Brahman only and not that of the highest Brahman and gradually on the attainment of true knowledge he reaches the Most High.* But the Upanishads and the Geeta

* "त्रिमात्रेणोंकारेणालम्बनेन परमात्मानमभिध्यायतः फलं ब्रह्मलोकप्राप्तिः क्रमेण च सम्यग्दर्शनोत्पत्तिरिति।"—Sankara's commentary to sutra I. 3. 13.

teach otherwise. They enjoin in unmistakable words that through unswerving devotion one can reach the Most High.* They further proclaim that that one meditating on Brahman through the syllable *Om* reaches the highest path.† But if one can not reach the Highest through whole-hearted devotion, how can he at all reach Him ? In his opinion the *vidvan* whose soul has been enlightened by the texts such as 'That art thou' and the like inculcating that there is no difference between his individual self and the Highest Self does not pass out of the body but obtains at the moment of death immediate final release and putting away all fetters of *maya* asserts itself in its true nature, which is nothing else but the absolute Highest Brahman. But all the revealed Scriptures of the Hindus especially the *Puranas* and *Tantras* refer to the *siddha-mantras* and they further teach that any one having a *siddha-mantra* from a *guru* having vision of the eternal truths can attain to the Highest. But such *mantras* according to Sankara's showing can not yield the Highest. If so, what necessity can there be for resorting to a path which does not enable us to get the Highest Lord ? If there is such a royal road to *moksha* as indicated by Sankara, none ought to follow a circuitous path. If the knowledge of the texts of the Upanishads pointing to oneness is the only path

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* Vide कठ ० १।२।१, मुण्डक ० ३।१।८, गीता ८।२२, १८।५५ and other places.

† गीता ८।१३.

to final release, then the *Sastras* must have taught the rule of the *siddha-mantras* to no purpose. But alas ! Indians have never swerved from the path of the *rishis* in spite of the teachings of Sankara to the contrary. We have noted above that the state of final release proclaimed by Sankara is one of pure intelligence without specific cognition. In other words, it is something similar to that of dreamless sleep. We hanker after eternal bliss and you point to a state akin to that of sound sleep. We want bread and you give us stone instead. Is it the *summun bonum* that has been promised to unswerving devotees by all the great teachers of the world ? Is it the state of *bhuma sukha* or supreme bliss proclaimed in the Upanishads and other Hindu scriptures ? We think it is not. To say the least such teachings are not in keeping with our best traditions and highest aspirations. Time will deal out to them the fate they deserve.

The Vaishnava schools, generally speaking, and the Saiva school of Sreekantha teach that the essential differences existing between matter, soul, and God are intrinsic and natural. God, who is the same as the Supreme Brahman, is the cause of the universe, and the universe made up of matter and soul being the manifestation of His body or *sakti* from its causal state is the effect produced by him. Matter and soul form the body of God according to Ramanuja and Sreekantha, and they are His *saktis* according to Nimvarka, Baladeva, Sreenivasa, and others. By the words body and *sakti* they mean much the same thing. Ramanuja

in his bhashya to sutra II. 3. 47, says that the relation of the universe to Brahman is like that of a ray of light to a luminant, that of *sakti* or power to a source of power or that of a body to its soul. Parasara and other rishis also view the relation in a similar way.* Thus Ramanuja regards the relation of the universe of sentient and non-sentient beings to God as analogous to that of a *sakti* to its source though he frequently uses the analogy of body and soul to express that relation.

The relation of *sakti* or power to its source is one of unity-in-difference. There is difference between a ray of light and its luminant. But there is non-difference as well. A ray of light is but a mode of the luminant —is but the luminant in some shape.† The Upanishad regards the universe of the living and non-living as the foot of Brahman.‡ Sankara, as noted above, admits that the word foot in the text means *amsa*. As the universe of the living and non-living can constitute the *amsa* of Brahman in the only way of that of a ray of light to its source, this *bhedabheda* relation has practically been recognised in the Upanishad. The

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* एवं प्रभा-प्रभावद्रूपेण शक्ति-शक्तिमद्रूपेण शरीरात्मभावेन च अंशांशिभावं जगद्ब्रह्मणोः पराशरादयः स्मरन्ति—

"एकदेशस्थितस्याग्नेर्ज्योत्स्ना विस्तारिणी यथा ।
परस्य ब्रह्मणः शक्तिस्तथेदमखिलं जगत् ॥"—Vide Sribhashya to sutra II. 3. 47

† "अतो यथा तेजस्त्वेन प्रभातदाश्रयोरपि तादात्म्यम्; एवमचित्प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मणो रूपत्वमिति ।"—श्रीभाष्य १।२।२७

‡ "पादोऽस्य सर्व्वा भूतानि त्रिपादस्यामृतं दिवि ।"—छा० ३।१२।६

Geeta views both the material universe and the jiva as *prakriti* of Brahman.* The material Universe is viewed as the *apara* (changeable) and the jiva as the *para* (unchangeable) *prakriti* of the Highest Lord. The Geeta uses the words *kshara* and *akshara* for the material universe and the *jiva* respectively in a different Discourse. †

Earth, water, fire, air, ether, *manas*, *buddhi*, and *ahankara* are simply the eightfold division of His changeable *prakriti* and the jiva is the eternal *amsa* of Brahman. It has been distinctly pointed out in the Geeta that the Highest Lord is superior to both the *kshara* and the *akshara*.‡ As according to the Geeta the material Universe and the jiva are *prakriti* of God and as He is viewed as superior to both of them as well, the relation of the material universe and the jiva to God has undoubtedly been conceived as one of *bhedābheda* in the Geeta too. The Vedanta-sutras regard Brahman not only as the operative cause of the material universe but as its *prakriti* or matter as well. § We have shown above that the *jiva* has been regarded as eternal *amsa* of Brahman in the Sutras. Badarayana states in unequivocal terms that the relation of the universe to Brahman is comparable to

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* "अपरेयमितस्त्वन्यां प्रकृतिं विद्धि मे पराम् ।"
जीवभूतां महाबाहो ययेदं धार्य्यते जगत् ॥"— गीता ७।५

† गीता १५।१६

‡ "यस्मात् क्षरमतीतोऽहमक्षरादपि चोत्तमः ।
अतोऽस्मि लोके वेदे च प्रथितः पुरुषोत्तमः ॥"—गीता १५।१८

§ "प्रकृतिश्च प्रतिज्ञादृष्टान्तानुपरोधात् ॥"—ब्रह्मसू० १।४।२३

that of the rays of light to the sun.* In illustrating the relation of the jiva to Brahman he has but resorted to the same example. † Thus in his opinion too the relation of the universe of the living and non-living to that of Brahman is one of *bhedábheda*. Sankara in his commentary to the Brihad-āranyaka Upanishad V-i, has combated the *advaita-dvaita* theory as promulgated by Bhartri-prapancha. Sankara argues that two contradictory attributes *dvaita* and advaita,—dual and single can not be true of the same object. The union of contradictories may take place in phenomenal objects such as the sea and its waves which are identical-in-difference but not in noumenon—the "simple" eternal object. We point out in reply that those who advocate the union of advaita-dvaita in noumenon never view it as one of contradictories. In their opinion when the jiva attains the Divine nature of Brahman then only this union takes place. Hence under the *advaita-dvaita* theory as upheld by the Vaishnavas there is really no union of contradictories but only that of the objects of similar nature. To use the language of Plato the *jivas* 'being of the same nature cleave thereunto.'

We have noted in a previous chapter that according to the Brahma-sutras as interpreted by the Vaishnava teachers and the Saiva teacher—Sreekantha the jiva is an immutable knower of very minute size. This theory is technically known as the *anu-vada*. This doctrine

* "प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ।"—ब्रह्मसू० ३।२।२८

† "प्रकाशादिवन्नैवं परः ।"—ब्रह्मसू० २।३।४६

reminds us of the theory of the monads of European philosophy. The word monad in its modern signification was made current by Giordano Bruno, who used it, in conscious opposition to the atoms of Democritus, to denote the individual elementary substances in which the divine essence of the universe manifests itself. Next, Leibnitz in antithesis to the philosophy of Spinoza, formulates his theory of the plurality of monads which constitutes the element of all reality, the fundamental being of the whole physical and spiritual universe. The monads, in his conception, are not material or extended like the atoms of the physicists and the mechanical philosophers, but they are 'metaphysical points,' or 'immaterial centres of force.' But as Leibnitz views his monads as qualitatively different, it is difficult to see how interaction between different monads can at all take place. In order to cure this defect Lotze, who has his roots in the Monadology, conceives the monads or spiritual substances not as absolute or unrelated reals, but as organic members of one world, moments in the life of one Being who conditions them all and makes reciprocal interaction possible. Ladd follows Lotze. Lodge suggests as a working hypothesis that life or soul "may be a real and basal form of existence, and therefore persistent."* The Vedanta by teaching that it is an eternal knower of very minute size virtually regards it as a real and basal form of existence. If "life is itself a

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* "Lodge, Life and Matter, p. 104.

guiding principle, a controlling agency" as has been maintained by the scientists of repute, then we think that the Vedantic conception of life is the best that has been advanced up to date. It is applicable not only to human life, but to all life—to that of all animals, and even of plants; and in our opinion it is the only theory that enables the thinkers to fit the known facts of ordinary vitality into a thinkable scheme.

In the west, generally speaking, philosophy is speculation, thinking consideration of things. The moral nature of the philosopher in no way affects his speculation. Good mental endowment and learning are deemed quite sufficient for his purpose.* Some western thinkers and some Indians too have regarded the philosophical system of the Vedanta in a similar light. But nothing can be far from the truth. We have pointed out in Chapter I., that the Vedanta is both a philosophy and a religion at the same time. It is not a philosophy which merely argues, but it is a practical philosophy. Western scholars are gradually realising that religion is a practical activity and that we ought to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs.† The Brahma-sutras contain all that is necessary for the practical realisation of Brahman in life. In this

* Vide Woodroffe, *Shakti and Shakta*, pp. 5-7.

† Cf.: "On such a subject it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but if the investigations of our previous chapters have not led us astray, we shall be compelled to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs."—Russell, Problems of philosophy, p.242.

connexion the readers are particularly referred to Adhyaya IV, Pāda I, of the Sutras.

The Katha Upanishad teaches that "he whom the Spirit chooseth, getteth the Spirit and to him God discovereth His body."* The Geeta enjoins that "by bhakti or loving devotion he knoweth Me in essence, who and what I am."† The Sutras but take up the same strain and declare that Brahman can be known by '*aradhana*' or devotion.‡ They further tell us what the devotees experience when they see God. When the devotees see God, their fetters are removed, all sorrows are split, all doubts vanish, and all works become nothing. They enter into Brahman just like streams into the ocean ; they leave behind them *nama* and *rupa*,— their *ahankara* (egoism), but not their own self or individuality. They are joined unto the Highest Lord as one spirit and abide in Him for ever enjoying His bliss which passeth all comprehension. And so the Vedanta in its unfalsified form is the greatest consolation in the suffering of life and death, is the strongest support of the seekers after truth, and is the highest path that has ever been revealed unto humanity. It is not for India alone, in the language of Swamin Vivekananda, it is for the whole world. In the whole world there is hardly any study so beneficial and ennobling as that of the Vedanta. Nay, it is destined sooner or later to become the faith of the whole world.

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* कठ० १।२।३ † गीता १८।५५ ‡ ब्रह्मसू० ३।२।२४